While plans were being made for the Normandy landings, the Allied strategy in Europe included an attack on Italy, which Winston Churchill called "the soft underbelly of Europe."
Following the North African campaign, the Allies landed in Sicily on July 10, 1943, in an operation codenamed "Husky." As they advanced toward northern Italy, the British and Americans increasingly disagreed about the strategies to be adopted in the European theater, particularly in Italy. The armies were advancing toward the Apennines and the German defenses of the Gothic Line, which German General Albert Kesselring renamed the Green Line in June 1944.

Churchill hoped to bypass or break through the Green Line and race across the Po Valley to reach Vienna and the Balkans via Trieste and the Ljubljana Pass. Churchill hoped to bypass or break through the German defenses of the Gothic Line and race across the Po Valley to reach Vienna and the Balkans via Trieste and the Ljubljana Pass in order to prevent the Russians from expanding their “influence” in the Balkans.

Disagreements arose when, against Churchill's wishes and at the strong insistence of Roosevelt, Operation Anvil-Dragon was decided upon. This operation involved the landing of Allied forces in southern France on August 15, 1944.

This landing served only to divert divisions from the Italian front, weakening the Allied attack and allowing the Germans to stop it. This left the Russian armies free to penetrate the Balkans.

The Americans felt pressured by Stalin to open new fronts even though they knew the fighting in Italy was distracting German divisions from other fronts. However, the Americans weren't interested in the Italian front, believing that all forces should focus on invading France.

Normandy offered the shortest route for the Allied armies to occupy Germany's industrial areas, so the southern France landing was seen as a diversion to draw German divisions away from the northern French front. Ultimately, the landing in southern France served almost no purpose. If the divisions engaged there had remained in Italy and been used for a landing behind German lines—for example, along the Adriatic coast toward Cervia—the outcome of the Battle of the Gothic Line certainly would have been different. The war in Italy certainly would have been shorter, and the basis for the subsequent Cold War certainly would have been different.