The mountain infantry training battalion was formed in late 1941 in Mittenwald, Upper Bavaria. It was stationed at the Mountain Infantry School primarily as a training and instruction unit. Among other tasks, it was responsible for testing weapons, animals, and equipment for mountain warfare under extreme weather and terrain conditions.

Most of the soldiers and non-commissioned officers had been transferred from the Glasenbach weapons school near Salzburg. Lacking combat experience in 1943, the men were replaced by experienced soldiers from mountain troops who were convalescing in barracks in Bavaria. All the officers were members of mountain troops called up from all parts of Germany and Austria.

From March 1943, Captain Hans Rauchti was the battalion commander. He was an experienced leader, wounded during the campaign in Poland, and was the only professional soldier
having served as a sergeant major and officer candidate in peacetime in the army.

The battalion consisted of 1,300 men and was organized, armed, and equipped to operate as an independent tactical unit. This principle was also extended to the company level, enabling them to carry out entire missions on their own initiative:

The transport animals, consisting of about 600 mules and horses, ensured mobility on difficult terrain and complete availability of the then-standard heavy infantry support weapons such as heavy machine guns, mortars, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, a motorized tank destroyer platoon, and two heavy infantry support guns, also motorized.
A communications platoon and an engineer platoon completed the picture. Long-distance mobility was, however, hampered by the large number of pack animals and pack horses suitable only for transport. Motorization remained very limited until the late period of the war and deployment in Italy.

Note: the battalion was nevertheless an elite organization equipped with the latest weapons. Each squad had two MG42s with bipods. Towards the end of the war, two more MG42s with Lafette tripods were added to the heavy weapons company of each battalion. For the Allies, the heavy machine gun was the .50 caliber Browning (12.7 mm), while for the German army, the heavy machine gun was a normal MG42 or 34 mounted on a Lafette tripod - and three 80 mm mortars,  the version supplied to mountain troops allowed, through a special percussion mechanism, to fire even with the tube almost horizontal, to each rifle company. The battalion also had a large number of weapons captured on the Russian front and Italian mortars.
The heavy weapons company was equipped with at least two 75mm howitzers, 4 or 6 heavy mortars, and 4 or 6 MG42 machine guns.
The tank destroyer platoon of a rifle battalion usually had four 50 or 75 mm cannons and, in , a heavy 150 mm cannon to support the infantry, among the many captured in France or from the First World War. There were also 105 mm mountain guns available, and each company was well supplied with anti-tank weapons such as Panzerfausts and Panzerschrecks, the latter copied from American bazookas, which were very useful against difficult targets.

As a training battalion at the Mountain Infantry School in Mittenwald, it gave its non-commissioned officers and officers ample time and opportunity to be trained to be part of a unit prepared for mountain warfare at any time and under any conditions. Training exercises in extreme conditions pushed men and animals to their limits. Particular emphasis was placed at all times on developing leadership in non-commissioned officers and young officers and their independent thinking and decision-making.

The unstable political situation in Italy in August 1943 led the battalion to conduct its first mission in South Tyrol in Alto Adige in northern Italy; for this occasion, it was reinforced by a company from the 54th Mountain Engineer Training & Replacement Battalion and a High Mountain Company from the High Mountain School in Fulpmes in Tyrol. Security operations were carried out between the Brenner Pass and Bolzano in collaboration with the then loyal units of the Italian Army. The armistice of September 8 between Italy and the Allies changed the cooperation into conflict. The Italians south of the Brenner Pass were disarmed and taken prisoner.
The battalion was busy for some time protecting important installations in the Bassano del Grappa area at the foot of the Alps, from where it was sent on a search and destroy mission east of Lake Como. Italian partisans had settled in the mountainous regions and were causing problems for the supply lines of the Army Group South. During that period, the Mittenwald or Ruchti Battalion—so named after its area of origin or the name of its commander—suffered its first casualty in action against the enemy.
In November 1943, it returned to Mittenwald and resumed its role as an instruction and training battalion.

The battalion returned to Italy in June 1944, where it remained until the end of the war.
The companies of the Ruchti Battalion were divided into numerous small detachments to secure supply and communication lines and protect vital installations scattered throughout the Apennine Mountains from Lucca in the west, above Abetone and the Futa Pass, to the Adriatic Sea. At that time, the Todt organization was busy building fortified positions to defend the mountain passes and other access roads from the Tuscan plain to the Po Valley. These works also had to be protected. A number of localized battles were fought by small detachments, but without significant losses.

Towards the end of July, the entire battalion was concentrated near Pontremoli, a small town on the Parma-La Spezia road a few miles south of the Cisa Pass. The mission was to keep open the supply lines for the Army Group still fighting in the south and to attack the Partisan units in the remote valleys of the Apennine Mountains in Etruria, which had become increasingly organized. n groups were supplied by parachute drops and were commanded by British officers trained in guerrilla warfare; in some cases, they were led by German deserters.
Men and animals performed magnificently on the mountainous terrain at altitudes of around 900 meters, and some of these groups were eliminated.
Of course, sometimes the nest was empty because the local civilian population did its best to keep the Partisans informed of the battalion's movements.

A report from that period states: "All the time and effort spent on training in Mittenwald has now paid off; the men respond willingly to extreme demands and the non-commissioned officers are reliable when on independent missions in the field, having to make their own decisions. Commander Ruchti and his officers can be fully proud of the Training Battalion. Only a few units remain in the Southern Theater that convey such an impression of cohesion and competent leadership."

Later, in mid-August 1944, the Mittenwald Battalion is transferred to the west of the Alps. The American army and French troops are advancing in the valley north of the Rhone and threatening the west-east roads leading to the Po Valley. The troops occupied the ridges along the border between France and Italy between the Tenda Pass, on the Turin-Ventimiglia road, and the Maddalena Pass west of the Alps, repelling any enemy advances.
Some supply problems were encountered due to the large dispersion of small units in alpine positions that were difficult to reach and repeated partisan activity.

Just before preparations for winter began, orders arrived to redeploy by train or on foot to the Apennine Mountains. By mid-November, the battalion headquarters was once again established in familiar Pontremoli, south of the Cisa Pass.
The mission was to once again fight the partisans, who had recovered from the punishment the battalion had inflicted on them the previous summer.
One of these missions involved transport by rail to the starting point. Several carriages were uncoupled during the journey, in an act of sabotage that was never proven, and sped wildly along the tracks on the southern slopes until they crashed at high speed into a freight train.
The men of the 1st Company occupying the two front cars suffered heavily from the impact. The 12 dead and 60 wounded, some seriously, were more than the total losses of the battalion's previous missions.

During the Christmas holidays, Task Force Ruchti had its first serious clash with the US Army. The Americans, in their advance northward, had passed through the plains of Tuscany and were now fighting along the roads that crossed the Apennines toward the Po Valley. The battalion was tasked with advancing along the foothills east of the mountains and flanking the enemy, which was advancing towards Lucca. Due to the rough terrain and the need to move only after dark— t due to the need to maintain the element of surprise as well as the omnipresent daytime presence of Allied observers and air support on the ground—this proved to be a difficult undertaking.
However, the battalion was able to achieve its objectives and caused some damage to the enemy, but the American troops of color had generally been able to withdraw their artillery pieces in time.
Pursuit was out of the question due to the ever-increasing distance from the German lines. Contact with the enemy was broken off without incident during the night of December 26/27, and after a grueling march and some heavy fighting, the battalion reached Pontremoli again on New Year's Day.

The battalion's combat strength was reduced in early 1945 with the reassignment of two mountain infantry companies. These units were needed to replace losses suffered by a battered Mountain Division in northern Europe. The Third Company under 1st Lieutenant Reichart and the Fourth Company under Captain Leibetseder, who had been with the battalion since the beginning, left the unit.

At the beginning of January, an attempt was made to encircle and annihilate the partisan units operating from the mountains south of the Po Valley. As part of the operation, the remaining units of the battalion were initially transported by rail through the tunnel under the Apennine ridge to Borgo Val di Tara. The mission was then to advance northwards into the mountains, flush the Partisans out of their territory and drive them into the arms of other troops advancing southwards from the Po Valley.
But things did not go as planned, even though Ruchti achieved his objectives with two task forces and managed to wipe out several Partisan strongholds.
The forces advancing from the north, however, soon became bogged down when heavy snow began to fall. Additional and significant factors contributing to the failure of the operation were the increasingly apparent shortage of units capable of carrying out such an extensive mission and the lack of sufficient communications equipment for efficient coordination.

By the end of January, the battalion was transferred to the sector between Abetone and Passo della Futa. This involved a 125-mile march, completed in seven days, over snow-covered and icy roads and mountain passes. This extraordinary achievement earned well-deserved praise from senior headquarters, where the availability of a reliable reserve unit created a sense of relief, given that the mountain passes were already under attack by American forces.
The battalion's command post was located in Fanano, a small mountain town about 6 miles northeast of Monte Cimone (2165 meters above sea level), which overlooks the Abetone Pass. Monte Belvedere is located east of the town and can be reached via a 16 km road that runs southeast until it meets the Bologna-Pistoia state road, via the Passo di Porretta road, a few kilometers north of Porretta and Monte Belvedere Terme.
Monte Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia form a ridge, about 5 km long with an altitude rising from 975 to 1100 meters above sea level, overlooking the state road that leads to Bologna in the northeast.
The American forces, apparently the 10th Mountain Division, managed to take this ridge towards the end of February despite fierce German resistance.

NOTE: This account is based, up to this point, on letters and notes from Captain Hans Tengelmann, former commander of the 5th Company of the battalion. The events of Monte Belvedere were reconstructed during a gathering of former officers of the Rauchti Battalion near Salzburg.

The battalion, currently deployed in the Fanano area, was notified on February 24, 1945, and ordered to recapture the mountain ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte
della Torraccia. The starting line was in the area of the village of Rocca Corneta, immediately west of Monte Belvedere, which was reached by improvised transport on trucks and without pack animals; at the beginning, only some of the heavy weapons supporting the infantry were available.
The distance from Monte Belvedere was about 5 km, and the difference in altitude was about 450 meters. The distance between Rocca Corneta and Monte della La Torraccia was about 10 kilometers.
The unloading and deployment were promptly disrupted by sporadic enemy artillery barrages.
Major Ruchti personally went on reconnaissance to the northeast, attempting to establish contact with various rifle units; it was said that the 4th High Mountain Battalion was engaged in the Monte della Torraccia area. No members of these units were located.
The commander, Major Ruchti, opted for an immediate attack without elaborate preparations. The 2nd Company, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Gast, was ordered to assault Monte della Torraccia, the eastern extension of the ridge formed by Monte Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia, bypassing Monte Belvedere to the north. Immediately after the attack, contact with this company was lost.

The 1st Company, commanded by First Lieutenant von Duerrfeld, also bypassed Monte Belvedere and attempted, during the night of February 24-25, supported by other elements of the battalion, to take the saddle between the two mountains.
The frontal assault faltered just below the crest of the saddle due to enemy artillery fire and four tanks that the Americans had managed to bring up from the south to the crest of the ridge. The battalion was limited to its own resources during this action. The support promised by the Corps artillery did not materialize, and positioning the battalion's heavy weapons proved extremely difficult. Furthermore, they did not have adequate range.

Not much happened in the following days. The battalion's movements were seriously hampered by the accurate fire of the American artillery and the aforementioned tanks, which also targeted individual soldiers. This is why the main elements of the 1st Company, about 25 men (including the company commander), were unable to disengage and had to surrender.
The battalion subsequently established a line of defense along the northern slopes of the Monte Belvedere-Monte della Torraccia ridge and remained there, virtually alone, until the second half of March. From then on, there was no significant combat action, so much so that the US Army left only defensive forces in position. Thus, the Americans continued their advance northward, and the ridge of Monte Belvedere-Monte della Torraccia became insignificant.

On V-E Day, the battalion was in the Aosta Valley, its mission being to deny French access through the Little St. Bernard Pass in the Po Valley.
Some elements of the battalion crossed the border into Switzerland and remained interned there until the end of 1945.
Most surrendered as a unit to the US Army and remained for several months in the Ghedi camp near Brescia.
During their captivity, the members of the battalion, still under the command of Major Hans Ruchti, were treated fairly by the Americans who took them prisoner.
The unit had earned an excellent reputation and respect from the enemy during the fighting in Italy.
Casualties during deployment were relatively low, as was the case during the action on Monte Belvedere, with seven killed during that four-week period of combat.
The number of wounded is not known, but it is unlikely to have been excessive. About 50 men were taken prisoner, especially on Monte Belvedere.

The strengths of the Ruchti Battalion were: mobility in trackless terrain, enormous firepower, precise leadership by experienced officers (this should be considered a very significant factor, given the conditions encountered towards the end of the war), and a selection of men hardened by peacetime training and combat experience.

 Source: DIE MITTENWALD BATALION, Hans Tengelmann
Translation: Andrea Gandolfi