The 232nd German Infantry Division was activated on June 26, 1944, in the Wildflecken maneuver area and transferred to Italy in August of the same year. From November 5, 1944, under the command of the LI Gebirgs Korps of the 14th Army, it fought from January 1 to April 30, 1945, in the Apennines, retreating to the Po Valley.
It was composed of elderly and convalescent men from the Soviet front. It was a static division and was classified exclusively for second-line services. Most of the staff and soldiers came from the so-called "ghost" division of Wildflecken. It was commanded by Lieutenant General Eccard Freiherr von Gablenz from its formation until its surrender to US Army officers in May 1945 in the area between Milan and Brescia. During the same period, the operations officers were Colonel Heinz Herre (July 10, 1944 - October 25, 1944) and Major Friedrich Wilhelm Kohlmeier (October 25, 1944 - 1945).

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The positions of the 232nd Infantry Division west of the front, from mid-December 1944 to February 24, 1945, were as follows:

232nd Rifle Battalion
The battalion, together with a battalion from the Italian San Marco Division temporarily part of the 4th Hochgebirgsjäger Battalion  in the Abetone Pass sector, was positioned from the Radici Pass to Cima Tauffi.

1045th Grenadier Regiment
The regiment was positioned from Pietracolora to the southwest of the village of Vergato, i.e., at the division and army border.

1044th Grenadier Regiment
The regiment is positioned from Cima Tauffi towards Monte Spigolino, Monte Belvedere, up to Monte della Torraccia (inclusive). Specifically: the 2nd Battalion from Cima Tauffi to Rocca Corneta (inclusive) and the 1st Battalion from Rocca Corneta (exclusive) to Monte della Torraccia (inclusive).

The 1st Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment
The battalion is positioned in reserve and employed in the construction of positions near the village of Roffeno.

The 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment
The battalion, subordinate to the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, is positioned from Monte della Torraccia to the village of Pietracolora.

The assault on the Monti della Riva
With this deployment on the field, immediately before the planned redeployment to allow the entire 114th Jäger Division to be inserted on the right of the 232nd Infantry Division, heavy enemy attacks began, which, at first, were directed solely against the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, which, in December 1944, had already repelled attacks by the Americans and Brazilians.
The name "Operation Encore" only against the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, which, in December 1944, had already repelled attacks by the Americans and Brazilians. The name "Operation Encore" was most likely chosen following the failure of the Brazilian and American attacks in November and December 1944.

On the night between February 18 and 19, 1945, the enemy, starting from the Vidiciatico area, launched a surprise attack that was initially directed only against the "Riva Ridge" ridge, a chain of Mountains north of Monte Spigolino and Monte Mancinello (4,7640 ft) that includes Monte Riva, Monte Serrasiccia (4,577 ft), Monte Cappel Buso (3,776 ft) and Pizzo di Campiano (3,156 ft) south of the village of Rocca Corneta.
The enemy needed the ridge, particularly Pizzo di Campiano, to protect its left flank in the main attack on Monte Belvedere. On February 18 and 19, 1945, the German 232nd Infantry Division was preparing to rotate various units, including the 1044th Grenadier Regiment.

Meanwhile, on the enemy side, on Friday, February 16, 1945, the commander of the US 10th Mountain Division, Major General P. Hayes, who had already fought in France during the First World War, gave a rousing speech to Company C of the 85th Regiment, emphasizing the importance of the attack on Monte Belvedere. "Mt. Belvedere is the strongest point of the German defense line in northern Italy." The condition for the conquest of this difficult objective on the night of February 19 was the capture, on the night of February 18, of the key position Serrasiccia - Campiano ("The Serrasiccia -Campiano ridge is the key to the taking of Belvedere ..."), because from Pizzo di Campiano the Germans were able to observe the southern slope of Monte Belvedere and the Americans' attack routes. For this reason, the ridge had to be conquered on the night of February 18, even before the attack on Monte Belvedere could be carried out. The American army set the start of the attack on Monte Belvedere for the night between February 19 and 20, 1945, with the following orders:
- The 86th Regiment must capture the ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte Gorgolesco and from there attack, in a north-easterly direction, towards Monte Torraccia.
- The 85th Regiment, led by Company C, was to advance towards the summit of Monte Belvedere and, after its conquest, send a battalion north-east.
- The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 87th Regiment must attack across the western slope of Monte Belvedere.

General Hayes explains that the terrain has been heavily mined and that there are numerous bunkers and machine gun nests. He then mentions that the assault must be carried out regardless of casualties, even resorting to bayonet fighting, and that the enemy positions must be taken at all costs.
"You must continue to move forward. Never stop. If your buddy is wounded, don't stop to help him. Continue to move forward, always forward. Don't get pinned down. Never stop. When the assault comes, you must get into the enemy's position as quickly as possible. You must move fast. Don't give the enemy time to recover. Shoot him, bayonet him, and brain him with your rifle. You must take his position."
The Germans must have their skulls smashed! But to the victors, said General Hayes, goes the spoils: "Take trophies and souvenirs: cameras, rifles, pistols, and watches, and send them home. One day you can show them to your grandchildren
("To the victors go the spoils, take trophies and souvenirs: cameras, guns, pistols, and watches. Ship them home. One day you can show them to your grandchildren").
The general concluded by wishing the soldiers "Good luck!" This speech was also reported by a correspondent who noted: "The General would make a hell of a football coach."

On Sunday, February 18, General Hayes also spoke to the officers and men of the other battalions before they went to the departure areas for the attack.
For the surprise attack on Monte Cappel Buso during the night between Sunday, February 18, and Monday, February 19, 1945, the companies of the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment entered their four respective departure areas. They were transported by truck from the villages of Torlaino and Farnè to the hill that runs from southwest to northeast along the Dardagna River.
The destinations of the individual companies (seen from the southwest) were Monte Mancinello (Company D), Monte Serrasiccia (Company C), Monte Cappel Buso (Company B), and Pizzo di Campiano (Company A), the latter peak dominating Rocca Corneta and the pass leading from Querciola to Fanano. Company F had to reach Cinghio del Bure and contribute to the complete occupation of the ridge, which was guarded by only two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment with a section of the MG Company. Another company (the 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment) was in reserve.

The difference in altitude that the attackers had to overcome was about 1,640 ft. At the start of the attack, smoking, lighting lights, or talking loudly was not allowed. The attackers' faces are blackened with soot. The ridge must be reached, if possible, by midnight, and then the positions must be attacked from the flanks after heavy fire from the 605th Field Artillery Battalion. The artillery is directed at the targets by air observers. The battalion command was set up in Le Frescare. The starting points for the climb to the ridge are Farnè, Torlaino, Madonna dell'Acero, and others.

Despite poor visibility at night, the Germans put up fierce resistance from their various positions and even launched counterattacks, twice on Pizzo di Campiano alone. Here, 13 men were killed and 11 taken prisoner. Seven men were killed on Monte Serrasiccia. Patrols from both sides clashed at various positions, but their numbers varied greatly. Individual German units also retreated to the edges of the northern slopes of the ridge to avoid the shells of the incessant American artillery bombardment. Then, the Americans also found themselves under well-aimed fire from German artillery.
At dawn on February 19, soldiers of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment still held some positions, behind snowdrifts, on the northern edge of the ridge. Due to heavy American artillery fire, telephone connections to and between the mountain bases were interrupted and remained so until dawn. At first, the commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment personally explored the positions before informing the regiment commander, unfortunately too late, and taking countermeasures . Only then did the first reinforcements arrive from the rear, because American artillery fire deep into the rear was now a foregone conclusion.

Very early, at dawn on February 19, 1945, and even before the commander of the 2nd Battalion had reported on the enemy attack, the adjutant and communications officer of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment command post were on their way to Castel d'Aiano by Krad to begin moving the entire regiment to the left and replacing the 1045th Grenadier Regiment. A regiment of the 114th Jäger Division was to replace the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, and the Jäger Division was to take over the entire right sector previously held by the 232nd Infantry Division. Lieutenant General von Gablenz then intends to use the forces thus made available to launch a counterattack, starting from the Castel d'Aiano area and moving south, similar to that of December 1944 in the Serchio valley.

Due to the snow that had melted during the day, the roads on the southern slopes were dirty and the crossroads south of Montese was full, as often happened, of new large craters that stood out against the light background of the snow. All the officers of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment are gathered in Castel d'Aiano for a conference on the ongoing redeployment of troops and are unaware, until the end of the meeting, of what happened the previous night on Monte Cappel Buso, or rather "Riva Ridge."
The return to the front lines takes place via Villa d'Aiano, completely destroyed and bombed by US artillery and Jabos4, continuing towards Rosola and along the road along the Panaro River, sometimes passing through tunnels, to the wooden bridge built by engineers to cross the river. Here, due to bad weather, entire slopes of land have slipped downhill and formed barriers. On the bridge over the Panaro River, we are met by the regiment commander, Colonel Winkelmann, in an off-road vehicle ("Tatra"), who says: "There's some mess going on in the high Mountains." The aide, with a second car, immediately goes to the regiment's command post, and the communications officer, together with radio operators and a lot of telephone cable, follows the commander via Fanano towards the front. "The Americans are on the heights; the US 10th Mountain Division is attacking." The second car, arriving from Ranocchio, is quickly loaded with telephone cables and begins its journey, standing on the open truck because the sky is once again full of Jabos, hurrying via Fanano to Due Ponti, the starting point for the counterattack.
There, above the village, Alpine troops from the "Hoch Vier" Battalion arrived by truck from Pievepelago via Fanano and placed mortars along the road. Lots of weapons, young soldiers, Alpine troops with their backpacks. This was to be the starting point for one of the organized counterattacks, the one on Monte Serrasiccia (1380 m), while at the same time building telephone lines.

Meanwhile, the regiment commander went to the nearby village of Corona where, in the area of contact between the 1st and 2nd Battalions, Colonel Simon's 7th Company was positioned in reserve. Winkelmann wanted to personally lead a team to attack Pizzo di Campiano. All the men of the communications section of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, who had been deployed on the front line, the radio telegraph and repair section, were involved in the infantry fighting and most of them were killed. New telephone lines and direct links with the 1st Battalion were needed for the counterattacks.

The regiment's radio operators (Sergeant Kamm and with him the young radio operators Eritt and Marquardt, originally from East Prussia) are already building a section of telephone line starting from C. Pentiz because, following the counterattack by the reinforced Eichwalder Company of the 4th Alpine Battalion, a completely new telephone line will be built for Monte Serrasiccia, from an altitude of 1,640 to 4,527 ft. All this with about a meter of snow on the northern slopes.
Without the hard-working mules, it would be impossible to constantly supply the team of men working on the heavy cable. However, given the general American attack on Monte Belvedere, which began during the night, the team that was building the telephone lines had to return from the Mountain at dawn because there was a shortage of radio operators at Monte Belvedere and, even earlier, at Corona. Throughout the night, the radio operator remained with Captain Maas of the 232nd Rifle Battalion, who took responsibility for the Fanano sector and led the counterattack of the 232nd Rifle Battalion and the 4th Alpine Battalion. At the same time, connections must be established with the other units participating in the attack, with the 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment on the left and with the 4th Alpine Battalion on the right.

Of the 80 men of the 7th Company of the Grenadier Regiment who carried out the counterattack, 35 were killed or wounded and three were taken prisoner. Of the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 232nd Rifle Battalion, 29 men were taken prisoner. The atmosphere is very tense, and only after long intervals does the Eichwalder Company of the 4th Alpine Battalion make contact. Due to the particularly difficult climb and the need to resupply the telephone cable, two more donkeys are required. On the left, shortly before reaching the top of the Mountain, Captain Knoblauch, who was leading the assault team, falls. During the night, the radio operator continuously reports the situation to the commander, who has meanwhile returned to the regiment's command post. After the main telephone line to Monte Belvedere is interrupted due to ongoing fighting, a new direct connection to Monte Belvedere must be established by the advanced telephone exchange.
Towards morning, the radio operator received orders to return because the front line in the 1st Battalion's sector had been broken over a stretch of about 9.3 miles. From midnight, the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, deployed near Monte Belvedere, was involved in heavy defensive fighting. Meanwhile, during the fighting, the situation of the 2nd Battalion 1044 requires a change in the position of the telephone line with Fanano. The head of the communications team, Marshal Pliger, has to build direct telephone connections following the main line of combat, which is in constant movement, despite the snow depth in the side valleys being about 5 ft. The 6th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment is also involved in the enemy attacks on Monte Belvedere. Despite everything, a direct telephone connection is established.

On a starry night, near Monte Serrasiccia, the Eichwalder Company, after crossing snow-filled gullies, was involved in violent fighting. The enemy riflemen were behind snowdrifts in which they had made slits, and sharpshooters with precision rifles fired at the Alpine Jäger as they slowly advanced through the snow-covered undergrowth. The American defensive positions, now under assault, were located on the edge of the Mountain ridge, mostly behind snow-covered bushes.
The German soldiers, in their counterattack, have the disadvantage of having to advance along slopes covered with deep, icy snow. In the dark, it is equally difficult to keep in contact with the men on the right and left, and there is also the danger of firing on their own men. But the Americans, who also use explosive bullets, are nevertheless repelled, outflanked, and attacked on the sides. In the positions in the snow, abandoned hastily at dawn, the attacking Jägers find ammunition, clothing, shovels, supplies, coffee, mess tins, petrol stoves, Chesterfield cigarettes, cinnamon-flavored chewing gum, and much more.
After sunrise, with clear visibility, the fighting subsided and the attackers settled down to defend themselves behind snowdrifts. Now, on both sides, the wounded required treatment. During the morning, however, the fighting reignited. MG bursts, mortars and, on the American side, the renewed use of explosive bullets causing wounds the size of a man's fist. Around noon, American artillery observers flew over the positions at low altitude, followed by heavy shelling. Then, on Monte Serrasiccia, American attacks began again, followed by German counterattacks. Although the previous positions on the summit could no longer be recaptured, it was nevertheless possible to establish a new HKL [ Hauptkampflinie – literally main combat line] on the upper half of the slope. Here the fighting continued for several days, but the enemy failed to break through.
The German counterattacks at Pizzo di Campiano were carried out by the 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment and the 232nd Rifle Battalion. "The Germans renewed their attacks and continued to hammer the thin line of defense of the strategic height all night." Due to the respective artillery, losses on both sides were high. On the morning of February 20, 26 grenadiers and riflemen fell at Pizzo di Campiano alone, and another seven were taken prisoner. After February 21, the enemy had to advance and call in new reinforcements.

According to Lieutenant General Gablenz himself, some time later, it is true that the counterattacks by the 232nd Infantry Division in the sector of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment along the entire ridge (Riva Ridge) until February 24 were carried out hastily but, despite everything, considering the very difficult and snow-covered Mountain, the enemy failed to break through. The 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment had paid a very high price in blood on the Mountain ridge, both in the surprise night attack by the Americans and in the subsequent counterattack; however, it had managed to inflict unexpected losses on the Americans. To shorten the front and improve the position of the 232nd Division, Von Gablenz decided to withdraw from Cima Tauffi, across Monte Lancio, to reposition himself along the northern slope of Monte Cappel Buso. This position regained contact with the old HKL to the east at Polla.

After the replacement of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment on February 24, the hill was entrusted to the 114th Jäger Division, to which the 232nd Rifle Battalion was assigned. This battalion, in turn, led the counterattack on Pizzo di Campiano and was also temporarily assigned the 4th Alpine Battalion. The latter part of February saw 25 dead, 36 wounded, and 23 missing. According to reports dated March 1, 1945, however, it was still a strong fighting unit with 19 officers, 166 non-commissioned officers, and 834 men, as well as 188 volunteers and 1 officer in the mule and ammunition transport columns; a total of 1,237 men, 51 mules, 4 2 cm anti-aircraft guns, 4 36 Mountain guns, 42 machine guns, and 16 medium-caliber mortars. The unit's morale and willingness to fight were rated as very good, and its combat value as level 2.

While German counterattacks took place during the night of February 19-20, 1945, the enemy also launched a night attack on Monte Belvedere. The night was starry and freezing, and the snow crunched underfoot with every step. At 11:00 p.m. on February 19, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 85th Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division crossed the starting line, the 1st Battalion on the right and the 3rd on the left, in order to reach the ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte Gorgolesco. The difference in altitude still to be overcome is only 490 ft, and the attack can only be carried out from the east flank, towards the high peak of Monte Belvedere at an altitude of 3,700 ft.
At the beginning of the attack, firing is prohibited. Even the artillery and aircraft must not yet enter the scene. However, it is not possible to take the Germans completely by surprise. Company B of the 1st Battalion of the 85th Regiment, engaged on the right advancing from the east, was already under fire between the towns of S. Filomena and La Valle at 00:40. At 1:00 a.m., the 3rd Battalion of the 85th American Regiment is still 885 ft from the top of Monte Belvedere when defensive fire from two machine guns and mortars begins, followed by artillery fire and, finally, small arms fire. Although there are only two groups of German grenadiers, a mortar group, an observation post, and a radio telegraph station on the top of the Mountain, they put up fierce resistance. The more the enemy advanced, the more intense the defenders' fire became. The two German machine gun positions were finally neutralized with hand grenades ("wiped out with hand grenades"). To this end, at 00:34, the enemy had brought forward an additional battalion.

Meanwhile, the telephone line to the top of Monte Belvedere, via the direct line to the bridge, is still fully operational, and the radio line is also still stable, despite the order to destroy key documents and switch to radio communication. Subsequently, the base at the top of the Mountain reports that it is completely surrounded by the enemy: "We continue to defend ourselves... there are six of us left..." The radio connection is interrupted along with the cable telephone connection. Attempts to contact the station are unilateral, from the command: "Hello station, hello station...!" The station at the top of the Mountain is lost.

While the 2nd Battalion of the 85th American Regiment occupies the southern slope of Monte Belvedere, the 1st Battalion is moved from Monte Belvedere, initially behind the 2nd Battalion of the 86th Regiment, to advance towards Monte Gorgolesco (3.690 ft) and the Cappella di Ronchidoso (3,428 ft), in the direction of Monte Torraccia (3550 ft) in order to break through the second line of defense of the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment with an attack on the flanks. After the 2nd Battalion of the 86th Regiment had already suffered losses in the minefields, at 03:00 the 1st Battalion of the 85th Regiment also came under mortar fire from Monte Gorgolesco. The enemy managed to occupy this last Mountain only at 06:30.

The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 87th American Regiment also encountered major problems when they faced the German HKL along Rocca Corneta - Polla - Corona between "Riva Ridge" and Monte Belvedere in the central area of the attack. The American battalions advanced from Querciola with the support of tanks, attacking Monte Belvedere from the west as well.

Until February 18, the 3rd Battalion had been in reserve for the US IV Corps. Both battalions, like all the others, launched their attack at 11:00 p.m. on February 19. Already the previous night, simultaneously with the operation against "Riva Ridge," the 2nd Battalion had occupied Casa Buio northwest of Querciola. At 2:10 a.m., both Company B and Company D, south of Polla near Fossa della Polla, came under fire from other German positions.
Now, however, the attackers were guided by partisans, four of whom were killed. Company C took Corona, defended by 39 German soldiers, and joined Company B to climb the western slope of Monte Belvedere. At 06:30, the 1st Battalion reached Valpiana under German mortar fire. Here too, the attack was halted. Weather conditions were good throughout the day, allowing for continuous Jabos attacks and heavy artillery bombardment.

Already on the morning of February 20, preparations for the counterattack began by the 232nd Infantry Division and the first unit of the 114th Jäger Division. Due to the enemy's air superiority, all maneuvers were virtually impossible during the day. Pavullo was heavily bombed for the second time, including the hospital. Near Sestola, where long columns of the 114th Jäger Division were stationed with little camouflage, the radio operator of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, while returning to Krad from the Fanano area, came under attack from Jabos.
The enemy's barrage was heavy. The soldiers threw themselves off the road, taking what little shelter they could find on a path. Among the columns of vehicles is the vehicle of General Strahmer, commander of the 114th Jäger Division, whose 741st Regiment is advancing towards the front to take over the positions of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment and, in part, of the 232nd Rifle Battalion.
The General takes cover with his vehicle and is only able to continue after two hours, the duration of the air raid and bombing. The enemy wants to destroy the German forces flowing towards the front line from the rear. They advance with difficulty, 300-400 meters at a time before the next Jabos arrive. In the Panaro valley, in the southern part of the front ( ), the last reserves of the 232nd Infantry Division advance, counterattacking towards Monte Belvedere together with the 114th Jäger Division. Infantry, scouts, and hunters advance from shelter to shelter, from tree to tree, from bush to bush because of the Jabos.

When the 1044th Regiment arrived at the combat positions, enemy fighter-bombers and heavy bombers were carrying out a new air attack on the town of Montese, assuming that the 1044th Regiment's command post was located there. Bomb after bomb, huge clouds of smoke rise into the sky, so much so that, despite the distance of 1.2 mls as the crow flies, the windows of the command post are broken. After reporting on the difficult situation in the 2nd and 1st Battalion sector, the commander returns to the front via Albarelli. All radio links were working: "there was great chaos in the airwaves."

On the morning of February 20, supported by fighter bombers, the enemy resumed its assault on a wide front. The battalions of the 85th American Regiment assaulted the eastern slope of Monte Belvedere, advancing from Monte Gorgolesco in a north-easterly direction towards Monte della Torraccia, then broke through the front line with flanking attacks against individual positions that were short of men.
Everywhere, these attacks were supported by fighter-bombers and artillery. In cases where resistance was stronger, the American infantry waited for heavy weapons and Jabos to be deployed. The weak positions on heights 1059, 1088, 1019, Capella di Ronchidoso, and others were all "slaughtered." However, the enemy only managed to reach height 1009, and only on the evening of February 21. Individual companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 86th American Regiment attack Ronchidoso di Sotto from the south and, subsequently, the second hamlet of Ronchidoso di Sopra (south of the Cappella), making contact for the first time at 8:00 p.m. with the Brazilians, who are completely isolated and inactive.

In the central area of the attack between "Riva Ridge" and Monte Belvedere, American tanks and tank destroyers, positioned in Vidiciatico ready to attack, marched towards Corona. The advance was halted at 11:00 a.m^. in Querciola because the road had been mined and engineers had not yet finished clearing it. During the night, four partisans, who were supposed to scout the terrain, ended up in the mines.
In Querciola, Company C of the 85th Regiment had also taken up position in the local church before the attack. At 11:30 a.m., a tank also hits the mines, and a vehicle carrying weapons and a bulldozer block the narrow passageway. The wounded Americans are recovered using tracked vehicles. Over 100 dead German soldiers lie in the combat zone of the 2nd Battalion, 1044th Regiment.

The first German prisoners suffer from the cold of the night and the shock of imprisonment. Soldiers from the 87th Regiment gather the prisoners of war in a concentration camp and interrogate them about the positioning of troops, their equipment, combat strength, available reserves, and other information. The interrogations are led by Staff Sergeant Leo A. Handel. Among the prisoners is the commander of the 6th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, Reserve Lieutenant Student. According to Earle's reports, he is the first to voluntarily provide information, so much so that the word "deserter" is noted on his Red Cross card  ("he talked willingly and gladly when his Red Cross Card was about to be marked deserter").
The combat positions of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, which until then the Americans had believed to be in the wrong location, were probably revealed by another prisoner, as the positions came under heavy artillery bombardment that same night. The 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment was essentially defeated. In place of the fallen battalion commander, the commander of the 5th Company took charge. The 4th Company, with its machine guns and mortars, was almost wiped out; after the enemy assault, the company commander was also seriously wounded and left lying in the snow. The next day, along with two other wounded soldiers, he is killed in cold blood by the enemy. Only one wounded soldier, who pretended to be dead, manages to return to his own lines to report what happened.

The entire sector of the 1044th Infantry Regiment, from the main line of combat to the road to Montese via Salto and S. Martino to Panaro, is under incessant bombardment from countless enemy heavy artillery and continuous Jabos attacks on predetermined targets and anything that moves. The enemy is dropping phosphorus bombs. The use of explosive shells is again causing terrible injuries. However, the enemy is unable to break through. On the conquered heights, the enemy has set up observation posts from which it has a wide view of the hinterland. Observation aircraft are guiding the artillery fire. During the day, reconnaissance aircraft take photos of 13 German artillery positions: at Sasso dell'Oca (4), south of Montese (5) and at Campiano (4). Five new positions are identified west of Montese.

During the afternoon of February 20, at the main communications base of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, one radio message follows another: "the enemy has reached the road," "hand-to-hand combat in front of the positions of 5./A.R. 232," "the switchboard of the 2nd Battalion south of Castelluccio has been hit by a bomb," "the Wehrmann radio telegraph team is changing position" (originally with the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment and now with the 232nd Rifle Battalion) to the open field near Casa del Lago, after the withdrawal of Lieutenant Jäger's Pak section⁸  in the village of Fanano, "fire on the flanks at Albarelli," "in the storm of fire, a bomb hit the dormitory of the assault team of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, which was preparing for a counterattack," and so on until late at night.

With the loss or withdrawal of observation posts and the partial displacement or loss of batteries, all links and communications with the artillery were temporarily lost.

The infantry, on the other hand, managed to establish a new line of defense through direct links between the individual battalions. An enemy advance through Corona to Cappella il Monte was blocked. On this occasion, in the evening, a group with the regimental commander was temporarily blocked in a house and had to be freed. A regiment made up of training course participants and named " combat group Lieutenant Hose" is made available on the Mountain slope north of Castelluccio. During the night, even the good soldiers who were believed to be lost reappear, including radio operator Kunze from the outpost.

On the night of February 21, enemy artillery concentrated their heavy caliber fire (175 mm and 210 mm) on the command post of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment. Despite the incessant artillery fire, the switchboard and transmission station were moved to a bunker on the outskirts of the village, under some ancient oak trees. On the morning of February 21, the command post of the "Feldmabig" regiment was also moved to this narrow tunnel, which had been used until then by the 4th department. Unfortunately, on this occasion, a soldier lost a leg due to a grenade and the village priest was also wounded.

Finally, heavy weapons arrived to support the infantry. The Panzerjäger⁹team and a team of assault guns obtained a dedicated radio link that same night.

On the morning of February 21, 1945, bombers bombed the regiment's command post in San Martino. After an MG opened fire on the planes, the bombs fell outside the village. From this moment on, the entire San Martino - Montese - Albarelli - Castelluccio section was under constant artillery fire and Jabos attacks. Until the evening of February 21, the Americans only managed to occupy the 1009-meter hill and then, until the following morning, waited for support from the Jabos. It was certainly to be expected that the Americans would exploit this success and continue their attack towards Monte della Torraccia because, with the possession of this Mountain, the enemy would have the opportunity to advance towards Castel D'Aiano and then continue, almost always downhill, along the Reno valley to the Bologna area and the Po Valley.

With the conquest of Monte della Torraccia, the enemy managed to prevent the 232nd Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Von Gablenz, from joining forces with the 114th Jäger Division.

Von Gablenz improved his positions, particularly in the Bombiana area, i.e., in the area of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment. His plan was to "damage the enemy, capture prisoners and seize materials, gain clarity on the enemy's strength and intentions, and deceive them about our own strength and intentions." Due to the enemy's absolute air superiority, the operation had to be carried out at night, starting from the area between Monte Cappel Buso and Monte Belvedere, between Rocca Corneta and Corona, against the village of Lizzano in Belvedere. Starting from there, the surprise advance of a combat group was to move towards Gaggio Montano and then turn north and recapture Monte Bombiana (2,894 ft) from the south. The planning and the entire reconnaissance, during which individual teams of scouts went as far as Lizzano in Belvedere and Bombiana, was now complete.

Despite the loss of Monte Belvedere on February 20, the German General Staff was unaware of the heavy fighting and the actual strength of the US 10th Mountain Division, which was not in fact a 'light' division, the German General Staff had not yet abandoned, but rather accelerated, the insertion of the 114th Jäger Division, which was approaching the front in arduous night marches from the Comacchio valleys through Ferrara, Modena, Pavullo, and from Monfestino by truck. This Jäger division, in which 20% of Volksdeutsche serve, had previously been assigned to the 10th Army and has now been reassigned to the 14th Army with the task of retaking the entire right sector of the 232nd Infantry Division, from Monte Belvedere westward to the Radici Pass. The 232nd Division will then carry out the planned attack. The Jäger Division and the LI Gebirgskorps must anticipate the American attack on Monte della Torraccia, and to this end, the plans are to launch a swift attack against Monte Belvedere. To this end, and despite being engaged in combat, the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, which had suffered the heaviest losses, was hastily reorganized, particularly with regard to the 13th infantry support artillery company and the two heavy mortar companies (4 and 8).

The 1044th Grenadier Regiment had suffered greatly and had only managed, at the cost of very heavy losses, to prevent the enemy from breaking through the German defense lines in depth. It was therefore no longer considered strong enough to carry out a counterattack against Monte Belvedere. Consequently, the colonel commanding the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division was appointed to lead the counterattack. Lieutenant Colonel Winkelmann, commander of the decimated 1044th Regiment, who had excellent knowledge of the battlefield, was assigned to him as an "advisor." Lieutenant General Von Gablenz later expressed his regret at this decision. In addition to the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, this commander, an expert on the battlefield, was also assigned important parts of the heavily depleted 1044th Grenadier Regiment. The remaining reserves of the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment, involved in the battle on the left flank of the front and which could be used instead for the defense of Monte della Torraccia, as well as the reserve battalion (Feldersatzbatallion) and parts of the Pioneer Battalion of the 232nd Infantry Division were also brought to the front line. "In fact," Von Gablenz later wrote, "the men, tired from the hasty march (those of the 114th Jäger Division), were no longer able to carry out a serious attack.
The prospects for an attack were not favorable from the outset because the artillery had already lost many observation posts and it was difficult to quickly install new ones with a good view of the terrain to be recaptured; in addition, some of the artillery batteries were forced to change positions and were barely available." During the meeting held on the afternoon of February 21, 1945, at the command post of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, near Albarelli, to plan the counterattack on Monte Belvedere, the commander of the 232nd Division summoned "all the decisive commanders"; "all problems are discussed," says Von Gablenz, "and explained. In accordance with what has been decided, the attack must only begin if all the necessary preparations can be made, even if hastily, and the respective starting positions reached." When the division commander, Lieutenant General Von Gablenz, called the commander of the Jäger Regiment at 2:00 a.m. on February 22, 1945, he reported that he was "confident" and that "the troops would be ready to attack as planned."

Von Gablenz then ordered the attack. In reality, at that moment, there were still a number of trucks from the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, loaded with men, moving from Monfestino towards the front and therefore not ready for action. Parts of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, whose readiness had been verified by Colonel Winkelman, arrived on time in their assigned sector in accordance with the orders received and launched a decisive attack on Corona and the northern slope of Monte Belvedere, up to halfway up the slope, where they were forced to stop because they lacked the support of the units of the 114th Jäger Division, which either did not show up or only showed up in part.
Due to their exposed flanks, the companies of the 1044th Regiment were attacked from behind and over 100 men were taken prisoner. Of the 3rd Company of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, which barely managed to intervene in the fighting, 29 men were taken prisoner. The radio operator of the 1044th Regiment, who had supervised the installation of the telephone line from the command post at Albarelli during the attack and had managed to sleep only six hours in total during the previous nights, observed and noted in his diary: "The colonel is asleep and his companies are not arriving. The attack begins late, with only a few units of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment." However, the troops of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment recaptured half of the slope of Monte Belvedere and, despite the support of tanks for the American troops, the town of Corona. Before retreating in the face of the advancing 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, the American vanguard blew up the apse of the chapel north of Corona.

Lieutenant General Von Gablenz wrote: "The attack (by the Jäger Regiment) was a complete failure and did not even have the effect of hindering the enemy's attack on Monte della Torraccia on the same day. In investigating the causes that led to this failure, it became clear that the regiment commander's report regarding the timely preparation and readiness—facts that the commander in charge never personally verified—did not correspond to reality. For this reason, part of the troops did not show up for the attack and were even caught up in the enemy attack on Monte della Torraccia, demonstrating that the deployment was wrong. The failure of the commander of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division was further proof of how, due to the long duration of the war, suitable commanders were in short supply and how capable men, due to continuous overload, were no longer able to find the energy required of them.

After these setbacks, the General Staff is of the opinion that it is advisable to retake at least Monte della Torraccia because, without that position, in the long run, it will not be possible to hold the current HKL, which runs from halfway up the northern slope of Monte Belvedere to the heights west of Pietracolora.

This second counterattack, against Monte della Torraccia, was to take place on February 24, 1945. Command was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Winkelmann, commander of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment. For this purpose, in addition to the units still operational after the assault on February 22, he was also assigned the reconnaissance units of the 114th Jäger Division and the Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger training battalion. Von Gablenz attributed to both a "good combat rating" and wrote that "they arrived punctually and relatively rested in the area of deployment."
All preparations for the counterattack suffered from the enemy's massive availability of material: heavy artillery bombardment in the rear, up to the maximum range of the artillery pieces, guided without the slightest disturbance by the artillery's aerial scouts; Jabos attacks from dawn to dusk without the slightest regard for the civilian population or even for Red Cross vehicles in action, as well as the use of phosphorus ammunition and explosive shells. The information obtained by the Americans during the last few days in the course of systematic interrogations of German prisoners is immediately translated into artillery attacks and bombings, such as, for example, in the case of the dormitory of the newly formed 'assault squad' of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment or the command post of the same regiment, as well as all troop movements observed by civilians and partisans. These agents and informants did not consider, or neglected, the fact that the civilian population would also be affected by the resulting bombing of their villages.

For now, the aim of the new counterattack is solely to recapture Monte della Torraccia, after which an attempt will also be made to drive the enemy down the slopes of Monte Belvedere. The 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment is once again entrusted with the most difficult part of the undertaking, as it is positioned halfway up the slope, with orders to head towards the summit of Monte Belvedere, now occupied by large American forces.
Consequently, the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, also composed of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, was positioned east of the 1st Battalion with orders to attack. Lieutenant Hose's assault team, 140 men strong and consisting of grenadiers from the 6th and 8th Companies of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment with three light machine guns and one heavy machine gun, occupied the hill near I Frati.

The task of recapturing Monte della Torraccia was assigned to the newly arrived and "renowned" Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger training battalion, also known as the "Ruchti Battalion."
The Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger as training battalion, led by the valiant Major Ruchti, left the attack staging area near the village of Monteforte at 9:15 p.m. with the following formation:
- 1st Company led by Captain Dürfeld with two sections and two platoons with four machine guns (section leader of the first platoon Lieutenant Steindl).
- 2nd Company led by Lieutenant Gastl in the same order and with the same armament as the first. 
- 4th Company led by Lieutenant Damerow with a group of engineers, a group of radio operators, and a group of heavy mortars.
- 5th Company led by Lieutenant Hörtnagel with a machine gun group, a mortar group ( ) and an infantry gun group (heavy MG, four 81 mm mortars and two 76 mm infantry guns)

After marching through hills 891 and 874, at 10:00 p.m., the battalion arrived in Vecchia dei Monti and at the starting line for the attack in Le Tane (3,060 ft). In the meantime, the heavy weapons of the 5th Company took up their positions. The battalion command post was located 200 meters south of Le Coveraie. The objective of the 1st Company's attack was Monte della Torraccia (3,550 ft) and, for the 2nd Company, the 1079-meter hill southwest of Monte della Torraccia. After conquering the summit, the 1st Company was to advance south-southeast and the 2nd south-southwest. The counterattack began on the morning of February 24, 1945, delayed due to miscommunication on the part of Lieutenant Jung, who claimed that the enemy had broken through at the road. The attack was supported by well-directed artillery fire. However, the new German artillery positions were identified almost immediately and put out of action by American and Brazilian heavy artillery and continuous attacks by American Jabos. At first, the counterattack gained ground, but shortly afterwards, the infantry once again suffered the enemy's supremacy.

The 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, after overcoming the enemy's barrage, almost managed to retake the old positions but was targeted by fire from the top of the Mountain without even being able to see the enemy. The losses were consequently heavy again. One officer, three non-commissioned officers, and 27 grenadiers were taken prisoner. More than 100 men from the nearby unit to the east were also taken prisoner.

On this day, the already weak 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment got away with few losses. In contrast, the Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger training battalion suffered heavy losses; the attack had started well, gaining ground, but the advance of the first company was stifled by heavy enemy fire and two American tanks positioned on the hill. Four men from the battalion's general staff, the commander of the first company, Captain Dürfeld, five non-commissioned officers, and 19 Jäger s were taken prisoner. Among the wounded was the head of the first section, Lieutenant Steindl. The battalion and the 232nd Infantry Division managed to advance but were unable to conquer the entire Mountain.

Major Ruchti declared that he had "never seen such artillery fire, especially in terms of the quantity of phosphorus grenades launched." Not only did the battalion suffer heavy losses, but the company also lost its radio transmission documents, including the ciphers. The Scouts section suffered the same losses. Another code book remains buried and another is lost in unknown circumstances. Two D2 radio transmitters are blown up. The code is revealed and all other radio stations have to replace the code in use with the emergency code during the battle. The telephone line is interrupted several times due to long-range artillery bombardment.

In conclusion, Lieutenant General Von Gablenz, commenting on the counterattack of January 24, 1945, wrote: "The troops, already completely exhausted by fatigue and exertion, had already given their all." Against only two battalions of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, the enemy had deployed two large artillery formations, but without succeeding in breaking through.

Since October 1944, after the 14th Army had passed long-range reconnaissance to the 10th Army, an incomplete picture of enemy forces in the area prevailed. In reality, the Germans were not facing a "light" division but a particularly well-equipped, strong division that had just arrived on the battlefield: the US 10th Mountain Division, supported by the 1st American Armored Division and the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division. Last but not least, there was also the support and help of the partisans, who had had a very strong effect in terms of reconnaissance behind enemy lines and guidance in the Mountains.

Starting on February 25, 1945, fundamental changes were finally made, albeit too late.

Until then, the bulk of the fighting by the 232nd Infantry Division had been carried out by the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, particularly in the area of Monte Cappel Buso and Monte Belvedere, with the greatest impact between the western slope of Monte Belvedere and Rocca Corneta. On February 24, 1945, the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment was left with a fighting force of 150 men, and the 2nd Battalion with 120 men.
Together, both battalions were weaker than the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment, which had a strength of 330 men. The two battalions of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, with 433 men (2nd Battalion) and 392 men (1st Battalion), are still considered strong and medium-strong, respectively. The 232nd Rifle Battalion, with 397 men, also still has medium strength, while in the reserve battalion, apart from the logistics personnel (129 men), there are still 432 men left.

The fact that the 1044th Grenadier Regiment was able to maintain possession of the road between Monte Belvedere and Montese and from Rocca Corneta to Fanano without being overwhelmed was due to the experience and 'panzer test' of most of its men who had fought in Russia.

For this reason, the Italians nicknamed this division the "German Russian Division." The Americans, on the other hand, called it the "German Tourist Division from Russia" (fighting in Italy compared to Russia was considered a vacation). In fact, both the division commander, Lieutenant General Von Gablenz, and his aide, Major Kohlmeier, as well as other young officers, had participated in heavy fighting in Russia.

The continuous movement of anti-tank weapons and the arrangement of artillery fire on the battlefield had been learned in Russia. The coordination between anti-tank weapons and artillery, and the assembly of different units according to the needs of the battlefield, show that the enemy's strong point, on the left wing of the 232nd Infantry Division, was not taken into consideration or understood by the General Staff, which therefore underestimated the strength of the American 10th Mountain Division.
Until then, the eyes of the army command had been focused mainly on the 10th Army and exclusively on Bologna, and not to the south, in the area of transition from high Mountains to hills. Reconnaissance of the enemy camp had been insufficient, and the concentration of two large enemy units in front of a single German regiment, the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, had not been taken into account. The enemy brought its attack units forward from the rear, at night and by truck, immediately before the main attack.

The Brazilians and Monte Castello
In the documentation on the history of the US 10th Mountain Division, the Brazilians' action is only mentioned from the third day of the offensive onwards. In fact, the chronicle of the American attack on the summit of Monte Belvedere, Monte Gorgolesco, and the Cappella di Ronchidoso up to Monte della Torraccia, practically omits the Brazilian front, deployed on the right. The attack on Monte Castello, called "the Brazilians' concern" because of the failed attacks in November and December 1944, did not begin on February 18, like the American attack, but only on February 21, 1945, after the Americans had already reached the Cappella di Ronchidoso.

As part of the new operation of the US IV Corps, the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was again entrusted with Monte Castello. At a conference at the headquarters of the IV Corps in Lucca on the morning of February 16, 1945, General Hays, as commander of the 10th Mountain Division, demanded that the Mazzancana area be assigned to the 10th Division, despite the Brazilians' insistence that the division line should be at the top of the Mountain.
The Army Corps decided to accept General Hays' request. The Brazilians then asked to coordinate their attack on Monte Castello with the Americans' attack on Monte della Torraccia. During the fighting, the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Regiment came into contact with the Brazilians far to the southwest of Mazzancana, and only after the Americans had achieved this objective could the Brazilians begin their operations. Their bases along the road from Gaggio Montano to Abetaia were located at Casa di Corazza, Gamberana, and Le Roncole. After the occupation of Monte Castello, the attack had to be carried out across the Marano stream and La Serra lake to the Ronco Vecchio - Seneveglio line and then stop. The attack with a limited objective therefore took place later.

Starting from Monte Gorgolesco, writes General Mascarenhas, the resistance and counterattack of the Germans against the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division were powerful. But the support given to the 10th Division by many tanks and about 150 cannons of all calibers made the American attack "extremely powerful." When the Americans reached their objectives at 5:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. on February 20, respectively at the Cappella di Ronchidoso and Mazzancana, the moment of the "Brazilian engagement" arrived. Until then, the Brazilian artillery had supported the American attacks. Now the Brazilians wanted to deliver the fatal blow against Monte Castello. The attack was also supported by the Brazilian air force. The Brazilians wanted to finally prove that their technical skills and fighting spirit were successful. [.. it would demonstrate to the Brazilian troops that their technical know-how and aggressive spirit would be a decisive factor in bringing about the success of "Operation Encore"]

The attack began on February 21, 1945, at 5:30 a.m. According to orders, the Brazilians were to attack Monte Castello at the same time as the Americans attacked Monte della Torraccia. The Brazilians had the advantage that, due to the Americans' action on their left flank, they could attack Monte Castello mainly from the western side and that the German counterattacks were directed mainly against the Americans. More than four Brazilian battalions attacked the German defenses at Monte Castello, which were less than a company in strength. However, the fighting lasted until 5:20 p.m., for more than 12 hours.
According to Major Vernon A. Walters, an American interpreter for the Brazilian language requested by General Mascarenhas, it was a great moment when the summit was conquered, which considerably boosted the morale of the troops. General Crittenberger arrived shortly afterwards to congratulate the Brazilian commander. The Americans, on the other hand, were unable to conquer Monte della Torraccia on that day. The Germans defended the Cargè area (954 meters) and hill 1036 so decisively that a Brazilian battalion had to be brought to the front line, together with the American battalion already there, to attack hills 930 and 875.

Vernon A. Walters, who also acts as an interpreter during the interrogation of German prisoners, reports on the state of mind of German soldiers after the fighting on Monte Soprasasso. As an observer of the attack and witness to the desperate resistance that German soldiers were still able to put up despite knowing they were surrounded. One interrogated prisoner replied to the interpreter as if he did not know that the position was surrounded, even though he was perfectly aware of it, and then said, "One is loyal to one's comrades, isn't one, Major?" Walters explains, "This was a typical response of the attitude that made the Germans truly formidable adversaries." With fighting from February 23 to 25, 1945, on the line between La Serra (884 m) and hill 958, northeast of Malandrone, "Operation Encore" ended for the Brazilians. The Ronco Vecchio - Seneveglio line, initially planned as the target of the Brazilian attack, was not reached. The 10th US Mountain Division was positioned between Monte della Torraccia and La Passione.

In the five days from February 21 to 25, the Brazilians counted 22 dead and 137 wounded. The Brazilian artillery fired "1,600 rounds of ammunition." Sixty-one German soldiers were taken prisoner. The IV Corps orders the Brazilians to hold the Seneveglio - Colombaretta - Torre di Nerone - Boscaccio - Monte Cavalloro line. To the west, across the Serra and hill 958, a connection with the Americans on Monte della Torraccia is stable.

In preparation for further operations, numerous troop redeployments were carried out within the US IV Corps in order to free up the 10th Division for an attack on a very narrow front, which would be the starting point for subsequent attacks between Monte della Torraccia and Seneveglio; this corridor was called "the tenth's corridor." Consequently, the Brazilians took over from the Americans the ridge west of Monte Cappel Buso through Pizzo Campiano, Monte Belvedere to Monte della Torraccia and were thus cut off from their units positioned to the east.

General Da Costa took command of the Brazilian western group, consisting of: a subgroup of the 1st Reconnaissance Squadron, a company of anti-tank guns from the 1st Infantry Regiment, a company of anti-tank guns from the 6th Infantry Regiment, and 450 partisans (Italian guerrillas).
The defense of the western flank towards the top of the Mountain was left to the Italian guerrillas. The entire 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment and an additional battalion relieved the Americans at Monte della Torraccia and were assigned two artillery groups. To the right of the Americans, positioned in the corridor of the 10th Division, is the concentration of the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment and the entire 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment commanded by Colonel Nelson De Melo. The headquarters of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division remains in Porretta Terme.

March 1945. The "eastern combat group" of the 232nd Infantry Division on both sides of the village of Jola.
Already on the night of February 25, 1945, after the failure, or rather the partial success, of the German counterattacks, the redeployment of troops began, along with the relief of others and the delivery of service orders. For the 1044th Regiment, after all the fighting, this meant another night of only two hours of sleep. Clearing of current positions, dismantling of telephone lines, switchboards, and radio stations, night march, and setting up everything in new positions. The 1044th Regiment, greatly weakened, was still not detached from the front line but was instead deployed to another part of the front with parts of the "eastern combat group" of the 232nd Infantry Division.
The new position of the 1044th and the eastern combat group is the area on both sides of the village of Jola, north of Monte Castello, on the Corona-Albarelli line. Corona marks the border between the 114th Jäger Division, positioned on the right, and the 232nd Rifle Battalion on the part of the front towards Fanano, which is subordinate to the 114th Jäger Division itself. To the right of the 1044th, south of Castel d'Aiano up to the border between the 14th Army and the German 10th Army, is the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, which, up to this point, has only suffered and repelled minor local attacks.

On February 25, 1945, the entire area of Montese-Jola, which can be observed from the previous HKL on the Mountain ridge, is under particularly heavy enemy artillery fire, and throughout the day, treacherous attacks by American Jabos follow one after another.
There are plenty of targets because parts of the 114th Jäger Division are approaching the front, replacing and preparing to take over the part of the front to the right of the 232nd Infantry Division. During the changeover, all the houses are full of soldiers, whereas at the previous HKL they were nowhere to be seen. Spies and partisans quickly communicate all troop concentrations, even specifying their precise location and equipment. The command post of the 114th Jäger Division is in Pavullo.

The 232nd Division now holds and defends only the left side of its front, up to the border of the 14th Army to the east, towards which the center of the enemy attack is shifting. The division's command post is moved to "Schoefte" (?), north of Zocca, about 1000 meters north of the Guiglia/Zocca-Pavullo fork, because it is now expected that the enemy will try to advance through Castel d'Aiano, northwards towards Zocca.

After the heavy losses of the 1044th Regiment, the 232nd Division forms a group called the "eastern combat group" led by Colonel Winkelmann, commander of the 1044th Regiment. The combat group includes: the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment (Colonel Pfeffer) with the Hose assault group, the 13th Infantry Artillery Company of the 1044th Regiment (Colonel Priemer), the 14th Tank Destroyer Company of the 1044th Regiment (Colonel Apfel), the 13th Infantry Artillery Company of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment, the Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger (Mountain troops) training battalion (Major Ruchti), the reconnaissance section of the 114th Jäger Division, and the 3rd Engineer Company of the 232nd Division.

After the experiences in Russia, the formation of a combat group is always a sign of an emergency situation in which the worst is sought to be avoided by forces assembled at the moment, drawing on the units available on site. The positions of the eastern combat group extend from Corona, at the western base of Monte Belvedere, to the east of Monte Torraccia in the direction of Pietracolora, as the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Regiment was no longer subordinate to the 1045th Grenadier Regiment stationed at Castel d'Aiano and the "eastern combat group" was stationed at Jola under the command of Winkelmann. Assault guns are positioned along the border between the 232nd Division and the eastern combat group to secure the road from Corona to Albarelli and Montese.

Due to incessant heavy artillery fire and Jabos attacks during the day of February 25, the units only entered the line during the night of February 26. The command post of the "eastern combat group" was located on a farm at point 823 northeast of Maserno. The combat line could be more easily described as "on both sides of the village of Jola": the Corona-Montese road south of Albarelli, west of the village, and the Abetaia-Castel d'Aiano road to the east. Until then, the eastern part of the front had been the responsibility of the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment.
The entire combat area was dominated by Monte Belvedere, Monte della Torraccia (1082 m), and Monte Terminale, south of Jola, which was still in German hands. The combat strip corresponds almost entirely to the attack corridor of the 10th Division, which, on March 3, will launch its second major attack starting from the "10th corridor" in a north and northeast direction.

The terrain around point 823 was also under constant artillery fire. The switchboard was operating in a farm barn after being laboriously moved during the night from an old mill. The nights were still slightly frosty. There was still snow on the northern slopes in the shade, even during the day. Every morning, the soldiers cover the footprints on the paths with snow so that they cannot be seen by aerial scouts and Jabos. Montese, which we can see, is attacked several times a day, once as many as 12 times. Montese is also under continuous bombardment from enemy artillery.

During the night between March 2 and 3, on the eastern front of the combat group led by Colonel Winkelmann, the 721st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division began to replace the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment, which, together with parts of the 1044th Regiment, had to go to the rear for a period of rest. On the morning of March 3, 1945, again during a phase of German troop rotations, the enemy launched a second large-scale attack, also targeting the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, which had its command post in Castel d'Aiano.
Due to an injury sustained by the commander of the 1045th Regiment, Colonel Stoeckel, command was passed to Lieutenant Colonel Oetjen. On March 3, the commander-in-chief of the 14th Army, General Lemelsen, finally reached the command post at point 823 east of Maserno. The general congratulated Colonel Winkelmann on the defensive successes of the 1044th Regiment and referred to our part of the front as "the crucial point of the southern front." From his command post, at the start of the attack, the General immediately alerts the army's Group C reserve, the 29th Falke Division (Armored Grenadier Division), a perfectly equipped and fully manned division, which he himself had previously commanded. It immediately sets off through Vignola.

Lieutenant General Von Gablenz wrote a detailed description of the fighting, including that of the 1045th Regiment, specifying "that the leadership of the Regiment as well as the attitude of the troops, despite the heavy blows of a two-division superiority, deserves full recognition." The effort required of the three regiments of the 232nd Infantry Division is also evident from the fact that an entire German division, the renowned Falke Division, and the 114th Jäger Division now had to be deployed to replace each of the regiments.

The three infantry regiments of the American 10th Mountain Division launched their attack in the early morning of March 3, 1945, starting from their narrow corridor, again with strong support from tanks, artillery, and Jabos. The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was deployed on their left flank. The structure of the enemy troops from west to east was as follows:
- The 86th Regiment with command post at Malandrone, the 1st Battalion on the left towards hill 1011 up to the north-west of Monte della Torraccia,
- the 87th Regiment from Mulino di Caselina towards Monte della Valetta,
- The 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 85th Regiment in reserve from Fornace and Casa Zolfo together with the 86th Regiment
- The artillery was behind the 87th Regiment near La Cà.
- To the right of the artillery is the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Regiment, close to the positions of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division,
- The 2nd Battalion of the 87th Regiment gathers west of Monte Castello and advances southwards through La Serra t , south of Seneveglia, where it is joined from the east by the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division.
- The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division moves parallel to the 10th Division along the Marano valley towards Santa Maria Villana, where it finds only the scattered units of the 1045th Regiment, which were unable to withstand the main American attack.

In this situation on the ground, the "eastern combat group," while positioning itself, is attacked head-on and on the flanks by the 86th American Regiment, with the maximum concentration of fire against hill 1011 and Monte Terminale; the Grenadier Regiment is almost isolated on the flank and is attacked from the west. The village of Pietracolora was reached from the northwest by the enemy at 9:00 a.m. and, after conquering Monte della Croce, located north of the village, almost behind it.

Company E of the 86th American Regiment reached Monte Terminale (1008 m) at 08:00, while at the same time, Company G conquered hill 953 to the west. Against hill 1011, north of Le Tane or rather northeast of Albarelli, which is objective A of the American attack, the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment moves and reaches the southern part of the western flank at 8:20 a.m. On hill 956, crossing a minefield, the enemy suffered some losses. Twenty-five men from the 11th Company of the 721st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division were taken prisoner.

Meanwhile, to the west, on the road from Abetaia to Castel D'Aiano, the 87th Regiment, which encountered strong resistance and a series of counterattacks by the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, reached Hill 997 (Cimon della Piella). After the bridge over the Malandrone was repaired, at 11:10 a.m., the first two tanks and six tank destroyers crossed and headed towards Jola. Enemy artillery fire was incessant and the Jabos resumed their attacks.

The so-called "silent battery" (2nd section of the 661st Artillery Regiment), positioned north of point 823, fires effectively but is unable to stop the enemy wave on such a wide front; the combat group's telephone lines are cut again but are restored. Five radio operators, two from the infantry and three from the artillery, are killed on the telephone line to the caves alone. The radio station of the 1st Battalion (Wehrmann) is hit by a bomb which, fortunately, only destroys the transmitter. The telephone line to Jola holds out for a long time, then two scouts from the Jäger battalion are wounded.
A large piece of shrapnel breaks through the wall of the regiment's command post and the neighboring house is also damaged. In the village of Maserno, from where the wounded are taken away, there is utter chaos. German Sankas with red crosses are hit and set on fire by the enemy. Two assault guns are positioned on the hill at Albarelli. Castelluccio, La Selva, and other villages are destroyed by bombing and artillery fire. Once again, the enemy used phosphorus grenades, particularly in the Montese area: "the Mountains are on fire." For the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, Monte Terminale, Campo del Sole, and Monte della Vedetta were lost early in the morning.

Around noon on March 3, 1945, too late, the commander-in-chief of the 14th Army, General Lemelsen, personally alerts the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, which had been resting since January 23, 1945, in the Bologna-Budrio-S. Giovanni-Castelfranco area. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Dr. Fritz Polack, had to march immediately through Vignola to replace the 1045th Regiment. The first destination of the march was the village of Zocca.

The commander of the tank troops, General Walter Fries, writes about the condition of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division:
"The structure is more complete than ever. Its combat strength is constantly increasing. In the evening, the division begins to move, but due to fuel supply problems, many vehicles are left behind, while others are towed. However, the division is completely ready for combat and in excellent shape. The battalions have a combat strength of 300 men, and reserves of 150 men are available at the regiments. Equipment and armament are excellent. Ammunition, except for a few specific items, is abundant."

On the morning of March 4, the division's columns move along the edge of the Mountain, through chestnut groves and other shelters. Only the commanders and scouts run along the only road, a narrow track, through a barren Mountain landscape constantly monitored by the Jabos, to explore and instruct... the front line. The division moved to the left, south of Castel d'Aiano, where the 15th Regiment was to be engaged, while on the right, on the ridges of the next Mountain, the 71st Regiment was to be positioned. After exploring the positions and instructing the local commanders on their takeover, they hurried back to proceed with the approach of the regiments and battalions. The situation of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, as reported to the command of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, on the other hand, "does not seem so desperate. It is true that the enemy is firing intensely with its artillery, but clearly always on the same areas. The noise caused and amplified by the echo is much more impressive than the effect. Much more unpleasant are the Jabos that arrive in small groups from behind the Mountains and appear suddenly, before one can take cover, warned only by the roar of their engines." The US 10th Mountain Division considers Fries' armored group "a well-equipped but still inexperienced troop."

The advance towards the front is scheduled to begin on March 4, but in daylight it is not advisable to proceed due to enemy air superiority. Only at dusk do the groups set off, advancing towards the front. The remains of the vehicles of the 114th Jäger Division caused traffic jams on the narrow Mountain road. Fries stated: "The roadway must be cleared without any particular consideration." The command post of the Armored Grenadier Division was set up in Zocca.

"When the grenadiers of the 15th Regiment of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division advanced at dawn on March 5, 1945, on the road to Castel d'Aiano, they encountered individual groups of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment coming towards them." At that moment, Castel d'Aiano was not yet in enemy hands . The 15th Regiment (Kassel) came into contact with the enemy very close to the road.
The Americans noticed the retreat and attacked vigorously. The 15th Grenadier Regiment immediately launched an attack on both sides of the road, in their direction of travel, and managed to stop the American attack; in heavy fighting with high losses, the Americans were repelled. The battalion took up a defensive position north of Castel d'Aiano. The assessment of the situation by the 29th Armored Grenadier Division at the beginning of its engagement near Castel D'Aiano was incorrect both in terms of the number of troops and the quantity of heavy weapons that the enemy had committed.
The US 10th Mountain Division, even in the clash with the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, noted that resistance was now weak and positions were occupied by only a few men. The available forces were not enough to counter an enemy that had far superior forces at its disposal, such as artillery, Jabos and, along the road from Abetaia to Castel d'Aiano, even tanks and anti-tank guns. Here too, the positions did not surrender without a fight. On the left side of the road west of the village of Jola, the enemy attacked with the 86th Regiment and, on the right side of the road, with the 87th Regiment. After that, the 85th American Regiment also arrived on the battlefield through the narrow "10th sector." To secure the flanks from possible attacks, the entire 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was made available.

By 3:35 p.m. on March 4, units of the American 86th Regiment were west of Sassomolare, heading towards Monte Grande d'Aiano. This was the sector that was to be taken over by the 71st Regiment of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division on March 5. By 2:15 p.m., the 2nd Battalion of the 87th Regiment had taken up position south of Madonna di Brasa, but it took almost two hours and the support of tanks to break German resistance in this village. It was not until 2 p.m. on March 5 that the enemy battalion reached the southern border of Castel d'Aiano.
The village was captured, with strong artillery and air support, only at 7:40 p.m. The replacement of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, underway on March 5, was carried out under heavy enemy attack and in positions that no longer corresponded to those in the instructions of March 4. The advance of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division was severely delayed, too late to help the few grenadiers remaining at their posts.

While the 1st Battalion of the 15th Armored Grenadier Regiment was in a barrage position north of Castel d'Aiano, the other two battalions of the Kassel regiment, including the Jäger battalion, attempted to attack Monte della Spe northeast of Castel d'Aiano. However, they were bombarded by American tanks from the Castel D'Aiano area (probably from hill 873 south of the village) and began digging trenches on the western and northern slopes of Monte della Spe.

The heights of Monte Grande D'Aiano (2,884 ft) and Monte Nuvoleti (2,802 ft) northwest of Castel D'Aiano must be defended by the 71st Armored Grenadier Regiment. "When the two battalions climbed the very steep slopes of the dominant heights, 879 m and 845 m, they were greeted with machine gun fire." The day before, starting from Sassomolare, the three battalions of the 86th American Regiment had attacked these heights and managed to these positions. Nevertheless, a company of the 1st Battalion of the 71st Armored Grenadier Regiment managed to gain a foothold on the northwestern part of Monte Grande D'Aiano and "hold this very exposed but equally important point. The 2nd Battalion of the 71st Regiment lost the commander of a company."

On March 6, the 15th Kassel Regiment tried again to conquer Monte della Spe, but the attempt was only partially successful "because the heavy weapons had not yet arrived." The Americans refer to this day as "four vicious German counter attacks." After that, the 15th Regiment's HKL was moved to the hill north of Castel d'Aiano.

The 71st Regiment also moved its HKL to the valley north of Monte Grande d'Aiano and Monte Nuvoleti, both occupied by the enemy. Only a section of the 1st Battalion of the 71st Armored Grenadier Regiment remained at the 819 high ground position, together with some sharpshooters. The position, on the slope behind the valley, was in a blind spot for enemy artillery, but it was difficult to resupply. The motorized troops did not have mules.

After the arrival of heavy weapons from the Armored Grenadier Division, they managed to repel some American attacks. The 29th Armored Grenadier Division, together with the 313th Army Anti-Aircraft Section, managed, to a limited extent, to repel even the air attacks. However, the village of Zocca, where the command post of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division was located, was "reduced to ashes" by enemy attacks. In the days that followed, the activities of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were guided by the principle of conserving their forces and avoiding losses and, where possible, striking the enemy. Anything that seemed in any way unnecessary was removed and moved to the rear. "Heavy weapons will determine the outcome of the battle."

On March 3, as ordered, the "Eastern Combat Group" handed over the positions of the 1044th to the 721st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, which had arrived on the scene in the meantime. Colonel Winkelmann remained on site to provide further instructions. Although the radio section of the newly arrived Jäger regiment was fully motorized, their radio officer was unable to take over the radio network on time. Therefore, some radio stations had to remain in place for another night and would be transferred later. The 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment and the Hose Combat Group, as well as the Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger training battalion, also remain engaged in the field.

Due to the rapid enemy advance in the sector of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment, the planned departure of the 1044th for Ciano is only possible via Montese and S. Martino towards the Panaro valley. In Ciano, north of Zocca, the depleted 1044th Regiment must be restructured and resupplied. The last units of the 1044th Regiment once again passed through the villages between Albarelli and the Panaro River that were so familiar to them. Maserno and many other villages were destroyed by bombs and artillery shell explosions; the village of Montese was reduced to rubble.
During the grenadier regiments' stay at the advanced combat positions in Albarelli and at point 823, in the locality of S. Martino, only one officer remained, the one responsible for weapons and equipment (WUG), as the village was still being bombed every day. The division's telephone line ended in S. Martino, at the main switchboard, which was constantly maintained in an underground bunker. The radio telegraph section of the 232nd Infantry Division had remained here since the beginning of the fighting on both sides of the village of Jola.
The General Staff company had already left for Ranocchio, to then continue on to Ciano, including Chief Radio Operator Marshal Pilger. Some radio operators and the main switchboard, as well as the few remaining radio operators from the radio relay team of the decimated 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, have organized heavy steel cover for a vehicle positioned under a viaduct in Ranocchio, out of danger of being hit by shrapnel. They are ready to leave.
At sunset, the heavy car is pulled out of its shelter, heavily loaded, and hooked up to the regiment's most powerful diesel truck. While S. Martino, Salto, and Montese are once again under artillery fire and a violent clash with the enemy is reported in the Castelluccio area by the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, the 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, and the Hose Combat Group, we move down into the Panaro valley towards the bridge that the engineers have installed to cross the river, beyond which, in small villages, engineers and tank destroyers have settled.
Along the road lie destroyed, burned vehicles and dead horses. Our radio car is also lying near the roadman's house on the Panaro. It is so badly damaged by bullets that it has to be abandoned, and all the equipment and cables have to be transferred to another vehicle.

During the enemy attacks, after the 1044th Regiment (at point 823) was replaced by the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, the base on hill 986 was abandoned; near Casa Orlando, an enemy breakthrough attempt is repelled; after an attack by an enemy battalion, the Hose combat group, positioned at Fosso di Prati together with the 2nd Battalion of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, takes up position from south to north of Fosso dell'Oca as far as S. Antonio, to cover Castelluccio again. The 232nd Rifle Battalion continues to repel enemy attacks along the road near Rocca Corneta.
On March 4, the enemy is again stopped. From March 5 onwards, after heavy artillery bombardment, the enemy forced the 114th Jäger Division's reconnaissance team to retreat from both sides of Casone, on hills 767 and 776 east of Montese. At 5:00 p.m., the 114th Jäger Division, reduced to only two groups, still held hill 808 north of hill 823 (south of Montese).
Fog and snow flurries allowed the enemy to penetrate, with three groups of 50 men each, between the positions of the 721st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division and those of the scouts of the 114th Jäger Division and attack, from the north and northeast, the left flank of the 1st Battalion of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division and partially defeat them. However, the remnants of the 6th Company of the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division close the open flank along the Mountain ridge north of Castelluccio, up to the vicinity of hill 628. In this combat situation of the 114th Jäger Division, it appears necessary to subordinate both the Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger training battalion and the 7th Company of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, as well as the Hose combat group, and to reposition the HKL. The border of the Jäger Division, on the left towards the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, has been moved.
The condition of the regiments of the 114th Jäger Division and their subordinate units after the fighting on March 6, 1945, is assessed as follows:
- 2nd Battalion of the 721st Jäger Regiment - destroyed.
- 3rd Battalion of the 721st Jäger Regiment - not ready for combat.
- 741st Jäger Regiment - damaged; limited suitability for defense.
- 114th Scout Section - limited suitability for attack.
- 3rd Battalion of the 5th Italian Infantry Regiment - suitable for attack.
- 4th Alpine Battalion - suitable for attack. 232nd Rifle Battalion - suitable for defense.
- Mittenwald Hochgebirgsjäger Training Battalion - suitable for attack.

While the enemy, starting on March 6, continues its bombardment with phosphorus shells, propaganda shells, and Jabos attacks, especially in the Montese area, infantry activity is now limited to groups of scouts. German artillery bombarded enemy artillery positions, concentrations of vehicles, cavalry, mule columns, and other identified targets; it no longer fired harassing fire because it needed to conserve ammunition.

But even the American 10th Mountain Division is unable to emerge from Operation Encore, which is being carried out in two phases, without suffering damage. The attacks in the first phase of Operation Encore, by the US 10th Mountain Division and the Brazilians at the end of February 1945, were carried out in the sector of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment on the very night of its replacement by the 114th Jäger Division.
From a timing point of view, the replacement of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment by the 29th Armored Grenadier Division (Falke Division) in the second phase of the enemy attack, starting on the night of March 3, after the massive attacks by the US 10th Mountain Division against Castel d'Aiano on March 5, was equally unfortunate.

However, on March 7, the IV US Army Corps surprisingly declared Operation Encore over, and the 10th US Mountain Division halted its attacks at Castel d'Aiano. American losses from March 3, the start of the second phase, until the evening of March 6, aMonteed to 649 men, including 107 killed and 25 missing.
After only two days of successful attacks, the Americans began to encounter problems when they had to face an entire well-equipped German division, the Falke Division. Problem: [Wire entanglements, mines, road blocks, were all constructed toward enemy counterattacks when and if they might develop. The Germans meanwhile poured in heavy artillery, especially in frontline sectors at Castel d'Aiano and M.te della Spe]  The Americans rotated their frontline units; they did have abundant reserves. After three days, the enemy realized that there was no hope left here. They reinforced their artillery and air attacks, but ceased their ground attacks. The Mountain village of Zocca, a crucial point for our supplies, was reduced to ashes by American bombs and grenades.

The "Lord of Libya," the British commander-in-chief in Italy, writes: "The 29th is certainly one of the best-equipped divisions on the Italian war scene and forced us to halt our attacks carried out by the US 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Brazilian Division." As for the Brazilians, Walters notes: "Since it was still too early for a major offensive before spring, no other major operations followed; however, the Brazilians sent out patrols. Some of them did not return."

The US IV Corps considers the Operation Encore offensive to have begun on February 18, carried out in two phases, and ended on March 7. In accordance with "Operational Order No. 14" of March 8, 1945, only the western part of the "10th Mountain Division corridor" was handed over to the Brazilians, and the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was left with only the sector west of the Cappella di Ronchidoso to Monte Nuvoleti (northwest of Castel d'Aiano). On the left, to the south, the 371st Regiment of the 92nd Infantry Division made contact with the Brazilians, and on the right, to the northeast, the US 10th Mountain Division. The Brazilian General Staff moved from Porretta Terme to Pavana towards Lizzano in Belvedere; with this, the Brazilians were excluded from the subsequent advance of the 10th Mountain Division.

Brazilian losses from November 5, 1944, to March 16, 1945, following fighting with the grenadier regiments of the 232nd Infantry Division, aMonteed to 1,666 men, of whom 240 were killed, 1,382 wounded, and 44 missing. The line that was handed over by the Americans to the Brazilians runs from southwest to northeast and corresponds approximately to Cappella di Ronchidoso, the slopes east of Albarelli, Casa Lana, Sassomolare, and Monte Nuvoleti. The road from Castel D'Aiano to Zocca, including the narrower western road through Villa D'Aiano and Rio Rosola, is located in the sector of the US 10th Mountain Division.

The restructuring and reorganization of the 232rd Infantry Division north of Pavullo and Zocca.
The detachment of the 232nd Division from the front, the transfer of the front sectors from the 1044th Regiment to the 114th Jäger Division and from the 1045th Regiment to ^the excellent and well-equipped 29th Armored Grenadier Division, were to give the 232nd Division about three weeks of rest. To this end, the unit moved to the area near the front, north of Zocca and northeast of Pavullo. The division's general staff remained, for the time being, near the Zocca-Guiglia road. In order to concentrate combat strength after heavy losses, the 1043rd Regiment, of which only the 2nd Battalion remained at the front, was disbanded. The 1044th and 1045th Grenadier Regiments each take on the strength of two battalions.

During the restructuring phase, the command post of the 1044th Regiment is located in Ciano, about halfway between Zocca and Bazzano. Due to the condition of the bridges, the journey to Ciano from S. Martino onwards had to be made on the western bank of the Panaro, along the river, to the north of the Aia Mortale pond where, at 741 ft, the Panaro river was crossed again in an easterly direction. After that, you climb towards Samone (2,040 ft) and La Torre (311 ft), continuing towards Zocca from the north, up to the western slope of Monte Cerpignano.
The area north of Rosola - Zocca is now under heavy fire from enemy artillery. After marching along the ridge to Monteombraro (2,385 ft) and Monte Cerpignano, the troops descend to 1,082 ft above sea level. Almost all the villages they pass through have been reduced to rubble by the Anglo-Americans. In the diary: "We are crossing a lunar landscape."

It took three night marches, heavily laden, to cover this stretch of road. For this reason, when the radio operators of the 1044th regiment arrived in Ciano, everyone except the guards was already asleep. In the entrance hall of the parish house, two ladies dressed in black hold large candlesticks. The regiment commander arrived two days ago, but still has no telephone line. As in Rosola and S. Martino, the priest here is also kind and helpful. To the northeast of the village is the ancient 17th-century castle of Castellaccio.

The 1043rd Grenadier Regiment is disbanded and the men are assigned to the two remaining regiments. The disbanding of a regiment is a sad thing. Those who experienced it in Russia try to respect the bonds of camaraderie. In a way, two new, fully operational regiments must be formed from the "failed mass" of three regiments. Particular problems are encountered in all places where specializations are required. The officers' meetings, considering the questions raised by the people concerned, are not without controversy.

There is a shortage of men and materials. The radio relay team of the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment now has only four men, including radio operators, while the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment has seven men but no equipment left. All the radio and telephone teams of the regiment, battalions, and 13rd and 14th companies need to be reformed. To this end, radio and telephone equipment and cables arrive from the 14th Army. Mules also arrive to replace the many mules that have died under artillery and Jabos attacks.

In the evening, light signals are observed in the Mountains, undoubtedly from bands of partisans or bandits. In the lower Panaro area, partisan activity has resumed to such an extent that special action is necessary. A group of radio operators is ambushed along with their commander. A commando unit, already ready to leave, is withdrawn because the regiment, which has been reinforced with many new men, has to leave for the front. Unexpectedly, new orders arrived. The further reinforcement of the ranks of the 1044th Regiment was to take place in Pavullo and, at the same time, the regiment was already engaged as a reserve for the LI° Alpine Corps. However, the first scouts sent to find quarters in Pavullo returned without success, as they could not find anywhere to house the troops in the semi-destroyed town.

Once again, as in S. Martino, the regiment's radio telegraph section, led by the radio telegraph officer, moved ahead of the column as scouts. After a long and tiring night march, the search for accommodation in the badly destroyed village began. Here, in 1830, the famous engineer [Sigismondo] Ferrari built his "Palazzo Ducale."

Due to air raids and Anglo-American Jabos attacks, many buildings in Pavullo were reduced to rubble or burned down. The houses that were still usable were used to house units of the 114th Jäger Division, as well as those near the farm close to the Tower. Finding nothing better and in order not to be spotted and attacked by Jabos at dawn, lay down behind a school, in which not a single window was intact.
A sort of path was improvised between the back of the school and the slope of the hill, where the vehicles were parked. Only direct hits could damage them. When the sun rises, no one must be seen on the streets, and no chimneys must be smoking. Therefore, the regiment's baker only works at night. During the day, the suffering population of the village retreats to tunnels dug near the cemetery. At night, they return to the rubble of their homes to salvage what they can and then, during the day, flee back to the tunnels to escape the Jabos and bombers. The airport at Pavullo has been completely destroyed by the partisans, who are so numerous that the Jäger division has to use cannons against them.

Meanwhile, the newly formed 1045th Grenadier Regiment arrives in the stationing area in S. Dalmazio, about 3 miles southeast of Monfestino, which, from the point of view of road connections, is advantageous because it is close to the S.S.12 for Brennero, north of Pavullo at an altitude of 1,740 ft. to the east, towards Marano, it was possible to cross the Panaro River via a bridge that was still passable by vehicle. This made it possible to carry out operations both to the east and to the west.

New engagement of the 232nd Division Infantry Division in the upper Apennines, from the Abetone Pass to Maserno, southwest of Montese.
On March 8, 1945, the 232nd Division Infantry Division moved its command post back to the front, east of Montecenere, on the Brenner state road between Pavullo and Lama.
The division once again took charge of the central part of the familiar upper Apennines, including the entire Monte Cimone massif, from the Abetone Pass in the west to Maserno, southwest of Montese.

The battalion of the Italian San Marco Division and the 232nd Rifle Battalion remain in position from the Abetone Pass to Monte Taufi. The San Marco battalion remains subordinate to the 232nd Rifle Battalion. The command post is located in Pievepelago.
To the east, the 232nd Battalion of the 1045th Grenadier Regiment entered the line, from Monte Taufi to Fiochi.
Fiochi itself is already part of the sector of the 1044th Regiment, to the northeast, which extends to and includes the village of Maserno. The "Winkelmann Regiment" is once again tasked with defending the most contested area, northwest of the heights of Monte Belvedere, across Monte della Torraccia to height 823. The HKL (main line of combat) of the 1044th Regiment runs, seen from the west coming from Rocca Corneta, generally in a north-easterly direction, always south-east of Fiochi - Cappella di Monte - Castelluccio - Albarelli towards Maserno. The main battlefield corresponds to the entire area of the waters that feed the Dardagnola River, which flows into the Leo River south of Mulino del Leo. The territory of the 1045th Regiment's sector carries its waters into the Dardagna River.
On the morning of March 15, the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment took over the sector of the 1st Battalion of the 741st Gebirgsjäger and, at 12:00 noon, the 1044th Grenadier Regiment assumed command of both battalions.

The command post of the 1044th Regiment was moved to the dominant hill of Gaiato, on the southeastern edge of Monte Torre, 3,088 ft high. The path that branches off from the S.S.12 (Brennero state road) to the east, south of Pavullo, near Querciagrossa, ends in the village of Gaiato at an altitude of 2,457 ft. However, an advanced command post was set up to the east, in the Panaro valley, at Mulino del Leo, even though a group of scouts had not even reached the mill the previous day and its condition had therefore not been verified.

Only paths that can be traveled by donkeys lead from Gaiato down the steep slopes to the Mulino del Leo mill, which was built on a waterfall at the confluence of the Scoltenna and Leo rivers. From the mill onwards, the two rivers converge to form the Panaro River. Behind the HKL (main combat line) of the 1044th and 1045th regiments, the Leo, Scoltenna, and Panaro rivers form a powerful natural barrier, which is why the second most important line of defense after the Gothic Line, the "Genghis Khan Line," runs along the slopes west of those waters.

As in previous battles at Albarelli and on hill 823, the reduced staff of the 1044th regiment, consisting of the commander, his aide, the radio operator, correspondents, and radio operators, took up position in the forward command post at Mulino del Leo (1,063 ft). This time, the radio operators of the 232nd Infantry Division will also have to establish themselves in the regiment's forward command post.

The descent from Gaiato at night with donkeys takes a long time, especially since a basic telephone line must be established at the same time. It is pitch dark, with no guide, no signs, steep, rocky, narrow, and uneven paths, with all the equipment on the backs of donkeys and men. The roar of the Panaro River can already be heard continuously; suddenly, the path ends. We are lost, as happened to the reconnaissance team the day before; for now, we simply lie on the ground. Only at dawn do we reach the riverbank and the ford for the Mulino del Leo, which we reach by wading through water that reaches our knees. The telegraph operators, who are a little advanced in years, suffer from cramps. "Come on, come on, otherwise you'll be lost!"

Mulino del Leo is positioned across the river, with the mill at the bottom of the valley and the living quarters one floor above, halfway up the slope. The lower floor of the house is on the same level as the upper floor of the mill, so that there are three levels in total. A covered corridor connects the upper floor of the mill with the ground floor of the house. Some of the window frames are missing.

The installation of Dora transmitters at the bottom of the valley does not provide 360° radio coverage due to the very narrow valley; for this reason, the main radio station is moved a little further south, above the mill, and a bunker made of sticks is quickly built.
An old room with a vaulted ceiling, located deep below the mill and recently covered with a concrete ceiling for mill management, is cleared to house the telephone switchboard. Evidently, the room had not been in use for a long time, because the strange mechanism that powered the mill was buried in more than a meter of dry sludge, which had most likely been deposited by occasional flooding of the river.
The effort of removing the dry sludge is worthwhile because the substructure of the mill, divided into several smaller sections, proves to be almost bombproof and offers shelter for all the men. After removing the main drive shaft, there is an opening in the vaulted ceiling through which it is possible to climb down from the floor of the mill into the room below. The vaulted room is lined with wooden panels and will later be the salvation for all the men in the mill.

The artillery radio telegraph teams, with their Berta devices, which work in radiotelephony, set up their equipment a little apart, on the north side of the Scoltenna River, not far from its confluence with the Leo River.

The entire valley floor is covered with gravel and very large stones which, during periods of flooding and storms, roll downhill. The deepest channel of the Leo River has moved away from the mill towards the east. There is plenty of water, lots of stones and high Mountains all around, but there is no drinking water in the mill. In all directions, there are steep Mountain slopes: to the southwest against the Monte Cimone massif, to the north against Gaiato, to the southeast against Monte Belvedere, and to the south against Monte Serrasiccia. The Panaro itself, a little further downstream, forms a narrow basin in this Mountainous world. The nearest is Gaiato, opposite the peak of Montespecchio with its little church on top, visible from afar.

In the evening, when the sun sets in the west, south, and southeast, the peaks familiar to the troops reflect the movements of enemy telescopic sights, but there is not enough ammunition to hit them.

The Mountain paths leading to the front are well known to scouts and communications personnel, especially in winter when there is a lot of snow; now they are almost entirely under enemy observation and during the day they are no longer passable without coming under fire. For this reason, supplies can only be brought in by donkey at night. The 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, led by Captain Pfeffer, defends the sector on the left starting from Maserno with the front facing east and southeast (against the morning sun), while the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th defends the sector on the right up to Fiochi, where it meets the 1045th Regiment with the front facing southeast. All positions are visible to the enemy, and there are enemy scouts (Klärchen) in the area. (Klärchen is the diminutive of Klara, a German female name. Scouts in German is Aufklärer, hence the pun AufKlärer > Klärchen).

Due to the position of the front and the route of the HKL (main combat line), east of Maserno and Montese, in the sector of the 1044th Regiment, there are no more roads suitable for vehicles. The connection between Montespecchio and Maserno is also suitable for vehicles, but after that, heading north and west towards the valley, there are only paths. Since all movements are only possible at night, supplies pose enormous difficulties.
Intermediate stops are established for the donkey columns, for example: for the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment at its command post at the Zagaglia Mill. From Mulino del Leo and from Mulino di Zagaglia, the Rocchetta Sandri farm can only be reached via donkey trails. From here, however, there is a road south to Fanano. If you want to go north, you have to go to Pievepelago and take the Brennero state road (S.S. 12).

The commander's inspection tour along the HKL (main combat line) – again with the communications officer – can only be carried out at sunset and on moonlit nights. At this time, the inspection is particularly important because, after the disbandment of the 1043rd Regiment, the various sections and companies of the 1044th now have their respective officers, non-commissioned officers, and men. In the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment commanded by Captain Pfeffer, for example, Lieutenant Katzer is the aide-de-camp (formerly aide-de-camp in the 2nd Battalion of the 1043rd Regiment).
The head of the 4th/1044 is now Lieutenant H.W. Wagner of MARBURG (formerly 5th/1043). It is impossible to move around during the day on the southern slopes of the Castelluccio sector. The former command post of Lieutenant Ph. Simon (7th/144) is abandoned and completely destroyed. The entire village has been reduced to rubble by the enemy. Only the apse and the lower part of the bell tower remain standing of the church. The ruins of the bell tower now house a section post.

At the command post of the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment (Captain Ziegenfuss) in the Zagaglia Mill, we meet up with the division commander Lieutenant General Freiherr Von Gablenz, Captain Stoll, the general's driver, and Marshal Rinsche. Even they have walked this last kilometer.

From Mulino del Leo, all the trails leading to HKL are uphill, generally through Montespecchio, with a splendid view of the Mountain landscape, whose peaks are still covered with snow. But woe betide if the Jabos arrive, they hunt down every single man. Losing your way costs a lot of time. However, in an emergency, all the waterways in the area serve as indicators because they lead to the Leo River. The valley floors are full of debris. It takes at least two and a half hours to check the telephone lines, and often you have to go around or climb over rocks.
To cross the Leo and Scoltenna rivers, near the Leo Mill, ladders have been laid down, which are not so noticeable in the photos taken by aerial scouts. Due to the heavy traffic to the command post and the partisans who are immediately informed and communicate everything to the enemy, it is only a matter of time before the enemy targets the mill.

The 1044th regiment was assigned a talented marshal as liaison officer with the artillery. Since there are no paths, all the artillery positions are located close to the Mountains. Responding to frequent and heavy enemy fire from the Montespecchio area and the old wooden bridge at the confluence of the San Martino and Panaro rivers, where there is also a ford through which donkey couriers cross the river, the artillery kept the enemy positions under fire with considerable success.

Starting on March 19, the I^aassault gun brigade also took up position in the Gaiato area with three guns, while three additional guns were moved to the Monte Passatore area. The day before, on March 18, three sections of the 114th Panzerjäger Squadron were also subordinated to 232nd Infantry Division.

The Easter holidays brought good weather and, for a short period, relative calm. In addition to firing phosphorus grenades, the enemy now began firing grenades with leaflets stating that warm beds were available for prisoners. In its 120th edition of March 30, 1945, entitled "Front Mail, Southern Edition," the enemy leaflet highlights the American advance, via the bridgehead at Remagen, through the Westerwald forest to Marburg. From the areas targeted by bombers between March 27 and March 29, the course of the following advance can be glimpsed. In addition to the destruction of fuel depots and factories and railway lines, "preventive bombing" of cities along the route of the advance is also carried out.

In early April, the enemy intensified its attacks throughout the area east of the Leo River. Phosphorus grenades set the cherry blossoms on fire. Incessant bombardments lasting from half an hour to a full hour dug up the ground throughout the regiment's sector. This indicated an imminent attack; all that was missing was the initial carpet bombing and barrage fire to allow the infantry to advance with tanks in the following hour.

The HKL (main combat line), which has been taken over by the 114th Jäger Division, runs through the high Mountains, from Monte Romecchio through Monte Rondinaio (1964 m), the Alpi Tre Potenze (6,365 ft) to Libro Aperto (6,355 ft), joining the old defensive positions. It continues through Monte Lancio (5,052 ft), the northern slope of Monte Cappel Buso (3,609 ft) and the northern corner of Monte Belvedere, turning north to Maserno (south of Montese). According to General Von Gablenz, this position "was completely unsuitable for defense. Any movement towards it, or rather, any movement within it, was impossible during the day. The enemy's position was far superior to ours. In some places, they could throw hand grenades without being seen."

Since a further major enemy attack on Zocca is clearly imminent, Von Gablenz no longer expects any other attacks in the division's sector, especially since he does not consider the combat strength of the Brazilians in front of the232nd Infantry Division to be "high." However, Von Gablenz considers it inappropriate to maintain such an advanced front line, as it is very demanding even in calm phases. For this reason, the 232nd Division's request to withdraw the HKL behind the southern edge of Monte Cimone, the southern edge of Monte Calvanelle, the southern edge of Monte Emiliano, and the southern edge of Monte Specchio is approved by the higher command.
This new line has already been explored and fortification has already begun. Weak positions are left on the old line. However, the enemy does not understand. A few weak exploratory attacks are easily repelled. Then the enemy intensifies its interference fire by firing phosphorus grenades at the positions on the northern slopes, at all supply routes, and mainly at the village of Fanano and all the bridges in the area. l phosphorus bombing becomes so intense that the troops once again speak of a "Mountain on fire." They only move when the fire reaches the combustible parts of a position's camouflage, as this is decisive for the conduct of the fighting.

Around noon on March 19, above both Pavullo and Monfestino, the enemy dropped dry leaves from the previous year from high-altitude aircraft. It is assumed that this was in preparation for a subsequent drop of incendiary leaflets camouflaged as foliage to set fire to barns, haystacks, and shelters often used to hide vehicles.

The Allies prepared a major partisan action as part of a large offensive in the spring of 1945.

General Alexander, the commander-in-chief of American forces in Italy, issued an order to all the "bands" in northern Italy before February 23, 1945, to "be ready to start on February 27 and to strike and expand sabotage actions."
In the "US Fifth Army Detachment," as early as late autumn 1944, Company D of the 2677th OSS (military intelligence) Regiment was active as a liaison unit with the partisan bands and issued its "weekly partisan report & memorandum." Partisans, bandits, and agents informed this unit, almost in real time, about movements on the other side of the front. Together with the information obtained in "in-depth interrogations" of prisoners, the enemy was well informed. By February 26, for example, it was already known that the 1044th Regiment had a Portuguese interpreter and what symbols the^14thCompany of the 1044th Regiment used on maps to mark positions.

In March, the partisans reorganized their forces, formed other brigades, and coordinated larger operations across all parties.

Preparations by the IV US Corps for the Spring Offensive
In preparation for the Allied forces' major spring offensive in Italy, starting on April 9, 1945, the IV US Corps, after consolidating the front at Castel d'Aiano, had four weeks to organize itself. The plan for the spring offensive was named "Operation Craftsman." The US Fifth Army divided the initial attacks into three phases:

A) "Green phase"
B) "Brown phase"
C) "Black phase"

As soon as the Black phase was underway, the mobile reserve, consisting of the 1st US Armored Division and the 6th South African Armored Division, was to attack towards the Po Valley and help surround and close in on Bologna. Throughout the winter, the Allies had been only 12 miles south of Bologna, but they were unable to advance. Now they had to move along the "Via di Vergato," passing west of Bologna, to intercept and disrupt the German reserves on the left flank of the IV Army Corps. Four days before D-Day, on April 5, 1945, the 92nd Infantry Division attacked at the far left wing of the IV Corps, in the direction of Pietrasanta - Massa - Carrara.

The distance from Bologna, on the "Via di Vergato" (SS 64), was only 20 miles. The US Fifth Army expected this to be the most likely place to overcome the German defense system. The Americans were also aware of the Germans' difficulties in obtaining fuel supplies after the systematic bombing of northern Italy and Germany. The destruction wrought by the Allies in the area attacked by the US IV Corps was systematically amplified by partisan activities in the Mountains and hinterland, and it was known that the Germans lacked the materials and fuel needed for rapid and extensive troop movements.
The German difficulties were deliberately provoked. [Thus, by the end of the war, the Luftwaffe was nothing but a myth in the sky over Italy]. In the meantime, the German air force had also been eliminated. "At the end of the war, the Luftwaffe was nothing, nothing more than a myth in the Italian skies," the Allies later wrote.

The sector planned for the breakthrough of the front was initially located slightly west of the point of contact between the 14th and the 10th German armies, but in a second phase it would be entirely in the sector of the 10th Army. For now, therefore, the LI° Alpine Corps is attacked on the left flank by the IV US Army Corps. Since the Reno River is also the point of contact between the US V Army and the British 8th Army for the enemy, the task of breaking through the front along the "Vergato road" is located in the American sector.

The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, with 14,839 men, including 2 generals and 887 other officers, is assigned to defend the left flank (west). Communist partisans were also assigned to the Brazilians. Alongside the material preparations, moral preparations were also made: "adequate moral preparation of the troops" by high-ranking officers.

During the meeting of the IV Army Corps at the command post in Castelluccio, near Porretta, on April 8, 1945, General Crittenberger assigned tasks to the Brazilians. They were to defend the sector between Ronchidoso and Sassomolare and then adjust their right flank (east) to the advance of the 10th American Division. General Hays, commander of the 'Mountainers' after the experiences of November and December 1944 at Monte Castello, now took the liberty of asking the Brazilian commander if he was really sure he could take Montese. When General Mascarenhas confirmed this, the Brazilians were ordered to take Montese, to continuously cover the left flank of the 10th American Division and to move towards Zocca - Vignola.

The Mountain defense battles of the 232nd Infantry Division in April 1945, taking the heights of Montespecchio and the Panaro River.
After the 232nd Infantry Division moved behind the Monte Lagoni – Monte Calvanella – Monte Emilano – Rochetta Sandri – Montespecchio line to the west of Montese, the outposts remained on the previous lines. The outposts had managed to repel attacks by enemy scouts.

With the start of the final Allied offensive, fighting broke out once again on the left flank of the division, especially in the sector of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, between Maserno and Fiochi. In the high Mountains and along the Brenner road, it was now only a matter of orderly retreat, locally disrupted by bands of guerrillas.

The left flank of the 1044th Regiment's sector is also the boundary between the 232nd Infantry Division and the 114th Jäger Division. The junction between the divisions runs in a straight line from Maserno northwest to the village of Chiozzo (east of the wooden bridge over the Panaro River) and then towards Pavullo. The road from Salto, through S. Martino and Ranocchio, is entirely within the sector of the light infantry division. The three assault guns engaged in the area north of Salto, near Leone, and the two assault guns of the 1115th  Assault Gun Company, engaged along the road to Salto and S. Martino, explored suitable routes for a counterattack as far as Rio S. Martino and managed to advance to heights 407, 483, and 526, to attack the flanks of enemy forces moving on the Montespecchio hill against the 1044th Regiment using the Maserno-Riva di Biscia road and from there on the path to Montespecchio.
The line between the heights of Riva di Biscia, Montespecchio and from there down to Mulino di Zagaglia and then eastwards via Cerro and Rochetta Sandri was prepared as the position of the "Franzi-Riegel", the "Franzi barrier". If necessary, this line continued into the sector of the 114th Jäger Division, between Montese and S. Martino, as the "Käthe-Riegel," the "Käthe Barrier." The next barrier, which narrows the front even further, is the "Erna-Riegel," the "Erna barrier," between Montespecchio and S. Martino, which, at point 407, near the mill (which supplies electricity to S. Martino), cuts the border with the 114th JägerDivision. This is followed, to the north, by the "Kitty-Riegel," the "Kitty barrier," which finally becomes the "Dschingis-Khan" line, the Genghis Khan line.

The Panaro and Scoltenna rivers, with their missing bridges, have such a strong dividing effect that in the sector of the 1044th regiment, heavy weapons in the north are positioned only in the Gaiato area and even further north, west of the river. The battlefield on the Montespecchio hill is almost devoid of vegetation. When constructing telephone lines and adjusting artillery fire, it should be noted that the entire Montespecchio area is subject to magnetic interference, which prevents compasses from working.

On the left wing of the 232nd Infantry Division, from east to west starting from Maserno, are the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, the 2nd Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, with command posts in the Zagaglia mill, and, west of Leo, both battalions of the 1045th Regiment.

On the enemy side, between Maserno and Albarelli, the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division continues to be engaged alongside the partisans. To the west followed the 92nd Infantry Division, a "Black Division" called "Buffalo Soldiers," whose soldiers wore a yellow badge with the image of a buffalo around their arms. This was "the only black division to fight in World War II as a division." Two of its regiments faced the 232nd Infantry Division, namely: the 365th American Infantry Regiment in the Cutigliano area, along the Brenner road, at s south of Abetone, and the 371st Infantry Regiment opposite the 1044th and part of the 1045th Regiment respectively. The "Buffalo Soldiers" division included black, white, Japanese-American, British, Indian, and Italian soldiers.

Despite the enormous reserves of ammunition and the absolute air superiority of the Allies, the artillery attacks, jabos, and bombings never ceased. in the early days of April 1945, before the Allied spring offensive, the activities of aerial scouts intensified, as did the enemy artillery's adjustment fire, especially on targets deep in the battlefield. In large-scale combat, the enemy infantry attack is preceded, as is now well established in Italy, by the destruction and bombing by Jabo of everything that moves. Finally, the infantry attack is supported, if the terrain allows it, by as many tank formations as possible.

On the way to the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, following the telephone line on a journey of over two and a half hours over rocks and stones, from the heights of Montespecchio, one can clearly observe the enemy artillery batteries adjusting their fire and the heavy bombardment of Montese, Salto, San Martino, Ranocchio, and the eastern slopes of the Panaro River.
Regularly, amid phosphorus grenades, there are again grenades with leaflets. Montespecchio initially remains unscathed and, with its blossoming trees and pointed bell tower, looks almost like a village in Upper Bavaria.
For four days, the enemy adjusted the aim of its cannons on the command post of the 1044th regiment at Mulino del Leo. High shots coming from above, single shots, smoke grenades sometimes too short, sometimes too long, sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left. Mainly on the slope in front of the "tower." From the fourth day onwards, carpet bombing also followed.

On the morning of April 9, an hour before dawn while it is still dark, heavy bombing begins, with more than one battery of cannons, on the mill, which suffers damage from shrapnel, and some telephone lines are interrupted for a short time; but the mill remains standing.
All radio equipment has already been moved to the rooms below the mill. The small bunker for radio operators above the mill was reinforced with an additional layer of wooden sticks, brought from the river, stones, and soil. The hard work would soon pay off, despite enemy aerial reconnaissance. The general staff continued to work in the largest room in the residential part of the mill.

The next day, April 10, 1945, at 10 a.m., enemy artillery fire begins again with even larger calibers. The adjutant also moves to the communications post under the mill; the commander and the communications officer, both without helmets, move to the lower part of the mill but above the lower room; the first shot hits the living quarters of the mill and its thick walls, made of poor-quality lime, shatter.
The second direct hit breaks through to the concrete floor, and the mill collapses into rubble. Both the commander and the communications officer are not only wounded by shrapnel but are also buried h ly under the rubble. Fortunately, they end up under a beam and are saved. Through the opening in the ceiling, it is possible to rescue both of them through the small cavity and provide them with assistance. The nearest doctor is in Gaiato, and in daylight it is impossible to reach him. Two more grenades hit the already destroyed mill. The ceiling and beams end up mostly inside the remains of the thick walls.

In place of the cable rack, on which all the telephone lines leaving the southern side of the mill are fixed, there is now a large crater. All the connection cables have to be replaced for at least 656 ft, while the radio operators maintain communications with the units; but there is still no sign of the enemy infantry attack. From the Zagaglia Mill, along the bushes on the banks of the Leo River, the commander of the 2nd Battalion arrives to replace the wounded commander. An ascent with the wounded to Gaiato during the day is impossible. Apart from the men wounded by shrapnel, there are many who are bruised.

Since the lower room of the mill, where the switchboard is located, has now also been partially destroyed by grenades, the command post is moved to 'the tall poplars' on the western bank of the river, where construction of a cemetery for the regiment's German soldiers has begun. Since even the good donkey Leo has been killed by shrapnel, all the tools and rolls of cable have to be moved on foot across the river. The only way to leave the destroyed room is through the mill's drainage channel.

At sunset, they can begin to climb up to Gaiato and reach the command post of the 13th Company of the 1044th Regiment. At the main command post in Gaiato, the doctor is already waiting and removes the first aid bandages from the regiment's communications officer. The doctor can only remove the smallest pieces of shrapnel and stone embedded in the officer's skull; the wounds are dirty with debris from the rubble.
As the main medical camp of the 232nd Infantry Division is still operating south of Pavullo, along the road to Brenner, transport to the field hospital is carried out with a Sanka from the 232nd. In the early hours of April 11, the vehicle is attacked twice on the Brenner road by American Jabo planes, despite the large red cross painted on the roof. Both times, the driver manages to save the vehicle by hiding in the ditches. The field hospital is in Colombaro, east of Maranello.

Colombaro is located north of the Mountains overlooking the Po plain, south of Modena. The hospital is housed in the main building of a very large farm that even has a gardener's house, set in a large, well-kept park. The hospital staff who unload the wounded wear large red cross badges on their arms, in constant fear of attacks by partisans. The Italians are kind, the building has a lot of marble and there are frescoes on the ceilings. From the living room there is a beautiful view of the park and a small chapel with a narrow bell tower, a 'miniature church of St. Elizabeth', reminiscent of the one in MARBURG on the Lahn, especially since the medical commander of the general staff and the commander of the motorized column are from MARBURG. The latter was recently in Marburg on his honeymoon, from where he managed to escape the newly arrived Americans and return to his troops via Thuringia.

The first few days of fever fade from memory after the removal of 32 small pieces of shrapnel and stone; fortunately, his skull was not broken. On April 15, a number of wounded soldiers from the 1044th Regiment arrive from the front and report attacks by "the Negroes," the occupation of barricades, the fighting at the Zagaglia mill, those who ended up in captivity, and those who fell. Not everyone wanted to come down from the Mountain. The front line of the 1044th Regiment is now located in the positions of the Franzi and Käthe barricades, with the fulcrum on the Montespecchio hill.

Upon arrival in Colombaro, the field hospital is already being moved north, and several units are now north of the Po River; unease and insecurity are growing. "I can barely wash my bloodstained Mountain pants and shirt." In Colombaro, the course of events is uncertain. Italian farmhands from the local area are being dismissed.

The continued treatment of wounds that have not yet healed at the front is possible if the medical commander of the general staff, Dr. Hess, approves. However, he is still in Vignola, in a hospital, not far from the combat position of the 1044th regiment in Gaiato.

With a large bandage on our heads, we return to the front along the Brenner road aboard a Sanka. An Italian lady from near Vignola provides medical assistance and accompanies us. From Monfestino to Pavullo, the Sanka is attacked again by jabos. The field gendarmerie guides the vehicle to shelter, to some trees, while the Jabos attack. After dropping a bomb on the supply warehouse in Pavullo, the planes fly over the village for another attack with their onboard weapons. Despite further bombing, we continue through the park to return to the HVPL (main rescue camp) of the 114th Jäger Division.
The Jabos continue to attack for another half hour, and the Italian women in the field hospital are trembling alongside the doctors at the entrance to the caves. It is not possible to unload; the day before, the Americans shot a wounded man who was about to be loaded.
Finally, it is possible to return to Gaiato, to the 1044th's combat position, and speak with Major Seibel, who commands the regiment. Colonel Winkelman, apart from a few minor shrapnel wounds to his chin, has lumbago and is in Gaiato. During his visit by the medical commander, Dr. Hess, the following morning, the latter is not at all happy with the state of the wounds: "it smells like something's burning here" and prescribes further treatment. However, this lasts only one day because the following morning the field hospital is attacked by Jabos and is so badly damaged that the HVPL has to be moved.
With their heads bandaged, they headed for the regiment's command post, in a chestnut grove under artillery fire. Meetings immediately followed to move the post from "Adlerhorst" (eagle's nest) to "Felsennest" (rock nest). This position is also known as "B-stelle" (observation post) due to its high location above the Panaro valley. From here, there is an excellent view of the 1044th Regiment's battlefield and, to the left, the nearby 721st Jäger Regiment.

On April 14, the Allies launched their general attack, the "Spring Offensive," code-named "Operation Craftsman" by the US IV Corps. To this end, the Brazilians established an observation post on hill 892, near Sassomolare, and also moved their command post to the village. For the attack on Montese, the Brazilians were supported by partisans and an American tank destroyer unit.

Meanwhile, the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division sent out patrols and bomb disposal experts to clear the area of mines and took up positions in the Sassomolare area, mainly on both sides of the road to Montese, in a line from Casone to Il Cerro to Possessione to hill 745. Already in the morning, the Allies advanced under heavy air cover ("On the morning of the 14th, the skies became populated with hundreds and hundreds of powerful aircraft of the Allied Air Force"). The patrols could only act at 10:15 a.m., at the same time as the start of the attack by the US 10th Mountain Division, opposed on the German side by the 334th Infantry Division. As the Brazilians' combat strip was very narrow, their artillery was able to deliver very concentrated fire. After the mines were cleared and a further barrage by the Brazilian artillery and the US Chemical Mortar Company A, the main attack began at 1:30 p.m. However, at the border of the village of Montese, despite the now weak defense by the Gebirgsjäger, the attack stalled. Now Mascarenhas sent forward his G-3, Lieutenant Colonel Humberto de Alenear Castello Branco. At the edge of the village, there were disagreements between the Brazilians and Americans over the passage of their respective tanks. Who would advance first? Only after a direct order from Lieutenant Colonel Branco did the Brazilians, according to the American interpreter's report, climb into their "mighty tanks" to drive the Germans out of the village, despite intense German artillery fire.

In reality, at that moment, only rearguards remained in the village and the German artillery was already moving back, while the Jäger of the 721st Regiment took up position in front of the "Käthe" barrier in the Salto - S. Martino - Ranocchio - Monte Buffone area.

For the evening of April 14, Mascarenhas indicates, as a general rule, occupied: the village of Maserno, hill 806, hill 808, the village of Montese, the localities of Serretto and Possessione, as well as the area east of Casa di Bortolino. On the left flank, towards the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, nothing significant changed in the Maserno area. The Germans fiercely defend the Monte Buffone area and successfully hold the only road from Montese to Panaro and the flank towards the 232nd Infantry Division (1044th Grenadier Regiment). Near Monte Buffone, American tanks destroy the ancient houses of Montello, but here too, no progress is made. Despite the great effort to occupy the "Montese bulwark," the enemy's gains were very limited, and Mascarenhas even expected a counteroffensive by the 721st Jäger Regiment to retake Montese from the Salto-Ranocchio area, hill 871, and Serretto, immediately north of Montese.

Regarding the progress of the 10th American Mountain Division on the first day of the offensive against the 334th Infantry Division, on April 14, Mascarenhas notes: "since the gallant 10th Mountainer's advance was small."

On April 15, the Brazilian division was again unable to advance: the "terrible barrage of German artillery" and machine gun fire was even more accurate than the day before, and minefields blocked the troops. On April 16, the Germans defended their positions with great tenacity throughout the day. Until April 19, the Brazilians were unable to break through the line between Riva di Biscia, Doccia (near Montese), and Salto to the west.

The 10th American Division managed, only on the third day of the offensive, to take the village of Tolè, defended by the 334th Infantry Division. Brazilian losses near Montese, up to April 18, aMonteed to 426 men, including 34 killed, 382 wounded, and 10 missing.

On April 18, 1945, the Brazilian sector Cappella di Ronchidoso - Monteforte passed to the 371st Regiment of the 92nd Division, which expanded its mission area, replacing the Brazilian III Battalion.

After that, the 371st American Infantry Regiment began to advance slowly but was again forced to stop at the "Kitty-Franzi" barrage on the line south of Rochetta-Mulino di Zagaglia-Montespecchio - Riva di Biscia line, where the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment, in open terrain and with great skill, always manages to establish flying positions. The battalion commander's watchword is: "We must put up more resistance."

On the left wing of the "Franzi - Riegel" barricade, near Montespecchio, it is necessary to continuously adjust to the combat line of the 721st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division, which involves constant movements of companies from left to right. After voluntarily abandoning the last barrier east of the Panaro River, the left flank of the 1044th Regiment was finally positioned on the wooden bridge crossing the Panaro west of Chiazzo.

Only a hesitant unit of enemy scouts proceeded along the road from Ranocchio to the Panaro River and, after intercepting their radio communications, was successfully taken under fire. To the east, between the woods of Montespecchio and the Panaro River, the enemy infantry is caught under mortar fire from the 1044th Regiment and communicates by radio that it is under heavy German artillery bombardment and unable to advance.

[...]

Partial translation taken from the book: "Bomber, Jabos, Partisanen" (subtitle: furious finale in Italy). The history of the 232nd German Infantry Division in Italy between 1944 and 1945. By Heinrich Boucsein.