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"APENNINE CAMPAIGN"
WINTER STALEMATE
The cold waters of streams and lakes covered with thin layers of ice, woven during the cold nights of the last days of October, heralded the arrival of winter in the Apennines.
The highest peaks were already covered with snow, the lower edge of which descended day after day, and local residents predicted that within a few weeks the entire countryside would be covered with snow. Women, children, and elderly men spent their days scouring the mountain trails in search of wood to heat their homes, while we held our water bottles close to the fires to melt the ice that had formed during the freezing nights or break the thin layer of ice in our helmets to perform our morning grooming.
Trails of icy vapor spread clearly from our mouths and nostrils on these cold mornings, and the biting cold of the air struck our exposed ears and fingers. A soldier on patrol with a bare finger on the trigger feared he might lose feeling from numbness. Intense cold winds moaned through the patches of trees on the razor-sharp slopes of the mountains. But to carry out your part of the defensive mission on the jagged peaks in these winter conditions required guts and great willpower to overcome the natural difficulties that were equal to the enemy's contribution.
With the arrival of November, Allied troops in Italy knew that the time had come to dig in for a second winter, but they had the satisfaction of knowing that they had beaten the enemy over many miles of ground during the past year.
For almost two full months, they had fought their way from mountain to mountain in a campaign that, in terms of intensity during prolonged action, was unmatched by any other effort made by armies elsewhere. Beginning during the warm, clear days of early September, the advance gradually slowed in proportion to the increase in torrential rains, coming to a halt at the end of October.
The strain of heavy losses, increased enemy resistance, and muddy supply routes also wore down the offensive strength of the attacking divisions.
It was believed that our troops could have continued, had it not been for one primary controlling factor: the state of the ammunition supplies available to the army. Priority in ammunition and replacements had been shifted to General Eisenhower's forces on the Western Front. It was estimated that if the average daily rate of usage continued, the current stocks available to the Army, including the current allocation and theater reserve, would be completely exhausted by November 10. It was further determined that theater allocations for the period from November 10 to January 10 would not be sufficient for any mission beyond a defensive role.
It would take some time to build up the reserve necessary to support even limited offensive attacks, especially in certain categories, such as ammunition for 155 mm guns, as production capacity in the United States was unable to meet overall demand. Under these conditions, the Fifth Army had no choice but to halt operations, and it was not known when new sustained action could be undertaken. Therefore, on October 30, the Commander of the Fifth Army issued verbal instructions, confirmed in a subsequent written directive on November 3, outlining the action to be taken by all units under the Army's control.