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"APENNINE CAMPAIGN"
WINTER STALEMATE

The cold waters of streams and lakes covered with thin layers of ice, woven during the cold nights of the last days of October, heralded the arrival of winter in the Apennines.
The highest peaks were already covered with snow, the lower edge of which descended day after day, and local residents predicted that within a few weeks the entire countryside would be covered with snow. Women, children, and elderly men spent their days scouring the mountain trails in search of wood to heat their homes, while we held our water bottles close to the fires to melt the ice that had formed during the freezing nights or break the thin layer of ice in our helmets to perform our morning grooming.
Trails of icy vapor spread clearly from our mouths and nostrils on these cold mornings, and the biting cold of the air struck our exposed ears and fingers. A soldier on patrol with a bare finger on the trigger feared he might lose feeling from numbness. Intense cold winds moaned through the patches of trees on the razor-sharp slopes of the mountains. But to carry out your part of the defensive mission on the jagged peaks in these winter conditions required guts and great willpower to overcome the natural difficulties that were equal to the enemy's contribution.

With the arrival of November, Allied troops in Italy knew that the time had come to dig in for a second winter, but they had the satisfaction of knowing that they had beaten the enemy over many miles of ground during the past year.

For almost two full months, they had fought their way from mountain to mountain in a campaign that, in terms of intensity during prolonged action, was unmatched by any other effort made by armies elsewhere. Beginning during the warm, clear days of early September, the advance gradually slowed in proportion to the increase in torrential rains, coming to a halt at the end of October.

The strain of heavy losses, increased enemy resistance, and muddy supply routes also wore down the offensive strength of the attacking divisions.

It was believed that our troops could have continued, had it not been for one primary controlling factor: the state of the ammunition supplies available to the army. Priority in ammunition and replacements had been shifted to General Eisenhower's forces on the Western Front. It was estimated that if the average daily rate of usage continued, the current stocks available to the Army, including the current allocation and theater reserve, would be completely exhausted by November 10. It was further determined that theater allocations for the period from November 10 to January 10 would not be sufficient for any mission beyond a defensive role.

It would take some time to build up the reserve necessary to support even limited offensive attacks, especially in certain categories, such as ammunition for 155 mm guns, as production capacity in the United States was unable to meet overall demand. Under these conditions, the Fifth Army had no choice but to halt operations, and it was not known when new sustained action could be undertaken. Therefore, on October 30, the Commander of the Fifth Army issued verbal instructions, confirmed in a subsequent written directive on November 3, outlining the action to be taken by all units under the Army's control.

Changes in the disposition of troops
At his command post overlooking Lucca, General Crittenberger received the following instructions from the Commander of the 5th Army; they outlined in general terms the plans for halting the Army's offensive but ordered a major change in the current areas of responsibility.

The 92nd Infantry Division, under the control of the 5th Army, would assume responsibility for the coastal area and the Serchio valley east of Bagni di Lucca. The new area of the IV Corps would extend from Bagni di Lucca to the border of the II Corps, on the Setta River. The 6th South African Armored Division and Combat Command B, currently engaged in that area, were to return under the control of the IV Corps.

To prepare to take command of the new area to the east, the General was tasked with establishing a small command group somewhere east of the area to facilitate subsequent movements, replacements, and the eventual assumption of command of the new sector. He was also to concentrate the 6th Combat Team of the FEB in the area then held by Combat Command B.
Upon the arrival of the Brazilians, Combat Command B, minus the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment, was to be relieved and return to its parent unit. The 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment was subsequently to be placed under the command of the 92nd Infantry Division.
After taking over Combat Command B, the Brazilians would continue to push forward along Provincial Road 64 to restrict the South African division's area of action.
Finally, when the command of the new sector became effective and if Monte Sole was still in enemy hands, plans for its capture were to be prepared.

On November 3, by virtue of a radio message from the 5th Army, the above instructions were put into effect, and thus the coast and the Serchio valley passed to the 92nd Division, and the rest of the area, up to the border of the II Corps, was placed under the control of the IV Corps. The following day, the transfer of troops began in the utmost secrecy.
To help cover the plan, all unit identification signs were left in the old areas while the troops were moving from the western zone to the new Corps area.
Organizational signs were removed from vehicles and equipment.
The highest ranks of IV Corps Headquarters were divided, and only a small number of operational personnel moved to the mountain village of Taviano, where they established an advanced command post.
The majority of the senior officers established a new command post in a huge square villa north of Pistoia.
To further deceive the enemy, radios and sign installations were left in the old areas northwest of Lucca.
The dissemination of these instructions was rightly timed to give relief to Combat Command B, which was under heavy pressure in the Reno River valley.

After weeks of retreating northward across Italy toward the Gothic Line, having been forced out of fortified positions and then slowly retreating, Hitler had suddenly given the order to hold fast in the Apennines. The German reaction was immediate. The enemy halted across the line and was now beginning to mount local counterattacks.

This standoff was highlighted by the stubborn defense exhibited south of Bologna and the fierce resistance offered east and west of the salient. Combat Command B, under the command of Colonel Dewey, in its advance along State Road 64 to Torre di Nerone, was put to a severe test by this sudden show of sensitivity.
Every effort was made to drive his small force from the high ground overlooking State Road 64 north of Porretta. In one day, the 11th Armored Infantry Battalion was counterattacked seven times near Affrico but held its ground.
To alleviate the situation, an emergency alert was once again sent to the IV Corps. The unit that managed to come to Colonel Dewey's aid the fastest was the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was then deployed on the coast. At midnight on November 2, a company of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion was ordered to break away and move 120 kilometers to the Porretta area, where it arrived at dawn the following day. The remaining tank destroyers of the battalion and the tanks of the 751st Tank Battalion followed closely behind.

The rapid arrival of those tank destroyers and tanks probably saved the day. However, infantry support was still needed.

Since the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB), under the command of General Mascarenhas, had to remain with the IV Corps, elements of the 92nd Infantry Division relieved the Brazilian infantry in the Serchio Valley. On November 2, the 2nd Battalion of the Brazilian 6th Infantry Regiment, already replaced, was hastily sent to the Porretta Terme area. The rest of the Brazilians who had been engaged in action moved to the Reno River valley as quickly as they were replaced. The rest of the Brazilian expeditionary force was sent away from the Pisa area as quickly as the delivery of equipment and the completion of their pre-battle training allowed.

On November 5, the 1st Infantry Division of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force took command of the area held by Combat Command B, straddling the Reno River, which, together with Troop D of the 81st Reconnaissance Cavalry Squadron, was placed under the operational command of the Brazilians.

The rapid movement of elements of the 6th Regiment towards the Reno Valley, followed by the rest of the Division's movement from the Pisa area and the engagement of these new troops in action, were a crucial test for the Brazilian Expeditionary Force. It was a sudden test of personnel planning, logistics, and leadership, all under the stress of haste.

The urgent move illustrates one of the phenomena of war, for while it is true that war in many cases consists of watching and waiting, on the other hand, when a threatening emergency looms, the rush is haphazard as troops hurry toward the threatened areas. This was the case when the Brazilian center of activity was moved so quickly from the Serchio Valley to the Reno Valley, 50 or 60 miles to the east.

The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was transferred to positions near Affrico before midnight on November 5, and the 2nd Battalion took over from the 11th Armored Infantry Battalion. On the same day, the 434th Anti-Aircraft Battalion moved from the coast and approached a staging area near Ponte Petri, preparing to replace the 74th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment.
In the following days, on November 6, the headquarters of Task Force 45, transferred to the coastal area, moved to the area of S. Marcello Pistoiese and took the place of the 107th Anti-Aircraft Group in the area stretching from Bagna di Lucca to Campo Tizzoro. At 6:00 p.m. on November 7, the 1st Battalion of the 6th Combat Team, in the assembly area at Grazlione (?), was detached from the 92nd Infantry Division. General Mascarenhas replaced elements of Combat Command B on one side and kept the contact with the enemy on the other, pushing combat patrols deep into enemy territory, where they engaged in combat north of Palazzo [d'Affrico] and near Labante and Caselina.

By 6:00 p.m. on November 11, the 11th Armored Division controlled the area. The troops that did not leave the area were the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment; the 13th Tank Battalion; the 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; and Troops D of the 81st Reconnaissance Squadron, which remained under the operational control of the 1st Infantry Division of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.
The missions assigned to General Rutledge's Task Force 45 in its new area were contained in IV Corps Operational Instructions No. 65, dated November 6, and were as follows: "Hold the Campo Tizzoro-Cutigliano-Bagni di Lucca line and prevent any enemy movement south of it; continue active patrolling and prepare plans to follow the enemy's retreat." This sector was held by the 107th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group. General Rutledge was also to prepare plans to complete the rotations of the 47th and 74th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments by November 8; maintain contact with the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps and the 92nd Infantry Division (now under the Army); and, finally, protect the left flank of IV Corps.

The area occupied by Task Force 45 was bounded on the right by Road 6629, which ran from Ponte Petri to Ponte della Venturina, where it joined State Road 64. The 92nd Infantry Division was adjacent on the left and the Brazilian Expeditionary Corps on the right. This segment of the Apennines was distinctly mountainous with extremely rugged terrain.
The enemy had carried out extensive demolition work on the roads.
The main supply route was State Road 66, which led from Pistoia through Ponte Petri to an intersection with State Road 12 at La Lima. State Road 12, which led from Lucca to Bagni di Lucca, Lima, and from there to Sestaione, was open only to jeep traffic from Bagni di Lucca to Lima, as was Road 6629. The road from Montecatini to La Lima was impassable due to demolition. There were no other roads north of the Bagni di Lucca-Campo Tizzoro line, only a few difficult mule tracks. To the east and west of State Road 12 from La Lima to Sestaione were mountains that were practically sheer cliffs.

The initial mission to relieve the 47th British Regiment and the 74th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment began on November 8 when the latter, on the right of the central sector, was replaced by the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion. The 434th garrisoned Spignana, Maresca, Pracchia, and Ponte Petri and, subsequently, Orsigna, Vizzanetta, and La Lima. It also took over patrolling the roads from [Ponte della] Venturina to Campo Tizzoro and from La Lima to Cocciglia.
The M-16 anti-aircraft guns, four 50-caliber machine guns mounted on an armored tracked truck, were used very effectively in these patrols. The M-16s were also placed at Orsigna, Maresca, and the La Lima bridge, where their formidable firepower provided excellent support to the infantry weapons. Battery C of the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion was in reserve, stationed in Campo Tizzoro, ready to travel along one of the two roads to reach any possible trouble spots.

On November 9, the 111th Battery of the 39th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment was moved to the Bagni di Lucca sector, where it replaced the 47th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, which was then sent to the rear to be transformed into an infantry unit. On the same day, the British 71st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment was placed under the operational control of Task Force 45 to provide artillery support. This unit replaced the 80th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment, which was to be transformed into an infantry unit. The 71st Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment had 24 94mm anti-aircraft guns. Eight of them were located in Bagni di Lucca, 12 in S. Marcello Pistoiese, and 4 in Porretta Terme.

The bombing of the advanced areas, particularly near Monte Alcino, was intense, and enemy patrols ventured out of their mountain positions to roam the front. On November 7, four artillery observation aircraft parked on the runway at Porretta Terme were rendered unusable by enemy artillery fire because the runway was under German observation. As a result, the remaining aircraft were evacuated to Pistoia, and due to weather conditions in the mountains and the limited fuel capacity of the aircraft, there were few days when the artillery had aerial observation. An extensive reconnaissance was carried out to locate a site for an airstrip somewhere north of the mountains and out of enemy observation.

Due to the rugged terrain, the only suitable site was found in a valley just north of Lake Suviana. However, it took two weeks for nearly a company of engineers to complete it, and until then our artillery was seriously hampered by the lack of aerial observation. Coincidentally, the enemy air unit, which was supposed to be extinct, rose from the grave on November 10 and 12. On the 10th, enemy aircraft attacked and dropped incendiary bombs in the vicinity of Riola, and again on the 12th, they strafed the area of the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment, inflicting two fatalities.

Smoke generators were used for the first time in the Reno Valley when a platoon from the 179th Chemical Smoke Generation Company took up position in the Brazilian zone.
Starting on November 9, a continuous haze was maintained over the bridges near Porretta, Marano, Silla, and Riola. Contrary to the enemy's usual practice, the bombing did not increase in the first few days of smoke screen coverage of the area but instead decreased significantly during the rest of the month.
Enemy artillery fire was directed at the sites where the bridges were located and was extremely light compared to periods when the smoke screen was not used. Two M-1 mechanical generators were used at each station and were supplemented by smoke pots to fill in the gaps in coverage caused by weather conditions or the inability to position a generator. The capture of prisoners was not limited to infantry, as members of this platoon captured three prisoners in early November. In addition, during the month, enemy artillery fire caused four casualties in the smoke generator platoon, one of which was fatal.
In Task Force 45's area, supplies to forward positions were greatly hampered by inadequate roads and trails. For this reason, rebuilding bridges cut off and roads destroyed by the enemy was given top priority. Approximately 300-400 local residents were recruited by Task Force engineers and put to work filling the large craters that had been created by explosions at critical points on mountain side roads. The reconstruction work required careful masonry, involving the construction of stone walls often 6 or 9 meters high, to restore the road level in the gorges. Excellent wooden bridges with carefully laid stone buttresses were built by Italian workers in a surprisingly short time.
On Road 6629, where a river crossing near Pracchia was urgently needed to allow armored vehicles to pass, the Engineer Task Force established a crossing using the railway bridge. This detour required the dismantling of 3 kilometers of track and passed through two long tunnels, but it provided an excellent road, suitable for all seasons, for heavy traffic.
During this period, closer contact was established between the organized partisan bands and the right flank of the Task Force. General Rutledge went to Lizzano Belvedere to talk with the partisan commander, the self-proclaimed General Armando, leader of about 400-500 partisans. Major Steve O. Rossetti and his OSS detachment, attached to the Corps, were extremely helpful in organizing these scattered bands into effective groups. These groups were often used to guard quiet sectors of the line and allow our troops to rest. The information obtained through the volunteers was extremely useful, as they could move much further ahead of our troops, often behind enemy lines, and were generally able to provide G-2 with an accurate picture of enemy dispositions and activities.

The reinforcement of Task Force 45's right flank became possible on November 11 when the headquarters of the 2nd Armored Group and the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion were detached from Task Force 92 and assigned to Task Force 45. This group of veterans was given the mission of developing the right flank. The troops available were the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion and a contingent of partisans numbering between 200 and 400 men. Vidiciatico, Lizzano, Castelluccio [di Porretta], and Pianaccio were garrisoned. Many strongholds were established, some manned by Americans, others by Americans and partisans together, and others by partisans alone. In this sector, road repairs were also a priority, and with the help of the G-5 of the IV Corps, Colonel Walker (AMG Officer), Italians were again recruited to repair roads and bridges. The paths, once passable only by mules, became passable by jeeps, and the roads once used only by jeeps were widened to allow the passage of trucks and tanks.

On the right flank of IV Corps, the South African 6th Armored Division was not affected by the changes in the deployment of other units. Many combat patrols were sent out and, in almost all cases, came into contact with the enemy. Contact was maintained with II Corps and unit changes were made along its frontline positions. General Crittenberger now had an Armored Division, an Infantry Division, and a Brigade-sized Task Force in line. For the first time since returning to combat in early June, IV Corps occupied an area whose left flank did not run along the coast.

OPERATION MONTE BELVEDERE-CASTELLO IN NOVEMBER

The bulk of the troops were withdrawn from the narrow front of the II Corps for rest, re-equipment, and training in preparation for the Army's large-scale offensive planned for December. Rest centers were set up, the largest of which was in Montecatini, for the relaxation of battle-weary soldiers. While the forces of the V Army, east of the IV Corps, began this period of rehabilitation, General Crittenberger's troops faced more arduous front-line operations. The most important of these involved the capture of local objectives in order to improve positions in view of a possible offensive.
Monte Belvedere and Monte Castello were the primary objectives for improving the Corps' frontline positions, as they offered the enemy observation points on State Road 64 and our positions. Since the Allied troops first reached Porretta Terme, plans had been underway to capture and hold the Monte Belvedere-Monte Castello ridge. Monte Belvedere, 1,100 meters above sea level, and Monte Castello, slightly to the east, were located about 24 kilometers north of Pistoia and west of State Road 64.
From that vantage point, the Germans were able to direct precise artillery fire at our frontline positions and the main road.
It was necessary to capture that dominant ridge to allow our troops to push down towards the Reno Valley with a certain degree of safety and success. The task of capturing the Monte Belvedere-Monte Castello ridge was entrusted to Task Force 45.

On November 18, IV Corps issued Operational Instructions No. 68, which assigned Task Force 45 the following mission: "Repel the enemy from the Monte Belvedere ridge, capture and hold the Monte Castello-Monte della Torraccia-Monte Terminale area."
It also assigned the following additional troops to Task Force 45: 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment; 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry and Reconnaissance Troop, 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, and 751st Tank Battalion minus Companies A and D. To support the operation , the 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and two companies of the 1106th Engineer Group were placed in direct support.
A border change was also made, giving Task Force 45 an additional 5 kilometers to the east, including the eastern slopes of the mountain range. On October 19 and 21, IV Corps assigned additional units from the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 13th Tank Battalion to add momentum to the attack. The 2nd Armored Group was to be directly responsible for the attack and commanded this sector of the Task Force area. The Corps artillery was to participate in support by setting up a prolonged neutralization fire program followed by fire missions on selected targets.
The 424th Field Artillery Group was assigned the mission of serving as the artillery headquarters for Task Force 45, and by November 23, the necessary regrouping of the 2nd Armored Group's forces for the attack on Mount Belvedere was complete.

At 06:00 on November 24, three attacking battalions set out. The weather was cloudy and foggy, preventing the arrival of the planned support and limiting artillery observation. The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry, belonging to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, on the right in the Abetaia area, moved forward to seize the heights near Monte Castello. The 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment, in the center and west of Gaggio Montano, advanced with the ultimate objectives of conquering the heights near Monte Della Torraccia and Monte Terminale, and the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, based in Vidiciatico and Lizzano, struck north to take Querciola, Corona, and Monte Belvedere.
The Brazilians were only able to make limited advances due to the open terrain and heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. Almost at the start of the attack, the support group's command tank was rendered unusable by mines. Resistance stiffened to such an extent that at noon, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment, belonging to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, was forced to retreat to the starting line to reorganize.
The 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment made good progress during the morning and advanced north to Morandella. However, in the afternoon, the enemy, in consistent obedience to Hitler's request to hold the ground, reacted furiously and forced it to fall back to positions just south and west of the village.
The attack by the 435th Anti-Aircraft Battalion was more successful. Querciola was taken in the early afternoon and Corona at nightfall. Strong resistance was encountered along the entire route, and there were many casualties from mortars, German machine guns, and small arms fire. At the end of the day, in the face of this fierce resistance, Battery B arrived on Monte Belvedere with Batteries D and C positioned on both flanks.
At midnight, the positions on the left flank of Task Force 45 at Corona were subjected to a German counterattack. The attack was of company strength, accompanied by blood-curdling shouts and screams, and was something new in the enemy's bag of tricks. We later learned that those Huns, members of the 1st Battalion, 1043rd Infantry Regiment, belonging to the 232nd Infantry Division, had been incited to this noisy enthusiasm by the famous Captain Straube, whose ambition for promotion spurred him to urge his men on from behind with a pistol in one hand and a hand grenade in the other. The name of this Nazi-minded officer came up many times in the prisoners' conversations, along with curses and vows of revenge. His name was also a topic of conversation in our intelligence channels, and out of curiosity we eagerly sought to find out whether or not this notorious enforcer of discipline had received the promotion he desired. The [German] attack was interrupted by concentrated fire from small arms, supporting tanks, and artillery. Fourteen Germans were taken prisoner, six were killed, and ten were wounded. Captain Straube retreated with the survivors, and the shouting seemed to have subsided to a whimper.
The next day, November 25, the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force began their attack at 08:00, in a second attempt to capture the heights of the Belvedere ridge. The Brazilians again encountered heavy fire but nevertheless managed to make some gains. In the afternoon, advancing up the slopes towards the small village of Laza, the 3rd Platoon of Company A belonging to the 849th Tank Destroyer Battalion almost managed to reach the crest of Monte di Bombiana. However, at dusk on the same day, intense mortar fire, which caused casualties, forced all but one company to retreat from their advanced positions towards the ridge south of Guanella. The 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment also made some minor gains in the center in the morning, but in the late afternoon, enemy mortar and heavy artillery fire halted its advance and it was forced to remain in position near Morandella.
Meanwhile, on the left, the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion held the positions it had just captured, with the exception of Battery C, which moved east to prepare to continue the attack on the morning of the 26th. Despite the foggy weather, the supporting artillery fired over 2,000 rounds at the German forces defending Monte Belvedere.
November 26 began with enemy mortar and artillery fire concentrated on the advancing elements stubbornly clinging to their positions on the southern slopes of Mount Belvedere. This pounding continued at an accelerated pace throughout the day. Faced with this heavy fire, the 2nd Armored Group regrouped and reorganized for the continuation of the attack. In the early afternoon, the 9th Company of the 6th Infantry Regiment of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, which had remained in the position it had captured the previous day, was forced to fall back to its original position. The intensity of mortar and artillery fire on the positions in the center also forced the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment to retreat a few hundred meters, where it dug in without making any further attempts to advance. At 10:30 a.m., Battery C of the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion attacked in its area, but encountered intense opposition and made no progress.
On the evening of November 26, IV Corps Operational Instructions No. 70 modified the boundary between the 1st Infantry Division of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force and the Task Force, moving it westward to give the Brazilian division responsibility for capturing Monte Castello. The same order transferred the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry belonging to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force, plus a platoon of tanks and a platoon of tank destroyers from Task Force 45. The area of operations of the 2nd Armored Group now covered only the areas of the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry.
From the afternoon of the 26th to the morning of the 27th, the enemy poured a concentration of over 500 mortar rounds on the newly conquered town of Corona. The partisans reported the concentration of enemies in the nearby village of Rocca Corneta. Our artillery came to the fore and concentrated a TOT (Time on Target - coordinated artillery fire between various calibers so that the shells arrive simultaneously on the same target) on the village, which seemed to crush all enemy activity.
To replace the loss of tanks and tank destroyers available to the Brazilians, IV Corps provided the Task Force with an additional platoon of medium tanks and a platoon of light tanks. The enemy was determined not to allow Monte Belvedere to remain in Allied hands and on the evening of November 28 launched a counterattack with a battalion's worth of forces against the Anti-Aircraft Battalion. In the early part of the day, it was preceded by a light bombardment of Corona and Monte Belvedere, then at 4:40 p.m., a concentration of 200 rounds was directed at Corona.

This caused an advanced fortified point to collapse and wiped out about thirty of our men. The enemy then attacked with two companies across the Valpiana ridge against Corona. At the same time, two companies launched an attack against the positions of Battery B on Mount Belvedere. The unit fought the enemy until a lack of ammunition forced it to retreat slowly to Querciola. At Corona, the men of Battery D continued to fight until 11:00 p.m. when heavy losses, consisting of seventy dead and missing and the destruction of three of their support tanks ( ), forced them to retreat to Vidiciatico. In the attack on Corona, the enemy showed remarkable skill in infiltrating infantry armed with bazookas (Faust-Patrone) at close range from our tanks, from where they could inflict damage.

Battery C resisted stubbornly until 1:30 a.m. the following morning and continued to engage the aggressive Germans until the danger of an enemy encirclement forced this valiant battery to retreat to Querciola. During this action, there was no change in the positions of the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment. It should be noted that during the entire Belvedere operation, the Partisans fought side by side with our troops, demonstrating equal courage and determination in carrying out their mission. The attack by the 435th Anti-Aircraft Battalion, although ending in retreat, instilled a strong respect and admiration for these Italian volunteers.

On the 29th and 30th, the 2nd Armored Group improved its positions as best it could, under heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire. The 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion consolidated and reinforced its positions at Querciola and Vidiciatico. Among the combat and reconnaissance patrols sent to gather information on the enemy's intentions, a patrol from Company G of the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment engaged in a firefight with the Germans in the municipality of C. Lamma, and when the patrol withdrew, our artillery struck the enemy positions.

During Operation Belvedere, the central and left sectors of Task Force 45 did not remain inactive. Since the mission of the 107th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group was to maintain its positions and contact with the enemy, attention was focused on patrol activity. On November 20, enemy activity was reported at Cappel d'Orlando, northwest of Sestaione, where an enemy group was engaged and driven off. The next day, the Germans returned to fire on our positions at Sestaione, but a quick response from our mortars silenced them. Between November 24 and 29, patrols pushed much further forward and made contact with the enemy at Ontoni, Pian Di Novello, and other nearby positions. On November 30, a small German patrol on the road to Cutigliano was intercepted and withdrew with one casualty.

British anti-aircraft artillery support fired an average of 500 rounds per day in the left and central sectors, to which the enemy responded sporadically. Seventy rounds of enemy light artillery fell on the municipality of Cutigliano around noon on November 23, without causing any casualties. On the last day of the month, Troop B of the 209th Battery of the 724th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Artillery, with its four 94mm anti-aircraft guns, was rushed to the right sector to supplement the fire of the 68th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in the Monte Belvedere area.

On December 1, an important change of command took place. Brigadier General Paul W. Rutledge, who had organized Task Force 45 from anti-aircraft artillery battalions into an effective infantry unit, was relieved of his duties to return to the United States to assume a new command. He was succeeded as commander of Task Force 45 by his executive officer, Colonel Gerald G. Gibbs.

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force's attack on Monte Castello
When the border between Task Force 45 and the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was moved westward to include Monte Castello in the Brazilian zone, General Mascarenhas immediately regrouped his forces in preparation for his attack. Activity on November 27 was limited to the movement of units into line.
The 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment remained in position awaiting the order to attack. The 2nd Battalion began moving into the Gaggio-Montano area, while the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment, still inexperienced in combat, approached Silla. Throughout the day, patrols came under machine gun fire from enemy positions at [Santa Maria] Villiana, and several mortar rounds fell on La Serra. The following day, November 28, fifteen minutes after the enemy had launched a counterattack on the positions on Monte Belvedere, another strong attack was launched against the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment. The enemy reached the advanced positions of the two battalions but was forced to retreat. At the same time, an enemy patrol of sixteen men attempted to penetrate our lines along the Brazilian-South African border. It was pushed across the river into the South African zone, where it was subsequently engaged and dispersed. For the rest of the day, enemy activity consisted of an aircraft strafing the Brazilian area and the bombardment of our front lines with artillery and mortar fire. At 08:00 on November 29, after thirty minutes of artillery preparation, the Brazilian infantry division attacked Monte Castello with three battalions in flanking positions. Initially, the attack encountered only light mortar fire, and the advance elements reached Abetaia at 10:45 a.m. However, in the late morning, enemy resistance stiffened, and the advancing troops came under heavy mortar fire.
By late afternoon, the units had reached halfway up the ridge, where they encountered heavy fire from permanently positioned concrete emplacements. The heavy losses suffered forced the 1st Battalion and the 9th Company of the 3rd Battalion to retreat to the lower slopes of Monte Castello. No further attempts at attack were made, and throughout November 30, the Brazilians reported little activity other than patrolling. At 6:25 p.m., however, another enemy attack developed against the positions of the 1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment. Using their artillery to support the attack, the Germans were able to reach the advanced positions of the Brazilian battalion, where they were again repulsed by small arms fire.
The Brazilians suffered their first setbacks, but like all units entering combat for the first time, they learned many lessons and gained valuable experience. The road to final victory was thorny and painful, but the Brazilians who fought at Monte Castello began the journey that would ultimately lead to success. The November weather, with its biting fog and cold rain, was another enemy the Brazilians had to endure. It was a painful contrast to the warm breezes of South America's warmer climate. Time took care of this problem, as immunity to the cold was gradually acquired along with combat experience. After these determined but repeatedly unsuccessful attempts to drive the enemy from their dominant observation positions, all further offensive efforts against the heights of Monte Belvedere and Monte Castello were postponed, and the Corps front remained quiet for several days, interrupted only by patrol skirmishes as the battle of nerves continued.

The 6th South African Armored Division on the right
During the attacks on Monte Belvedere and Monte Castello by Task Force 45 and the Brazilians, the South Africans held their positions on the right flank of the Corps. Contact with the Germans was maintained through the continuous use of combat patrols, both day and night. General Poole rotated the units within his division as often as possible so that the troops were adequately rested and equipped for any eventuality. There were some casualties from mines, artillery fire, and patrol skirmishes, but overall the sector remained quiet. Then in November, the first winter arrived and the attack on Monte Sole was temporarily abandoned while measures were taken to consolidate and maintain the ground already gained. Between November 21 and 30, constant probing of enemy positions by patrols kept the Germans on edge.

On the 24th, venturing towards Casigno, a patrol from the 12th Motorized Brigade encountered a group of enemies, well entrenched behind the thick walls of a cemetery. The area was surrounded by booby traps and mines that prevented the South Africans from approaching. l artillery support was requested from the rear and within a short time the shells fell, neutralizing the area and dispersing the enemy. On the same day, an outpost near Fonte was attacked by an enemy patrol, which was repelled without any losses for the South Africans. Other patrols engaged the enemy at Vergato, C. Creda, Casigno, Caprara, and Carbona. On November 29, a patrol from the 11th Brigade, moving towards Forte, a hamlet just south of Vergato, was ambushed and three South African soldiers were wounded in the action. A patrol from the 12th Brigade came under machine gun fire from the courtyard of a church in Corviano.

During the last ten days of the month, enemy artillery fire was present along the entire front of the division, with particular attention to key points within its range such as bridges, gorges, and crossroads.

Enemy activity in November
There was some consolation in the fact that the same bitter cold winds of November were also a burden on the enemy. Many poorly dressed prisoners of war and deserters shuffled their feet to the prisoner of war camps. They told painful stories of night watches on snow-covered mountains, which resulted in a growing number of casualties in their units from trench foot, tears, frostbitten fingers, colds, and pneumonia.
Our forces were dressed more warmly and were better able to withstand the winter's severity. German supply lines were long, and the bottleneck at the Brenner Pass in the Alps was a constant target for our bombers. The supplies that did get through were inadequate to sustain German forces.

Just as our troops did, the Germans dug caves and underground shelters along the reverse slopes of the mountains. The shelters were elaborately constructed and came in all sizes, some even large enough to accommodate a platoon. Towards spring, when they were finally overrun by our forces, we found these underground shelters surprisingly comfortable, heated by wood stoves, with calendars, pictures, and pin-ups on the walls. Some of the furnishings in these shelters were stolen from nearby Italian homes. Sometimes the Italians were forced to leave their homes to make room for the troops, other times the troops moved in with the families, who were already numerous.

German intelligence officers were severely handicapped in providing information about our intentions and disposition on the ground due to a severe lack of aerial reconnaissance. Only a few German aircraft remained in Italy, as most of them had long since been decimated by the superiority of our fighters and bombers. Germany's industrial capacity to produce aircraft and spare parts was seriously hampered by our long-range bombers.

The few German factories that were still able to maintain some types of production were unable to make up for the heavy losses. The few aircraft remaining in Italy were sent to the European Theater in a desperate attempt to keep out the Allied armies that were already surrounding the Saar basin. In view of this fact and to meet its intelligence requirements, the enemy was forced to use a large number of trained agents.
During this period, there was a sharp increase in the number of German secret service agents. The Corps' Counterintelligence detachments arrested an average of more than one enemy agent per day. This German espionage offensive was discovered when the first enemy agents began to cross the front line. They were arrested and interrogated, and stricter controls on civilian movement throughout the Corps' area were immediately instituted. All troops were alerted and military police, under the supervision of Corps Counter-Intelligence, were stationed on all roads, paths, and other access routes that could be used by enemy agents.
In addition to the spies and provocateurs arrested at the checkpoints, a number of paid saboteurs, most of whom were Italian, were captured in the rear of the Corps and in the forward area of the army. All civilians seen attempting to cross the front line in either direction were arrested. The Allied Military Government Detachment of the IV Corps, in collaboration with the Provost Marshal and the Counter-Intelligence Detachment, established a series of roadblocks or checkpoints. These were manned by the Italian State Police in blue shirts, the Carabinieri, and were intended to control the movement of civilians within restricted areas.
A Civil Affairs Police officer constantly monitored the checkpoints, not only to verify that instructions were being correctly carried out but also to test their efficiency. The fact that most of the enemy agents who infiltrated the Corps' area were subsequently arrested at these roadblocks was proof of their usefulness.
Immediately after the Allied invasion of Salerno, the enemy began training spies and saboteurs in German schools in northern Italy. This type of activity increased steadily, and by November 1944, this large-scale espionage offensive was in full swing. Almost all of the agents were Italian, whose missions ranged from obtaining tactical information in the immediate rear to reporting political and economic information from far behind the front lines. Most of them attempted to enter our territory disguised as civilian refugees. In a short period in November, ten of these agents, including a strikingly beautiful blonde, were captured while attempting to cross our front line along State Road 65.
It later emerged that almost twenty of them were executed after trials before the courts of the Allied Military Governments. Others, against whom there was insufficient evidence to justify their death, were sentenced to long prison terms. The Military Police and Carabinieri set up 150 checkpoints to control the movement of citizens. The total number of Carabinieri employed in this work varied from 101 to 253.

During that period, there were rumors that a German Alpine unit was moving from the French-Italian border. The statements and information available made it seem unlikely that this unit was larger than a regiment.
The 5th Mountain Division had been moved to the western Italian border, but it was clear that it was only relieving the 157th Mountain Division for border duty. This deduction led to the conclusion that only the 3rd and 4th Hochgebirge Mountain Battalions could be the only possible candidates.
On November 25, three prisoners from the latter unit were taken in the Cutigliano area, confirming the arrival of the "Edelweiss" porters in the area. These well-trained mountain troops guarded the sector with agility and were able to contribute a company to the counterattack on Monte Belvedere. The 4th Battalion proved to be a small, effective unit that faithfully took care of its sector in front of the IV Corps. During the month, over 426 German prisoners of war were taken, half of whom were deserters.

Support activities in November
It was a simple task for the expert German demolition teams to block a road with tons of rock and earth by blowing up a section of mountain.
The Corps engineers were heavy users of manpower to carry out road clearance and maintenance tasks. In November, they remained faithful to the old theory of "water off and rock on." Keeping the ditches open required a large number of trucks. IV Corps had neither [manpower nor trucks] to spare.
There were no side roads between State Road 64 and 6620 except for a jeep route from Taviano through Suviana, Bargi, Baigno, and Castiglione. North of Porretta Terme, State Road 64 was under enemy observation, which generally limited the use of this stretch of road to night traffic. The only routes open to Task Force 45 were State Road 12 east of Bagni di Lucca ( ly for jeeps) and State Road 66 north of Pistoia, which had many one-way sections and detours. Traffic at the intersection of State Roads 12 and 66 was limited to jeeps.
The 235th Mountain Engineer Battalion, reinforced with about 300 civilian workers and the 23rd Italian Artillery Battalion, was tasked with opening and maintaining the class 30 side road from State Road 64 to 6620, the road north and south from Suviana to Riola, and a junction with the side road from Porretta Terme to Castel di Casio. The Castiglione-Camugnano-Ponte di Verzuno section also had to be kept open to Class 30 traffic. The work assigned was more than enough to keep the battalion and its reinforcements constantly busy.

Another task undertaken by the engineers was in the field of camouflage and deception. The artillery officers believed that the small airstrip at Porretta, which had been successfully bombed by the enemy due to its dominant observation position, would be an excellent place to attempt some deception. It was thought that by placing a dummy aircraft on the field, the enemy would continue to bomb the airfield, thus allowing our observation to locate the enemy artillery batteries. The Porretta airfield had been built in an old river basin. Earth bunkers were built to protect the aircraft, but despite this, enemy shells had damaged four real aircraft. Engineers built full-size dummy aircraft, complete with details, so that from a distance they looked real. The materials used for construction were a wooden frame covered with wire mesh and then canvas. The wings were built separately and in two sections to facilitate their movement to the assembly site.
The dummy aircraft were painted olive green and identification markings were added, while the rear windows were made of aluminum to increase reflectivity. After two aircraft were completed, they were transported at night to the airfield and placed in bunkers. To simulate natural activity on the field, the Corps' artillery S-2s had prepared observation plans that included several passes over the field. In addition to this, although not planned, two aircraft were forced to land for repairs, but once completed, they wasted no time in taking off from the target area. The 84th Camouflage Engineer Platoon did a realistic job, and the artillery personnel eagerly awaited the sound of enemy batteries to locate them.
However, it was a disappointment as only a few artillery shells landed near the airstrip, and these could have been a miscalculation in relation to the targets on State Road 64, on the Silla ridge, or on Porretta. It was thought that agents had informed the enemy that dummy aircraft had been placed as decoys on the landing field.

From a tactical point of view, our position remained unchanged with respect to ground observation. The enemy maintained command of the terrain, while our observation was limited, in most cases, to a restricted area in front of the advanced defensive positions. German artillery, with excellent observation provided by hills such as Monte Belvedere, Monte Castello, and Monte Sole, was able at all times to direct fire at our advanced elements and harass our lines of communication. Our observation posts were constantly pushed forward in an attempt to gain advantages on the ground; however, many had to be positioned on secondary ridges, too far back to be truly effective. For many days, rain, mist, or fog greatly reduced artillery fire registration and observation for fire missions. Similarly, our smoke screens, maintained in the bridge area and vital areas, occasionally interfered with observation. However, the advantageous location of the enemy observation posts, mentioned above, made such measures necessary, and in general, the smoke was well coordinated with ground observation. When the latter became absolutely essential, the smoke generators concerned were stopped.
Extreme care was taken to select only the most profitable artillery targets because jamming fire was subject to ammunition shortages. When many fire missions were required during the day, night jamming and counter-battery missions had to be scaled back accordingly. All fire missions without observers were based on information gathered from intelligence reports, and all harassment missions were carried out as part of a carefully coordinated program. During the month, two German 88 mm guns were operated by the IV Corps artillery, but never more than one at a time was in action. Operated by a team from the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, they were recorded from a ground observation post and proved to be fairly accurate.
A large amount of ammunition was available and was used regularly in harassment and counter-battery missions. Sometimes a gun fired up to 400 rounds in 24 hours. For once, it was comforting for the troops in the area to know that the familiar sound of a German 88 was being heard on the enemy side of the line. As for enemy artillery, there was little movement in known gun positions, while new positions continued to appear. By the end of the period, the number of guns located opposite the Brazilians had almost doubled, and the number opposite the South Africans had more than doubled.

The discovery of new enemy positions, however, did not come from reports of artillery bombardments suffered but from other sources of information. On the most active day, November 7, only 1,000 rounds were fired. However, there was a 25% increase in artillery bombardments during the second half of the period. An average of 370 rounds per day fell during the first half and 460 rounds per day during the second half of the month. Enemy artillery was generally more active during the hours of darkness in November than in October. The main targets bombarded by the enemy were forward elements, roads, and bridges. Although many of our batteries were hit by hostile fire, there did not appear to be any organized attempt at counterbattery fire.

An interesting fact about signaling operations during that period was the use of pigeons as an alternative means of communication. Two pigeon cages were located at the Task Force 45 command post and one cage at Porretta. Task Force 45 used pigeons to deliver about 100 messages during the month. For the first time during combat, the symbolic birds of peace were effectively used by IV Corps in the war effort.

This chapter must end on a somber note to show that in addition to the suffering caused by the cold winds and bad weather of November, some of our troops also died on the steep slopes of the Apennines in this Allied effort to destroy the declining Nazi power that had bloodied all of Europe. Although the main offensive had been halted for the winter, local attacks to gain dominant hill positions in the Corps' area resulted in casualties. Seventy-two soldiers died in November 1944, some on Mount Belvedere, others on Mount Castello, and some in other areas. The Brazilians alone lost 48 men, most of whom fell on Mount Castello under fierce fire from German defenders. 448 sick, wounded, and injured soldiers demonstrated the significant effect of the harsh Italian Apennine winter, as well as the real effectiveness of enemy artillery.

The critical problem of replacements forced most units to fight with understaffed personnel. Due to the variety of troops, which included black US soldiers, Brazilians, and anti-aircraft personnel employed in an infantry role, solving the problem was more difficult than ever. The most critical situation was in the Brazilian expeditionary force, since, at that time, a large reserve of replacement personnel had not yet arrived in the theater and, moreover, the few who had arrived were undergoing training and battle orientation courses and had to be equipped, all under the supervision of the Corps.

Despite the harshness of winter warfare in the high mountain range and the slowdown and eventual halt of the offensive, which had once been proceeding apace, morale remained at a satisfactory level . At the beginning of winter, the period of inactivity was used for maximum rest and relaxation for the troops. As small units were withdrawn from the line, battle-weary soldiers were sent to army rest centers to forget, as best they could, those days and nights of exhaustion and constant hammering by the enemy. Some were sent south to Rome, others to Montecatini, and some to groups of villas along the coast.
The bleary-eyed soldiers, many of whom had left their posts with the haunted looks of men on the verge of complete exhaustion, returned to their units looking fresh and bright and with new perspectives on life. They had visited places where regular hot meals and long, deep sleep between clean white sheets were a daily occurrence. They cleaned themselves up in the civilization they had known since birth and which the mole-like life of a soldier at the front had almost erased from their minds. After all, it was the right dose of healing medicine at the right time.

 DECEMBER IN THE APENNINES

 On November 11, the first snowfall of the season covered the highest mountains. On November 15, 5 centimeters of snow, together with rain, submerged the Apennines, and in December, winter truly arrived. The use of chains on vehicles, the constant work of snowplows, and the endless hard work of thousands of soldiers and civilians kept the roads open.

December began with the IV Corps mainly engaged in wintering along a 48-kilometer front line. Long before the decision was made to postpone large-scale offensive operations until spring, extensive steps had been taken to prepare the Army for winter in the Apennines. Since the sweltering month of July, steaming cargo ships had been arriving at the crowded and busy port of Naples to unload tons of winter clothing, shoes, skis, fur-lined caps, ice crampons, stoves, and other winter items. The lessons learned on the Winter Line [the Gustav Line that ran between the mouth of the Garigliano River and Ortona in 1943/1944, also passing through Cassino], where the bitter cold and inadequate winter supplies created unbearable difficulties, were not forgotten.
The winter campaign of 1943-1944 was fought by Allied troops in a mixture of cold, rain, and snow; the battles of the winter of 1944-1945 took place on more or less the same type of terrain and in colder weather. The Apennine peaks reached higher into the sky and were much colder, but, unlike the previous year, the Army was incomparably better prepared. The winter conditions caused little suffering and illness compared to those that had plagued the troops at Mignano and Garigliano. The improved conditions were confirmed by the command's medical reports on the state of health during the winter of 1944-45. Infectious hepatitis, or jaundice, proved to be the most persistent and difficult disease to combat. The rate increased in the autumn months, affecting 88 men per 1,000 per year in November and then reaching a peak of 161 in December.

The new and improved types of clothing were largely responsible for the improved health conditions. Much of the required clothing was available at the beginning of winter. The first deliveries took place on November 2, although it took almost three months for all units to be fully equipped with shoepacs [wide rubber boots with grooved soles, worn over service boots to prevent the feet from getting wet due to water seeping in from mud or snow], the most critical element in preventing the epidemic of "trench foot" that caused thousands of non-combat casualties on the Winter Line. Troops on the front line were regularly supplied with clean socks, "provided with rations"; ultimately, this program resulted in a steady decrease in the rate of casualties.
Outerwear and sleeping bags were also distributed, based on the new principle of using large layers of fabric rather than something heavy and tight. Fur-lined caps were available for front-line troops ( ), although not in sufficient quantities for everyone. Combat trousers and new cold-weather trousers, which were heavily lined with wool, completed the winter kit. All of these new outdoor garments were water-repellent and at the same time allowed damp sweat to escape to the outside. Standard army blankets were supplemented by sleeping bags, made of wool-like material, which could be inserted into a heavy canvas outdoor blanket.

Winter quarters were prepared on a large scale. Buildings were used wherever possible, although men in extremely forward positions were usually forced to stay in holes in the frozen ground and protect themselves from the elements as best they could. Troops in support and reserve positions, however, dug to build walls and roofs made of empty shell casings, food containers, and other materials. Here, the ingenuity of the Allied soldier came to the fore; windows, furniture, and, of course, the usual curvy pin-ups were found in almost every shelter. Pyramid tents, equipped with stoves, were set up for use as reserve elements.
Supplying fuel for stoves became the main activity. Many stoves were equipped to burn gasoline or fuel oil, but it was often difficult to find a happy and comfortable compromise with them. Sometimes winter storms blew through the glowing stoves, making the quarters unbearably hot and often burning the sides of the tent or driving out its occupants; other times rain dripped from the stove pipe and smothered the fire. Wood was used less frequently due to its scarcity. Preparing the jeeps for winter led to the most ingenious ideas: some were covered entirely with plywood frames, with doors and windows covered with canvas and glass. It was during this period that the work of the subsistence staff reached its peak importance.

Operations limited to early December
By December 1, cheerfully wrapped Christmas cards and packages began to fill the army and postal warehouses at the Peninsula sector base. At home, the more prudent people ensured that gifts and greetings would arrive to friends and loved ones for Christmas.
Pre-Christmas activity consisted of artillery exchanges and patrol skirmishes with occasional small enemy counterattacks. IV Corps soldiers spent much of their time improving their individual quarters and defensive positions, in addition to patrol activities; in general, both sides were content to leave things as they were. In several cases, however, both the Germans and our troops attempted to improve their tactical situations with limited local attacks aimed at occupying valuable defensive and observation points. In most cases, however, the final result, after fierce fighting, was a return to previously held positions.

On December 6, for the first time in our area, the 1st Platoon, Battery C of the 360th Anti-Aircraft Searchlight Battalion produced artificial moonlight, whose debut and use was described by a war correspondent as follows: "A new weapon—artificial moonlight—has been employed by U.S. troops. At exactly 7 p.m., when darkness had completely fallen on these northern hills of the Etruscan Apennines, the artificial moonlight made its arc. Suddenly, the entire sector became visible from a great light coming from 8 million candlepower searchlights, lit several hundred meters behind the front; their beams were directed so that the parallel beams of light passed a few dozen meters above the heads of the troops on the front line. A few minutes later, other lights, thousands of meters behind the front line, added their illumination. In the glow provided by the diffused light from the enormous beams, the attacking infantrymen were able to see the enemy strongholds as clearly as on a full moon night. By discovering minefields, deep impassable ravines, and swampy terrain in advance, all those hazards on the ground that bogged down and caused the infantry to misstep in the usual blind nighttime reconnaissance could be identified and avoided.

In fact, the artificial moonlight did more than just help the combat troops. At one point on the front, a unit of engineers worked in vain for three hours in pitch darkness trying to build a bridge over a gorge. Finally, their commander requested a spotlight to be shone on a nearby cliff, and the unit quickly finished the bridge thanks to the light reflected in the gorge.
The transport of supplies to the front was also accelerated. The commanders of ammunition truck convoys, who were once forced to travel at no more than 5 miles per hour, were now able to travel at up to 25 miles per hour with the help of artificial moonlight. One of the officers who had helped establish the position of the searchlights explained that artificial moonlight had been developed many months earlier during maneuvers in England and had received its first combat test from the British 8th Army on the western Italian front, near Rimini, and more recently from II Corps in October. "It's so simple that it's amazing no one thought of it before. The searchlights are normal anti-aircraft beams, but it never occurred to anyone to use them to provide light for ground troops."

The failure to meet the 8th Army's planned timetable, set for the 5th Army's second offensive on November 28, caused a change of plan. At that time, British troops were engaged in fighting near Faenza and were making slow and costly progress due to adverse weather conditions and fierce enemy resistance. It was considered essential that the Allied armies, whose main mission was the destruction of enemy forces in Italy, continue to push forward so that the enemy would be unable to transfer any combat troops from Italy.

Operational Instructions No. 36 of the 5th Army, dated November 29, assigned the IV Corps the mission of capturing the area of Marzabotto, a village on State Road 64, 10 kilometers west of Livergnano, and clearing the terrain west of the Setta River. Monte Sole, in German hands, stood out like a formidable guardian, blocking the advance into the Reno Valley as far as Marzabotto. The conquest of that mountain was a prerequisite because it dominated not only the Reno river valley but also the Setta stream corridor from the east. Monte Sole was located in the area of the 6th South African Armored Division, which was entrusted with the task of conquering it.

The 6th South African Armored Division
As already mentioned, this was an experienced division with a record-breaking pride, commanded with competence and equipped with competent personnel, who carried out their work methodically after careful planning and on whom one could rely for the successful outcome of any reasonable combat mission. Its infantry strength was supplemented by a force equivalent to more than three American battalions. Its armored vehicles were of little value in the rugged Apennines, but its ability to move quickly across the Po Valley was recognized.

The artillery of the 6th South African Armored Division was able to provide direct support with some experience of counter-battery fire and worked vigorously and aggressively, using British equipment and techniques. There was a lack of unjustified confidence in fire without observers, which resulted in the expenditure of a lot of ammunition. The Division occupied a diagonal and winding front of about 21 kilometers in total, where the Division's area extended east and west for about 15 kilometers.
The Division's advance was contested by an equally experienced force, the German 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division and, to a lesser extent, the 94th Infantry Division. The unfavorable terrain facing the Division had to be crossed in any future advance.

On December 5, Operational Instructions No. 72 of the IV Corps contained instructions for the capture of Monte Sole and the Castelnuovo - Pietra Colora ridge, in conjunction with the attack by the II Corps and the D-Day of the 5th Army offensive, which would be announced later. During the night between December 8 and 9, in anticipation of a subsequent attack on Monte Sole, the South Africans continued operations on limited objectives to improve their positions.
During the night, elements of the 4/13 FFR attacked Hills 445 and 476, two hills on the south-eastern side of the mountains. They encountered strong enemy resistance and although one platoon managed to reach its objective on Hill 476, it was subsequently forced to retreat. The two platoons that attacked Hill 445 were more successful but, at sunset, were still engaged in clearing pockets of enemy resistance. The Germans, following their pattern of determinedly holding dominant positions as had been demonstrated at Monte Belvedere and Monte Castello, counterattacked the South African troops on Hill 445 with superior force.
The two platoons were forced to fall back to positions on the southern slopes of the hill. That evening, other elements of the 4/13 FFR, which had established positions on nearby Hill 431, were also forced to retreat under fierce enemy small arms fire. During those two days, enemy artillery maintained a constant barrage of fire across the entire area, with particular focus on the areas of Gabbiano (?) and Cavaliera. At 4:45 a.m. on the freezing morning of December 11, the 4/13 FFR attacked again to recapture Hill 431 and secured the objective at sunset.
That night, around 8:00 p.m., the area around the village of Murazze was pounded by a formidable and heavy concentration of mortar and artillery fire. On December 12, the South Africans on Hill 431 saw, unsurprisingly, waves of German infantry coming toward them through the morning fog in another counterattack. With every weapon available firing [at the approaching Germans], elements of 4/13 FFR managed to repel them. Realizing that the Germans were determined to retake that hill, reinforcements were urgently sent to support the positions south of Hill 431. Throughout that day, a considerable amount of enemy artillery fire hit the forward positions. For the next two days, reliefs were carried out between companies in the South African zone until, suddenly and surprisingly, the arrival of greater visibility gave the South African artillery its first opportunity to fire many rounds at observable enemy targets. The enemy responded in kind. Two prisoners of war from the 7th Company of the 35th Regiment of the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division who had been captured stated that an attack on Hill 431 was planned for the night of December 14-15.
Early in the morning of December 15, the enemy carried out a strong demonstration against South African positions just north of the village of Murazzo, accompanied by artillery and mortar fire. This was designed to distract our troops on Hill 431, as shortly afterwards the enemy launched a strong attack against these positions held by elements of the 4/13 FFR, who were forced to retreat. Fortune was again with the enemy in this local action. Their preliminary barrage with mortars had destroyed our radio and cable communications, and our troops on the hill were unable to call for the defensive fire that had been prepared.
The battalion held its ground firmly and all other positions were maintained. Later that night, under the haze of artificial moonlight, the Imperial Lighthorse Kimberly Regiment relieved the 4/13 FFR from its positions; the following day, the latter withdrew to a staging area near Camugnano. Enemy artillery fire continued its program of nighttime harassment, firing without observers along the entire front. On December 18, an ammunition dump just north of Cozzo, a small village on the main road just south of the Setta stream, was hit by enemy artillery fire. Approximately 2,500 mortar shells, the entire depot, blew up in an endless series of explosions that reverberated against the mountainsides until late at night.

From December 16 to 24, the South African 6th Armored Division remained in position, rotating companies and maintaining contact with the enemy. Operations against Monte Sole, , which was firmly held by the Germans, were temporarily postponed until reinforcements could be brought in and more ammunition was available, but planning continued and the South Africans remained vigilant.

The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division of the FEB
On the first day of the last month of 1944, the last elements of the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division of the FEB moved by convoy, via the highway, from their training area near Pisa and joined the division in Bagni della Porretta. General Mascarenhas had gathered his entire command in the Porretta area and immediately began a program of replacements to give the new battalions a taste of the front line as well as a period of rest for the older ones [probably meaning those who had been on the front line the longest]. That night, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment, positioned in the area just northeast of Gaggio Montano, was replaced by the 1st Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment and moved to a staging area near Lustrola.
The following night, just as darkness enveloped the surrounding mountains, an enemy patrol attempted to infiltrate the positions of the inexperienced 1st Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment. A brief firefight ensued, during which parachute flares were used and the enemy was forced to retreat. At 11:10 p.m., the 9th Company of the 11th Infantry came under a small enemy attack and, in the ensuing firefight, the enemy suffered some losses and was forced to retreat at 3:00 a.m. An hour later, they resumed their attack in the same area and also against the right flank of the 1st Battalion. The attack was supported by an unusually heavy barrage of artillery and mortar fire, under the cover of which an unknown number of Germans penetrated the positions of the 1st and 3rd Battalions. This caused a short retreat of the right flank of the 1st Battalion and the left flank of the 9th Company. In the morning, however, the Brazilians reoccupied their positions as the enemy had withdrawn before dawn. On December 3, the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment was replaced by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment and moved to a staging area near Bagni della Porretta.

On December 5, IV Corps transmitted Operational Instructions 72 to the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) command post in Bagni della Porretta, which required, when the 5th Army's offensive began, the capture of Monte Sole by the South Africans and the Castelnuovo-Pietra Colora ridge by the Brazilians. Planning began immediately, but before the many ideas could be put on paper, the attack was postponed.

The Brazilians had prepared to attack Monte Castello and, with the entire Division available, their hopes were high. On December 6, a reorganization of the troops was initiated: in the sector of the 1st Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion replaced the 2nd Battalion. The Division's Reconnaissance Troop, operating in the Bombiana area, was joined by a platoon of partisans. On December 9, the enemy, who had evidently sensed some kind of activity behind [our] lines, poured heavy artillery fire into the Porretta-Silla-Riola area and sent strong patrols into the Brazilian sector to study their intentions.

Throughout the front, over the last month, the enemy had shown growing concern about our positions and intentions. At that moment, however, their attention was focused particularly on the Brazilian sector. Of the numerous enemy patrols in action, some raided our outposts. The prisoners of war stated that their instructions were to take prisoners every three days and that leave was the reward for those who succeeded and punishment for those who failed. The only rare enemy air activity saw an unknown number of aircraft bomb Ponte della Venturina and Porretta. One bomb destroyed a building in Porretta, killing several civilians.

The acceleration of patrol activity was accompanied by a marked increase in enemy propaganda warfare. On December 9, the advanced elements of the 11th Infantry Regiment were bombarded with shells containing propaganda leaflets addressed to the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments. A prisoner of war from the 94th Infantry Division [German] stated that an SS propaganda company had appeared around December 1 and had been firing propaganda leaflets into our area ever since.
The general tone of the leaflets was the usual subtle attempt to denigrate relations between the Allies (Stalin's big stick leading Churchill and Roosevelt dressed as children) and, more pointedly, that the European conflict did not concern Brazilians who were dying far from home for the benefit of American capitalists.

On December 10, the Brazilians completed their plans for an attack on the Monte Torraccia-Monte Castello ridge. The 2nd Armored Group, which commanded the right sector of Task Force 45, was to assist with a diversionary action on the Brazilian left flank, on the southern slopes of Monte Belvedere. A small group of infantry and armored vehicles, known as Task Force Nelson, together with elements of the 13th Tank Battalion, operating under the Brazilian Division, was also to create a diversionary activity in the Castelnuovo area. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment, designated to lead the assault, were moved to the Casellina area and brought closer [to the starting line] at 11:00 p.m., in preparation for the morning attack. Enemy artillery swept the area back and forth and disrupted movements and road crossings. During the night, General Mascarenhas requested and obtained a 24-hour delay in the start of the attack on the Monte Torraccia-Monte Castello ridge.
The delay allowed time for further reconnaissance and to accumulate additional supplies that had been slowed down by heavy rain and sleet on the roads. The attack was rescheduled to begin at 6:00 a.m. on December 12. On the night of December 11, the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment moved to an advanced assembly area, and the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment moved to Silla, as a reserve for the Division. The Brazilian troops were tense and alert because they were once again attempting to scale the peaks in front of them. They knew that the enemy had been working desperately on that ridge since the last assault. Reports from prisoners and partisans indicated that mines had been laid, trenches dug, and defensive positions built behind rows of barbed wire.
Brazilian headquarters was also aware that there had been an increase in enemy artillery positions in the Monte Belvedere sector.

At 06:00 on December 12, after a thirty-minute artillery barrage by the Divisional Artillery and the 424th Field Artillery Group, the Brazilians attacked. The 1st Infantry Regiment made the greatest effort, attacking on the flank with the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, while the 3rd Battalion, on the right, advanced towards Casellina - Monte Torraccia. Initially, the attack made good progress, with enemy resistance concentrated mainly against the battalion on the right. By noon, the advancing Brazilian infantry had reached a line that was generally about halfway up the slopes of Monte Torraccia, and the 1st Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment, advancing on the extreme right flank of the attack, had elements not far from the crest of the ridge.
However, during the afternoon, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment were forced to return to their original positions on the slopes due to a sharp increase in mortar and small arms fire. As it was unwise to remain the only ones in the lead, the 11th Infantry Regiment also withdrew. On the Brazilian right flank, Task Force Nelson's diversionary action was more successful, and the tanks of the 13th Tank Battalion, supported by infantry, advanced along State Road 64 to Malpasso. They encountered no resistance, but as the advance was threatened by possible encirclement on both sides, this unit also withdrew to its original position. The following day, the 11th Infantry Regiment relieved the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Infantry Regiment from the positions to which they had withdrawn. These last two battalions, in dire need of reorganization, moved to Bagni della Porretta and Silla, respectively.

The Division's attack was carefully planned by the division staff and at first seemed to have every chance of success, but enemy resistance was too great for some of the inexperienced troops and, after suffering several losses, the Brazilian infantry was forced to retreat. The enemy was determined to hold the high ground that allowed them to observe State Highway 64 for as long as possible. Over the next two days, there was no activity on either side of the front except for artillery and mortar fire from the enemy. The no-man's-land was generally quiet, with the silence broken only by continuous enemy mortar fire in the Riola area.

On December 16, the boundary between the FEB's 1st Infantry Division and Task Force 45 was moved a few miles west so that the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment could return to the 92nd Division. This battalion was relieved that night by the 3rd Battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment. At the same time, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment replaced the 1st Battalion of the 1st Infantry Regiment near Affrico. The enemy was apparently well supplied with artillery ammunition as it continued its harassment program both day and night. The areas of Riola and Mordano received 190 artillery and mortar rounds in one day.
A harassment mission in the Gaggio Montano area destroyed a Brazilian mortar section, and at dawn on December 20, the Riola bridge was damaged by suspected sabotage. However, the attempt was only partially successful, and the bridge remained open to Class 7 traffic; by noon, it had been completely repaired. On December 23, a patrol from the 1st Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment reached the enemy defenses at Castelnuovo and engaged a German patrol.
That night, an average of 30 large-caliber artillery shells hit Porretta, but the Brazilians stubbornly refused to move their headquarters and chose to remain in the repeatedly bombed city. The following day, an enemy patrol of seven men from the vicinity of Gambiana [possibly Bombiana] clashed with elements of the 5th Company of the 11th Infantry Regiment and was repelled. A wounded German sergeant who was captured revealed during interrogation that he was from the 2nd Company of the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Regiment of the 232nd Infantry Division.

Task Force 45 on the left
For the first three weeks, activity in Task Force 45's sector was largely limited to patrols and disturbing enemy positions with sporadic artillery and mortar fire.
The enemy spent the days leading up to Christmas doing the same.
Both sides carried out local patrols and no changes in position were made. Relative calm prevailed in the Bagni di Lucca and Cutigliano-Sestaione sectors.

Our patrols increased the depth of their penetrations into enemy territory, but there were few contacts.
On December 7, ten enemy deserters were picked up, and others were taken from time to time. It appeared that the troops of the German Army's (Heer) 4th High Mountain Battalion had been replaced by inferior troops from the 232nd Rifle Battalion of the 232nd Infantry Division. This was later confirmed by two captured enemy agents who had traveled west from Pavullo to Abetone on December 19. They reported that a company of German troops, wearing white shirts and believed to be Alpine troops, were resting along the road with two carts carrying their luggage and heading north. Further south, in La Causuma (?), the agents had stopped at a company command post where they asked a German soldier where they were. This soldier, who belonged neither to the SS nor to the Alpine troops, said he did not know where he was as he had only arrived on December 17. This confirmed the departure of elements of the 4th Mountain Battalion and the arrival of the 232nd Infantry Division, but it remained unknown where the former had gone.

On December 3, the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion arrived in the Livorno area and was assigned to the IV Army Corps. The newly arrived unit immediately began converting all its anti-aircraft equipment, preparing to take on an infantry role in the Task Force 45 area. It was an extremely necessary reinforcement and was ready for action, having received several weeks of infantry training in the II Corps sector and, moreover, was a fresh and rested unit. On December 6, it was attached to the Task Force and, during the night between December 8 and 9, replaced the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion in the Vidiciatico-Lizzano area. The latter unit, tired from long service on the front line, returned to the control of the 5th Army and left for a rest area.

The 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion occupied positions at Querciola, Vidiciatico, Lizzano, and Pianaccio, establishing new positions to provide maximum crossfire and setting up an elaborate communication system that allowed for rapid call-up of mortar and artillery fire support. Maximum use was made of the partisans and, with their help, reconnaissance patrols slipped safely through enemy minefields and barbed wire entanglements, locating the outposts of the "Huns." The fallen snow had covered the countryside with a white blanket, making it necessary for the patrols to move cautiously on the snow-covered roads and paths. The crunch of snow under combat boots and shoepacs could be heard from long distances during the cold, silent nights.

A little further east, the right flank of the Task Force was held by the black troops of the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment. In this area, German artillery focused their attention on Gaggio Montano and bombarded the area heavily day and night. On December 11, two patrols engaged enemy groups slightly north of the small village of Morandella and killed two of the enemy.

On the same day, German attempts to infiltrate the Cutigliano positions were discovered by one of the partisan outposts, and the ensuing fighting continued throughout the night. At 6:20 a.m., the enemy group fired two rockets into the sky to request artillery support, and within moments, an enemy TOT (Time On Target) of 80 rounds fell on Cutigliano. The Germans retreated amid the confusion and noise caused by the simultaneous explosions of the grenades.

The following day, December 12, to support the Brazilian attack on Monte Casella, Task Force 45 conducted a major diversionary effort with the intent of confusing the Jerries. General Rutledge had designated the 2nd Armored Group to carry out this diversionary action. To the left of the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, tanks and tank destroyers rattled through the night and at first light began shelling the German-held Rocca Corneta and the road leading to it from the north.
At the same time, a patrol of one officer, 30 men, and 15 partisans, followed by a reserve force of one officer and 15 men, moved forward and stealthily deployed at the southern end of the town. When our troops were close enough to use their weapons effectively, they opened fire simultaneously with everything they had. The enemy responded with small arms and machine guns; at 10:30 a.m., when they began firing their mortars, our troops withdrew under cover of our mortar and tank fire.
On the right flank, held by the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, a similar force ( ) was sent to Corona. This attack was preceded by a small artillery barrage, and the Germans were caught napping. By 10:00 a.m., our patrols had penetrated to the northern edge of the town and had taken three enemy prisoners, killing nine and wounding two. Two German 81mm mortars were also destroyed by throwing grenades into the tubes.
At 11:30 a.m., the Germans recovered from their surprise and began a flanking movement supported by artillery, mortars, and machine guns. Our own artillery began firing shells and smoke grenades at the approaching enemy group, and under this cover, our troops withdrew. Two American soldiers and three Italian partisans were killed in this clash.
As part of the same diversionary action, the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment sent a platoon-strength patrol against the enemy entrenched on the slope of the Monte Belvedere ridge, east of Gaggio Montano. The troops engaged the enemy from 9 a.m. until 7 p.m., when, after suffering one casualty, they withdrew.

The enemy's continued interest in the Sestaione-Cutigliano area was evidenced by mortar and artillery fire, patrolling, and sniping from the vicinity of Cappel D'Orlando, a small mountain village just northeast of Tiggliano (?). On December 16, a partisan patrol of 70 men commanded by an American officer and also composed of American soldiers headed for Melo where, via radio, they directed friendly artillery fire at enemy targets in the mountain settlements of Pianosinatico and Rivoreta. On its return the following day, this partisan patrol engaged a German squad, killing one, wounding two, and capturing two.

On December 17, the change of border between Task Force 45 and the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division of the FEB and the 2nd Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment, together with elements of the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, which were on the FEB side of the new border, were taken over by the Brazilians.
At the same time, Battery C of the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion was detached from the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion and sent to Campo Tizzoro as a reserve for the Task Force.

Throughout this period, the right flank of Task Force 45 remained quite active. A precise firing system was developed with a tank destroyer positioned on a high hill north of Vidiciatico. With a 20x telescope constantly trained on known points of enemy activity, at the first sign of movement, the tank destroyer would open fire.
This kept the Germans on their toes and forced them to take cover during daylight hours eight kilometers behind their lines. On December 20, the armored vehicles were relieved of direct command by Task Force 45, but the 751st Tank Battalion, with attached elements of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, remained in direct support.
Two armored vehicles from the Reconnaissance Company of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion were attached to the 107th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Group to maintain road patrols from Campo Tizzoro to [Ponte della] Venturina. On December 21, the 2nd Armored Group was relieved by Task Force 45 and moved from the sector to supervise the infantry training of the anti-aircraft battalions, which were now to become fully-fledged infantry. Responsibility for the right sector of the Task Force was taken over by the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion.

The German threat in the Serchio Valley
In Italy, the spirit of the upcoming Christmas holidays was in the air.
The units' mail departments were busy sorting gift packages and hundreds of Christmas greetings. American Red Cross personnel were busy bringing as much Christmas cheer as they could to the frontline troops with books, stationery, cigarettes, etc. How and with what would Christmas be made attractive? Gift parcels containing sweets, biscuits, and cakes, some of which had been crushed during transport by sea and rail, were opened and shared with friends.
In the rear, units with better opportunities set up and decorated Christmas trees to give a festive touch to their surroundings. It was reported that men from units stationed in Italian towns and villages were preparing to wear homemade costumes and play Santa Claus for the local poor children.
Of course, these plans depended largely on a kind of informal truce between friend and foe so that the day of Christ's birth could be celebrated by the armies stranded there along with the rest of the Christian world. Even Axis Sally (Mildred Elizabeth Gillars, nicknamed "Axis Sally" along with Rita Zucca, was an American radio announcer employed by Nazi Germany to spread propaganda during World War II) in her nightly broadcasts to Allied troops, thoughtfully devoted much of her propaganda programs to Christmas carols and American holiday songs, one of the most popular being "I'm Dreaming of a White Christmas." However, her intentions were not so much to contribute to the upcoming holiday season as to lower the morale of our troops through her subtle method of bringing homesickness into hearts weary of war. He also devoted much of his time to hailing the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, news of which had arrived on December 17 at the forward command post of IV Corps Headquarters in Taviano, as the beginning of our tragic fate. On December 16, Von Rundstedt, under Hitler's direct orders, had made a last desperate attempt to avert disaster by attacking the advancing Allied armies with a force of 24 divisions. He had been able, thanks to the thick fog that had lasted for days, to secretly gather his forces in the wooded areas of Monshau and Trier. When the time came, eight Panzer divisions broke through on a 65-kilometer front and, having achieved initial tactical success, delayed the main Allied offensive by about six weeks. It was this Allied reversal that Axis Sally boasted about on German propaganda radio.

Suspicion and alarm on the IV Corps front
The news of the surprise offensive was met with some apprehension at Allied headquarters in Caserta, Italy. It was estimated that if the Germans wanted to, they could concentrate five German divisions and three Italian fascist divisions for an attack on the Tyrrhenian coast or in the Serchio Valley to capture the supply base at Livorno. This was a lucrative target because it could cut off the Allied army's supply line from Livorno eastward to Pistoia, Florence, and on to the 8th Army area.
Considering that the Serchio Valley and the coastal area were poorly defended, with no reserves, the consequences were obvious, and apprehension about such a German capability was justified. While the Battle of the Bulge raged on the Western Front, a suspicious calm prevailed in the IV Corps area. Intelligence officers were asked to make every effort to determine any indication that General Kesselring might use his forces on the Italian front for an offensive coordinated with that in the Ardennes.

Evidence of a general build-up of German forces opposite the poorly defended western sectors of the 5th Army front was detected and confirmed on December 17. On December 22, there were indications of enemy movement in the Abetone Valley and that the veteran 4th Mountain Battalion had been relieved by some other unit. At the same time, there were signs of the arrival of new troops in the sector previously occupied by the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division.
This was confirmed when prisoners from the 10th Parachute Regiment of the 4th Parachute Division were taken in a location that had previously been the responsibility of the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division. Prisoners of war from the partisans and our own agents reported that the enemy was feverishly repairing and rebuilding bridges and roads in the upper Serchio Valley and coastal areas; bridges that had been unusable in recent months. These reports were confirmed by aerial photographs.
Enemy troop movements were reported in the municipalities of Castelnuovo and Piazza in the Serchio Valley area, where Italian Alpine units and a growing number of Germans were said to be concentrating. Prisoners spoke of a "plan" scheduled for December 28, while other sources set December 26 as the date.
These reports were viewed with greater concern by senior commanders when assessed in light of the new German counteroffensive then underway in Belgium, the success of which could plausibly inspire counteroffensives on other fronts. This enemy capability, which had already been studied and evaluated, was re-examined. The five enemy divisions that could be concentrated in the area of the city of La Spezia were the 148th Grenadier Division and elements of the Italian Monte Rosa and San Marco divisions that were already in the western sector; there were some indications that the 157th Mountain Division might be moved to that area; it was also said that the Italia Division (Fascist Italian Republic) was heading south. Enemy movements in other parts of the 5th Army sector and on the 8th Army front allowed him to free up three more divisions to support such an attack: the 16th SS Panzergrenadier Division, the 26th Panzer Division, and possibly the 5th Mountain Division. However, the enemy's limited capacity to make any large-scale rapid movements was well known. For an advance along the coast, the Germans would have targeted the port of Livorno, the main base of the American forces.
At the time, the large port and its installations were protected by one division, the 92nd, under the command of Major General Edward M. Almond, and were rather spread out over a wide front. Constant attention was therefore paid to that western sector, and although the 92nd Division was directly under the 5th Army, General Crittenberger and his staff remained in frequent communication with the Division Headquarters.

The Christmas Interlude
The setting for the "Christmas Interlude" was Taviano, a small village of probably 20 stone buildings, nestled in a narrow gorge barely wide enough for the main road and the stream. The mountains rose steeply on both sides, and right on the tip of one of them, almost at the top, was perched a typical mountain village of 200-300 inhabitants (inaccessible by road and built there in ancient times for safety against invaders). From up there, the village seemed ready to plunge down on Taviano, while the latter seemed destined to be crushed by the enormous mountains on either side.

The inhabitants of this mountain village descended the winding cobbled path to take their dried chestnuts to the mill in Taviano and, after grinding them, climbed back up the path, carrying heavy sacks of chestnut flour on their shoulders and heads. Too high and difficult to reach, it was undamaged by passing armies except for a grenade that had the chance to hit the steps of the old church. It was a peaceful and restful Shangri-La, too high in the sky to worry about the war raging far below.

From General Crittenberger's van, at the stone inn in Taviano, one had to throw one's head back and look straight up to see the secluded village in the sky. Captain Fred Case, General Crittenberger's aide-de-camp, observed one day, "If these were less modern times, a small band of warriors in that mysterious mountain town on the cliffs above us could wipe us out and block the gorge, simply by rolling rocks down the mountainside onto us here in the chasm below." Taviano itself was picturesque in a contrasting way, because compared to the village in the sky, it was at the bottom of the earth. The gorge itself was no more than 500 meters from the top of one mountain on one side to the top of the other mountain on the other.

The headquarters staff occupied the few buildings, and sections G-2 and G-3 were located in the largest stone structure at the edge of the road. In the chasm, the roar of the nearby Limentra di Sambuca stream drowned out some of the quieter sounds of war. On the other side of this stream were the mill and the houses of some locals. (Madame Fosca was appreciated by the officers staying in her house for her culinary skills. Her sister, Madame Tosca, who was just as friendly, lived nearby).

The location was unique, like a stage set. The villagers went about their business, washing their clothes, just as the soldiers washed theirs in the icy waters of the stream, and looked up from their work only for the occasional convoy of cannons going to or returning from the front. The days in Taviano were short. Every afternoon, around three o'clock, the sun disappeared behind the mountains and the cold, along with the night, rushed into the gorge to envelop the command post.

If radio broadcasts, telephones, newspapers, and messages about the war could have been ignored, it would not have been difficult to imagine, quite effectively, being cut off from the rest of the world. The nearby mountain stream had been drowning out annoying noises for thousands of years, and December 24 was no exception, as the snow on the mountainsides, melted by the day's sun, sent gushing streams into the turbulent waters of the torrent. Around the corner from the headquarters building, Sergeant Patla was enthusiastically urging his Italian kitchen soldiers to work faster in preparing Christmas dinner for the next day.
He had a stuffed turkey and all the side dishes to prepare. Closer to the stream, about 8 meters away, the roaring sound was interfering with the telephone conversations of the G-2 and G-3 sections. News was coming in of alarming enemy movements in the La Spezia area. Colonel Wells, G-2, kept the general informed every hour. The onset of so-called Christmas "nervousness" had begun.

The Army reported that the 157th Mountain Division, which the latest report said was moving towards north-eastern Italy from the French-Italian border, had been diverted south. It was possible that the purpose could be to relieve the 148th Infantry Division or to increase the force available for an attack in the coastal sector or in the Serchio Valley. The first precautionary step was taken by the 5th Army when it attacked the 339th Regimental Combat Team (85th Infantry Division) at IV Corps. The infantry convoy hurried along State Route 65 towards the Prato area, where it arrived at noon on the 24th and was designated as Corps reserve.
It was the night before Christmas, and the large staff at the Taviano headquarters was on alert and somewhat prepared for the Christmas present they were about to receive. The G-2 and G-3 sections were busy receiving messages, studying maps, and drawing up probable contingency plans. The telephone lines of the 5th Army and smaller units were kept busy with messages and reports, both incoming and outgoing.

In light of the alarming news about the concentration of enemy forces in the Serchio Valley and coastal areas, it came as no great surprise to General Crittenberger when he was awakened in his van, next to the small stone mountain inn, at three o'clock on Christmas morning by a courier with an urgent message from the Army commander. This message contained instructions from General Truscott ordering General Crittenberger to proceed immediately to the western sector of the Allied front, assume command in the area of the 92nd Division, move his headquarters to Lucca, and prepare to face a possible German offensive in that area. At the same time, the 6th South African Armored Division would return to Army control and the right flank of the Corps would become the old Brazilian-South African inter-divisional boundary.

Once again, the emergency alarm sounded and the IV Corps was asked to intervene. Within twenty minutes, the general was traveling along the mountain roads toward Pistoia and Lucca. Before his departure, he gave instructions for the Forward Command Post to follow him, establishing itself in Lucca as soon as possible. He also ordered Brigadier General W.C. Crane, commander of the IV Corps artillery, and Colonel L.K. LaDue, Chief of Staff of the IV Corps, to personally investigate the situation, confer with General Almond of the 92nd Infantry Division, and meet him on Christmas afternoon in the Lucca area. The general's team, in two jeeps, skidded dangerously on some icy curves, but overall it was not too difficult to get out of the Apennines.
Although the weather was freezing, the roads were open and cleared of snow, and the 110 or 130 winding kilometers from Taviano to Lucca were covered in a short time. Upon arriving in Lucca, General Crittenberger turned north and drove up the Serchio Valley. At Bagni di Lucca, he conferred with Brigadier General Wood, Assistant Division Commander of the 92nd Division, and checked the positions of the colored infantry regiments occupying our front there, one east and one west of the Serchio River.
General Wood believed that his frontline troops could be expected to put up resolute resistance if the Germans attacked along the valley. This did not happen east of the Serchio, as was subsequently evident. The general checked the artillery and armored support arrangements, which he found to be well positioned and ready for any eventuality. On previous occasions, General Crane had asked the Corps commander to ensure that the supporting artillery was up to the task.

The following personal account, given by General Crittenberger himself, can better represent the enemy attack in the Serchio Valley accurately and in detail than any historian could ever present.

"During the day (December 25), I consulted by radio and telephone with General Almond, who had spent the night between December 24 and 25 at his command post in Viareggio, on the coast. Later that day, General Almond went up into the mountains and the Serchio Valley for a meeting with me and some members of my staff who had arrived in the area ahead of time. General Almond was familiar with the situation and had carefully studied the possible German threat. Although he had seen the frontline troops of his division falter often and retreat in the face of German attacks, on this occasion he did not betray the pessimism he was justified in feeling about the enemy offensive that seemed to be coming.
A personal reconnaissance of the Sarchio Valley and a trip across the pass to the coastal area around noon on Christmas Day confirmed the danger to our position in the face of a German attempt to overwhelm us by force. This danger was well known throughout the IV Corps and was nothing more than the calculated risk we had been forced to take, scattered as we were across the 130- to 150-kilometer front with the American 92nd Black Division, the FEB's 1st Infantry Division, and Task Force 45, the size of an undersized brigade, on the front line. On Christmas Day, it was perfectly clear, as it had been for the past few months, that at no point along our front would these troops, spread out in a thin depth, be able to withstand a concentrated German effort without reinforcements.
However, with the potential of the enemy threat made somewhat precise in terms of strength, location, and mission, the work of IV Corps in dealing with the threat also became more focused. It was immediately clear, as had long been imagined and planned, that our ability to stop the German offensive depended entirely on how quickly we could get effective reinforcements to that area.
On Christmas afternoon, after a personal reconnaissance of the Serchio Valley, I came to the decision to maintain the defensive line across the Serchio River and just south of Bagni di Lucca in case our frontline troops were overwhelmed by the Germans. With no reserves available due to our extended front and shortage of troops, it was clear that any troops that could stem the enemy tide would have to be sent in from outside. Looking around for the nearest available troops, I remembered that a brigadier from the British 8th Indian Division had visited my forward command post at Taviano the day before to secure road clearance for his division's march through the rear of IV Corps to the Pisa area.
Enquiries revealed that, on this very Christmas afternoon, two of the three brigades of this British 8th Indian Division were traveling west on the Pistoia-Lucca road. The veteran division had just been relieved from front-line duty with the British 8th Army and had been sent to the rest area between Lucca and Pisa for a month or two. I immediately requisitioned the division and sent for the division commander. Meanwhile, at three o'clock on Christmas afternoon, my Forward Command Post had arrived in Lucca, been set up and made operational before dark; It had to turn back from Taviano in the Apennines, moving about 80 miles, and once set up, it was directly in the path of any German offensive in the Serchio Valley and on the route of any German offensive aimed at capturing Livorno.
The Commander-in-Chief of the British 8th Indian Division, Major General Russell, was spending Christmas in Florence and was therefore not immediately available. Instead, the two Brigade Commanders of the 19th and 21st Indian Brigades were in their truck columns on the road and were brought to my Forward Command Post in Lucca. There, on Christmas night, I indicated on the map the defensive position shown in the early afternoon and ordered the British 8th Indian Division to be diverted from its march to the rest area, north along the Serchio Valley and into the planned positions behind elements of the 92nd Division. I estimated that the division could reach the position and be ready to defend it in the early hours of December 26.
In communication with the Army Commander, on Christmas afternoon I outlined my assessment of the situation, emphasizing the need to send reinforcements westward to the Serchio Valley as quickly as possible. At 11 p.m. on Christmas night, I called the Army Commander and told him that I had requisitioned the British 8th Indian Division, which I had commanded, to take up a defensive position across the Serchio. He informed me that the 1st Armored Division, the 85th Infantry Division, and a combat team from the 34th Division were all leaving to support us. Assuming that the advance elements or these reinforcements would begin arriving in the Serchio Valley within 24 hours, along the only available Florence-Pistoia-Lucca (motorway) road, I assured the Army Commander that if the German attack did not materialize before December 27, I would be ready.
However, this was not to be. The Germans were not following my timetable, but their own, and at dawn the next morning, December 26, the attack on the Serchio was launched.
General Crittenberger's personal narrative ends here. We will resume it later in order to include a detailed report of the action for the benefit of the reader.

Following the advances of its patrols on the night of December 25, at 08:00 on December 26, the enemy launched several local attacks on a 10-kilometer front straddling the Serchio River. These attacks in the valley were accompanied by a marked increase in artillery fire along the coast, which was probably intended as a diversion, since no further action took place in that area. West of the river, near Molazzana, Italian and German troops attacked the 1st Battalion and Company G of the 370th Infantry Regiment near the village of Calomini, south and east of Molazzana. In the morning, the enemy occupied part of Calomini and, from 2:00 p.m., Company G was driven out of the village. The 1st Battalion was also forced to give up ground despite the fighting on the west side of the river subsiding in the middle of the afternoon.
East of the river, a large unit, identified as belonging to the 285th and 286th Grenadier Regiments ( ), attacked the villages of Sommocolonia, Tiglio, and Bebbio, which were occupied and defended by the 2nd Battalion of the 366th Infantry Regiment. Enemy pressure increased in that area when German mountain troops from the Mittenwald Mountain Battalion joined the battle, and Sommocolonia, Tiglio, and Bebbio were all occupied by the Germans before darkness fell. Led by Italian guides, the enemy bypassed these villages by climbing the ridges to the east and attacking southwest along the slopes. Austrian and Italian Alpine troops, some dressed as partisans, led the assault. Two platoons of Company E of the 366th Infantry Regiment were virtually surrounded at Sommocolonia, and only 17 of the 60 men managed to escape.
A platoon of the 92nd Reconnaissance Squadron was scattered at Bebbio; however, the group managed to gather most of its men and retreat in good order to positions near Coreglia. The 2nd Battalion of the 366th Infantry Regiment retreated just over three kilometers to positions along the Gallicano-Barea-Coreglia line. Shortly before noon, Company G of the 366th Infantry Regiment found itself severely disorganized and withdrew, leaving a 500-meter gap along the western bank of the river. The headquarters of the 370th Infantry Regiment was threatened and forced to retreat. Hundreds of civilians clogged the roads heading south in an attempt to reach Lucca before the German advance. Confusion and alarm began to dominate the Serchio front.
Now we continue with the report of General Crittenberger, who was in the vicinity at the time.
"In the late afternoon, accompanied by Colonel Harry Semmes and my aides, I visited Colonel Raymond G. Sherman's regimental command post at Fornaci. The town had just been bombed, and our tanks were holding the enemy at bay several hundred yards north of the road. It was clear that the command post would soon be overrun. Colonel Sherman's attitude there at his regimental command post was one of good work as I saw throughout the entire battle. Fifteen or twenty minutes after I left to reach the command post of the British 8th Indian Division, the Germans invaded the town but failed to capture Colonel Sherman and his command post, who fled along the river just in time, settling again five or six kilometers to the south.
The 92nd Division's forward command post also withdrew to new positions. The 1st Battalion of the 370th Infantry, after losing the Calomini outpost, was positioned northwest of Gallicano but abandoned Gallicano, on its right flank, conforming to the new line established by units of the 366th Infantry Regiment. Company F of the 370th Infantry Regiment, which had been engaged in preparing secondary defensive positions west of the Serchio, was quickly moved across the stream to fill the gap created by the collapse of Company G of the 366th Infantry Regiment.
"To prevent the enemy attack from becoming a formidable threat to our supply lines, the 1st Armored Division, commanded by Major General Vernon E. Prichard, had been detached from II Corps and was heading towards the IV Corps area. The 135th Regimental Combat Team (of the 34th Infantry Division) had also been attached to IV Corps and was rushing west toward Viareggio.
Traveling south in my jeep along the west bank of the river, toward evening I was approached by another jeep coming from the direction of Lucca, with an imposing figure sitting in the front seat, almost completely enclosed in a large British coat, and carrying what appeared to be a shepherd's crook in his right hand. I stopped, and so did he. I soon recognized an English Major General, whom I assumed to be General Russell, the Commander of the British 8th Indian Division, who had just arrived on the scene from Florence. With a fiery red moustache and a ruddy face, he approached me majestically with his shepherd's crook, a figure who could have been taken from a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta. Our meeting was brief and to the point. After he identified himself, I told him that I was the Commander-in-Chief of the IV Corps, that I had arrived on the scene the night before and that due to the urgency of the emergency, I had requisitioned his division, which was heading for a rest area, and diverted it to a defensive position straddling the Serchio River, a position I pointed out to him on the map.
I informed him that I was perfectly aware of the conventions that usually involved taking over a new division and committing it to battle, but that there had been no time for such conventions and even if there had been, I could not have gone through with it as he was absent from his division, being in Florence. I ordered him to join his division, find out where it was, inquire about the situation, and that I would see him later that evening. The only part he had in the conversation was one word—typically British—as he saluted and walked away—"Precisely." Although this was a first meeting of considerable tension and an occasion when he would have been happy to kill me, and he did so with his looks, it turned out to be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.
At about 9:00 p.m. on the night of December 26, I again conferred with the General Commander of the British 8th Indian Division. At that time, I was encouraged by his report that his division was in position and that the German advance had been stopped. At that moment, it seemed that the rapid commitment of the British 8th Indian Division to that defensive position had saved the situation, at least temporarily. Discussing his plan, General Russell informed me that he wanted to conduct reconnaissance to prepare delaying positions, which he would then occupy and hold behind the defensive line and be ready to fall back on, delaying the enemy as he withdrew. I told him that this was not my plan at all. Instead, he would counterattack immediately to restore the line, and I would take care of the delaying positions in his rear with the large contingents of American troops that were on their way to reinforce us. He took my instructions without any sign of disappointment, and I retired for the night.
On the morning of the 27th, General Russell called me to inform me that he had surveyed the front and was ready to restore our front line in accordance with my orders from the night before. However, he nearly floored me with the request: "Can I have four or five hours to tidy up the battlefield?" That is, before counterattacking, he would like to take some time to clear his area of stragglers, many of whom were at that moment galloping in all directions. I had once heard the expression and always remembered it as typically British. In Africa, Field Marshal Alexander had spoken of "reorganizing the battlefield" several months earlier. Needless to say, I was very happy to give General Russell an opportunity to "reorganize the battlefield."

The Germans renewed their attack at dawn on December 27, concentrating their efforts in the area between Gallicano and Coreglia. Minor attacks took place west of the river around Molazzana, where our troops made further brief retreats. The attack to the east, however, continued to make steady progress against elements of the 366th Infantry and Company F of the 370th Infantry Regiment. Barga was evacuated in the morning. The enemy captured two intact 57 mm guns and turned them against the 366th Infantry Regiment, which had also lost most of its heavy machine guns during its retreat. By 1:00 p.m., our troops had fallen back from the second line of defense, and the Germans had penetrated the center of the area as far as the village of Pedona on the Serchio River, three kilometers south of Barga.
The 19th Indian Brigade, moving northwest from Bagna di Lucca, established a line extending from northeast to southwest, from Coreglia across the Serchio to San Romano, a village about 2 kilometers south of Pedona. In the darkness, the 2nd Battalion of the 366th Infantry Regiment passed through the "Indians" and across the river into new positions behind the 1st Battalion of the 370th Infantry Regiment. At that moment, the British 8th Indian Division assumed command of the Serchio Valley sector and all the troops present in it. During the night, the 19th Brigade held its positions and, using automatic weapons and mortar fire, repelled several enemy patrols.
Units of the 21st Brigade advanced and took up positions on the right flank of the division, further strengthening the defense of the Serchio Valley. On the west side of the river, the 370th Infantry Regiment readjusted and improved its position. There was a noticeable decrease in enemy activity, but patrols sent to the recently lost village of Gallicano were repelled by small arms fire.
Meanwhile, the reserve forces that the 5th Army had poured in since December 26 to help contain the German threat were assembled in tactical locations as close as possible to where they could be deployed. The 85th Division had completed its concentration in the area and was thus disposed: the 377th Infantry Regiment was moved to the sector of the 92nd Division, the 338th Infantry Regiment was in a concentration area near Lucca, and the 339th Infantry Regiment had moved to S. Marcello Pistoiese to reinforce the troops of Task Force 45. The 85th Division, minus the latter regiment, was designated as a Corps reserve. On December 28, the 135th Regimental Combat Team (of the 34th Division) completed its move to an area northwest of Viareggio and was attached to the 92nd Infantry Division.
West of Lucca, the 1st Armored Division, which had been waiting for some time, rapidly approached an area from which it would be possible to attack both the coastal plain and the Serchio Valley.
With the arrival of all the reinforcements complete, the situation took on a more optimistic aspect. Livorno was safe, now it was a matter of regaining the ground that had been lost, and the British 8th Indian Division promptly took on that task.
On December 28, the 6th Lancers (Punjab Mechanized Squadron), the reconnaissance unit of the 8th Indian Division, launched an aggressive advance towards the Barga ridge, encountering only slight opposition. The 6/13 Rifles RRF of the 19th Brigade moved a company to Barga to reinforce the 6th Lancers, with another company following immediately. Elements of the other regiment of the 19th Brigade, the 3/8 Punjab, reoccupied Coreglia and the ridge to the southwest. The 1st Mahrattas Regiment of the 21st Brigade sent continuous patrols throughout the night on the right flank, just south of the town itself. The 370th Infantry Regiment, west of the Serchio, readjusted its positions and sent out strong combat patrols. Enemy resistance against our patrols was sporadic, suggesting that they were retreating from both banks of the Serchio. A corpse found near Molazzana was identified as belonging to the 2nd Battalion of the 285th Infantry Regiment of the German 148th Infantry Division. This was the first indication that this unit had entered the line on the west side of the Serchio River.
To support our counterattack, on December 27, the XXII Tactical Air Command struck the enemy with more than 200 sorties, followed by another 228 fighter-bombers and 24 bombers on the 28th. Over the next two days, a further 878 sorties flew over the Serchio Valley and the areas behind it, while the 19th and 21st Indian Brigades continued to repel the enemy. On the 29th, Barga was recaptured, on the 30th, Sommocolonia was reoccupied, and on the last day of the year, patrols penetrated Gallicano, Bebbio, and Molazzana, encountering weak resistance from small arms. By the end of the action on December 31, all lost positions had been recaptured by the British 8th Indian Division.
The objective of the German attack was unclear, although a captured officer said it was a reconnaissance in force, which could have been exploited if our reinforcements had not arrived.
The enemy must have been taken aback when they came into contact with the dark-skinned, turbaned Gurkhas, who were the most skilled in the use of knives in night combat.
According to accurate intelligence estimates, thanks to timely planning and the rapid movement of many troops over a distance of 100 kilometers by road, an enemy offensive that could have turned into a serious disaster had been stopped and repelled.

On December 31, during a meeting in the War Room, General Crittenberger and his staff reviewed the situation and what had been accomplished in the previous six days. G1, Colonel Harry Semes, reported that the military population in the current IV Corps sector had increased from 31,762 to 88,934. G-3, Colonel Raymond W. Curtis, reported that by the end of the fourth day, the equivalent of three divisions and an additional combat team, with support troops including artillery, engineers, and tank destroyers, had been moved over 100 kilometers by road, placed in tactical positions, and assigned their respective missions. Colonel Arthur T. Lacey, G-4, reported that Class II and IV depots had been established in the vicinity of Lucca, capable of supporting 50,000 men. With regard to troop movements, the 5,840 vehicles involved in the operation had traveled over 680,000 kilometers by road, the equivalent of approximately 6,430,000 kilometers of tires. Considering a life of 32,000 kilometers per tire, this meant that the equivalent of 2,000 tires had been worn out.
Colonel Gillette of the Corps of Engineers, who later wrote an entertaining light comedy about the attack on the Serchio entitled "Christmas Interlude," reported that the average of one and a quarter battalions of engineers at the Corps' disposal had maintained 320 kilometers of road, more than half of which was subject to snow; built 61 meters of footbridges, 137 meters of pontoon bridges, and 98 meters of Bailey bridges; prepared a total of 130 bridges [of fuses] and pipelines for demolition; laid 36 minefields; extracted 372 tons of fortification material and distributed 250 tons; supplied 1,000,000 liters of drinking water in addition to that supplied by the division's water points.
The corps artillery officer, Brigadier General William O. Crane, stated that on the night of December 27, two battalions of 155 mm howitzers and three battalions of 105 mm howitzers were in position, aimed, and ready to fire. By the night of December 28, their numbers had been increased by the arrival of a battalion of 155 mm guns, a battalion of 155 mm howitzers, and the 10th Group of the British Royal Artillery, consisting of two regiments of 140 mm howitzers. For anti-aircraft protection, the deployment of the 62nd Anti-Aircraft Brigade resulted in a ring of heavy guns around Lucca and light gun protection for the bridges over the Serchio, troop concentrations, and Army Supply Points.
Lieutenant Colonel Walker, A-5 (Allied Military Government) stated that 50,000,000 lire had been deposited in local banks in Lucca because, to avoid panic, on December 26 and 27, twenty checkpoints were set up by the Carabinieri in the Serchio Valley to accommodate some of the approximately 10,000 refugees who would otherwise have completely blocked the roads to military traffic.
Colonel Edmund Cunningham, communications officer, reported that during the first day, 320 kilometers of four spiral cables were hastily laid, and in the following two days, 160 kilometers of W-110 were also laid, and four pigeon lofts were moved into position. The IV Corps Command Post, in that remote location, required 80 lines, 100 telephones, and an additional switchboard.
At the end of the meeting, General Crittenberger congratulated his staff on their efficient performance in accomplishing so much in such a short time and paid special tribute to his superiors and subordinates for their full and immediate cooperation.

By the end of 1944, IV Corps had seen its strength increase significantly compared to a week earlier. The 92nd Infantry Division and the 8th Indian Division now occupied the coastal sector and the Serchio Valley. East of the valley, the position of Task Force 45 had been reinforced by an infantry regiment from the 85th Infantry Division. The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division remained in the Reno River valley. The 85th Division, minus the regiment in the Task Force 45 area, was in Corps reserve, and the 1st Armored Division remained just west of Lucca and under Army control. However, it was available for IV Corps plans and would be used if necessary.

The first elements of the 10th Mountain Division, additional reinforcements for the IV Corps, arrived in Livorno on December 27, while the rest of the division was expected to reach Italy in January. From a security standpoint, December was relatively calm compared to the previous period. The enemy was still infiltrating agents through the Corps sector, and although many had been arrested, it was possible that some had managed to slip through. Despite heavy snowfall, which made travel in the mountains difficult, fifteen agents were stopped during the month. Seven were captured by the Counterintelligence Section of the FEB's 1st Infantry Division; four were taken by the South African Armored Division and the other four were captured by the IV Corps, CIC Detachment. A total of 104 prisoners were captured during the month. An important piece of information that reached the ears of intelligence officers was the report that Marshal Kesselring had been wounded when he was strafed by a low-flying Allied aircraft in mid-December. General Heinrich von Vietinghoff, commander of the German 10th Army and considered one of the most capable enemy commanders, took Kesselring's place, and Lieutenant General Joachim Lemelsen of the 14th Army replaced Von Vietinghoff to lead the more active 10th Army opposing the British advance.

Eighty soldiers from the IV Corps were killed in December and 374 sick or wounded were evacuated for medical treatment. 253 were reported missing or captured. To replace these losses, 424 replacements arrived and were sent to the most understaffed units. The shortage of replacements for the 92nd Colored Division remained a problem. The assignment to the division of an additional black infantry regiment, the 366th Infantry Regiment, a separate regiment composed of men from other branches converted to infantry, which landed at Livorno on November 21, had compensated to some extent for this immediate shortage; however, the low caliber of the black replacements lowered the division's efficiency in battle. This factor was expected to become of great importance as the troops were employed in missions of greater risk and difficulty.

Once again, the shortage of trucks for transport had plagued the supply personnel, creating many problems. At the beginning of the month, all supply depots used by the Corps' troops were managed by the Army. This simplified the supply problem for the Corps; however, the transport requirements for the troops on the move were greater than the Corps Supply Truck Company could handle. This was particularly true after December 8, when the 435th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, which owned a large portion of the trucks that made up the Corps Supply Truck Company, was relieved of Corps control. At the Corps' request, the Army agreed to make 32 trucks from the 70th Quartermaster Truck Battalion available to increase the Corps' transport capacity. On December 29, with the increase in troop numbers and the Corps resuming responsibility for maintaining stock levels in the western sector, the Army assigned the 3644th Quartermaster Truck Company to the Corps. However, at the same time, the use of the 32 trucks from the 70th Quartermaster Truck Battalion was withdrawn.

A total of 1,242,127 B rations and 79,791 C rations were distributed to the troops. The terrain in which the troops were operating was such that in some cases supplies and rations could not be moved to their final destination by motor transport for use by the units. This necessitated the use of pack mules and hand transport. To help with this problem, additional mules from the 10th Mule Company (Italian) were assigned to IV Corps. Ammunition supplies continued to be critical and were allocated, for each ten-day period, only by the 5th Army. On Christmas Day, when the Corps was moving into the coastal sector, the Army authorized the Corps to take whatever amount of ammunition was necessary to repel the expected German offensive, and substantial stocks were unloaded in the rear.
When the threat developed on the coast and IV Corps Headquarters moved west on Christmas Day, there was a regrouping and reorganization of the artillery within the Corps.
The 424th Field Artillery Group remained in the eastern sector as Corps artillery to provide general support to Task Force 45 and the 1st Infantry Division of the FEB. The artillery of the British 10th Army Group, with two medium regiments, a battalion of 155 mm howitzers, and a battalion of 155 mm guns, moved into the IV Corps sector and, with the exception of the 155s, took up positions in the Serchio Valley. The 155 mm howitzers and guns were moved further west and took up positions along the coast. These units were under the command of the IV Corps artillery for the rest of the month and performed well during that short period.
The long-range weapons were used mainly for precise adjustments and counter-battery fire. On December 30, an unfortunate accident occurred in the 633rd Field Artillery Battalion when two 155 mm guns exploded while firing for diversionary purposes. There were nine casualties, but the exact cause of these mishaps was not determined. On the night of December 31, under cover of darkness, a 155 mm gun from Battery C of the 633rd Field Artillery Battalion was moved forward about 2,300 meters from the front line and from there carried out three diversionary missions firing on German depots and supply points, then returned before dawn to its starting position.

Adverse weather conditions made snow removal one of the worst problems for the Corps Engineers. Half of the Corps' road network was subject to heavy snowfall, and only some of the snow removal equipment was available through normal supply channels. This consisted of a V-blade mounted on a road grader. The rest of the equipment was procured from civilian sources and often had to be completely overhauled and modified before it could be used.
We also had the trusty old bulldozer to fall back on, although it was not entirely suited to this type of work. With this limited amount of equipment and the few engineers available, IV Corps could not afford to set up permanent snow centers as other corps and armies did. The Corps' program was the same as that used for road repair; teams with the available snow removal equipment were distributed to the units. When the snow began to fall, the teams abandoned the road reconstruction work they were doing and began clearing the snow. Finally, the Corps engineers could boast that no road in the Corps sector had been blocked by snow long enough to prevent the movement of essential supplies or troops.
The largest Bailey bridge ever built by the IV Corps was constructed over the Serchio River at Borgo Mozzano. In the hasty preparations to face the expected enemy attack, it was essential to have a bridge near Bagni di Lucca so that reserves could be moved from one bank of the Serchio to the other with minimal loss of time. The narrowest point of the Serchio River was near Borgo Mozzano, and here, on the night of December 25, the bridge became operational. The engineers worked day and night, and by December 27, they had built a 4.5-meter double-triple truss Bailey bridge.

The hard and bitter year of 1944 passed into history, and Germany was finally defending itself desperately on all European fronts. On the western front, Rundstedt retained only a small part of the ground gained in the costly Ardennes counteroffensive. In the east, the Russians were determined to capture Budapest and later launched a massive offensive from the Vistula that was destined to take them to the Oder River. Pressed on three sides, Germany was almost at the end of its rope. On all European fronts, the final chapter was about to be written.

THE WINTER FRONT

At the dawn of 1945, there were few visible changes on the IV Corps front from the situation that had prevailed during the last two months of 1944. In the eastern part of the Corps sector, positions were roughly the same as those held on November 1. In the western half of the Corps' sector, the failed attack by German and Italian Fascist forces in the Serchio Valley had ended, and our lines had been restored to the positions held before the attack began. Winter had been with us for some time, and much of the front line was buried under a blanket of snow, in some places up to 50-60 centimeters deep. Patrol activity was limited; artillery fire, both from the Germans and from our side, was at a minimum.
On January 1, it was estimated that the Germans were capable of defending their positions and launching counterattacks to regain any lost ground; fighting in delaying actions towards successive positions, moving up towards the strong defensive line of the Adige River, on the northern edge of the Po Valley, at the foot of the Alps; or launching a large-scale attack. Although the enemy had reinforced its force on the coast to a total of nine German and twelve Italian battalions, which still posed a threat in that sector, it was considered very likely that they would be content to adopt the first option and maintain their current line. On January 5, the first operational instruction of the new year ordered the reorganization of the 5th Army in preparation for future operations.

The decision to wait
At the end of the first week of January, the 8th Army's offensive operations still in progress were halted northeast of Faenza when the 15th Army Group decided to postpone further major offensive actions by the two Allies until the arrival of spring. Numerous factors were considered in reaching this decision. Whatever the enemy's intent in its attack on the Serchio Valley influenced to some extent the decision to further postpone any large-scale attack. By April 1, new British and American divisions were expected to be available, and several units of the new Italian army, well trained and equipped by the British, would be ready for combat. By that date, an adequate reserve stock of ammunition would have been built up; the main combat units would have been re-equipped and rested; and there would be no difficulty in predicting weather conditions during the winter.
For the rest of the winter, the 5th Army was assigned the mission of active defense. On January 9, the Army planned attacks on limited objectives to improve our defensive positions, to keep the enemy guessing about our ultimate intentions, and to provide a better starting line from which to launch the spring offensive, later scheduled for early April. The extensive reorganization of the Army, which began on January 5, continued for the rest of the month, which was relatively quiet across the entire front. Only a few small raids were carried out by our troops and the enemy, mostly designed to capture enemy prisoners. Several violent clashes occurred along the IV Corps front in the Serchio Valley and in the Strettoia hill massif near the coast when opposing forces attempted to secure local observation points.

Most of the units detached from II Corps, which had rushed to the IV Corps sector during the Christmas attack in the Serchio Valley, were returned to II Corps. On January 6, the 136th Regimental Combat Team returned from Viareggio to its previous sector on State Road 65, where it came under the control of the 34th Infantry Division. the following day, the 366th Regimental Combat Team (of the 92nd Infantry Division), previously assigned to the II Corps, moved to the IV Corps area to join its parent unit, and on January 8, the 85th Infantry Division began moving east to rejoin the II Corps.

To rebalance IV Corps for these withdrawals, on January 5, it was assigned the fresh and untested troops of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the first elements to be ready for combat from Major General George P. Hays' 10th Mountain Division.
The following day, these mountain warfare specialists were placed under the command of Task Force 45, and on January 9, they replaced the 434th and 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalions and the British 39th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment in the mountain area at the center of the Corps' sector. The two American battalions that were relieved were moved from the area to subsequently become part of the new 473rd Infantry Regiment. On January 10, following the return of the 365th Infantry Regiment to its area, the 92nd Division took control of the Serchio Valley sector, allowing the 8th Indian Division to move to the rest camp near Pisa. Ten days later, the second regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment, was assigned to Task Force 45, and on January 28, the rest of the division was moved to the area. The entire division thus became available; however, at the request of counterintelligence, it remained known as Task Force 45.

By the end of January, the IV Corps' positions consisted of the 92nd Infantry Division, Task Force 45 (10th Mountain Division), and the 1st Infantry Division of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force.
Throughout the month, our troops improved and consolidated their positions, building a series of secondary defense lines while preparing for the spring offensive.
The Army assigned a supply of snowshoes, sleds, and skis, which were distributed to the units to help them overcome the heavy snowfall in the mountains.
About 60 Weasels (M-29) were sent to the Corps; most of these were assigned to Task Force 45 for use by units of the 10th Mountain Division. Ammunition allocations were strictly adhered to, and even the quantities already allocated were not completely used up in order to build up a substantial reserve.

The 10th Mountain Division moves into line
Early in the morning of December 23, the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment landed in the port of Naples. With doughnuts and hot coffee under their belts, the men piled into trucks to head for the staging area at Bagnoli, north of Naples. They had not yet settled in and were thinking about how to spend Christmas Day in Naples when they received orders to prepare for a transfer to the IV Corps combat zone. On December 31, the regiment moved to Quercianella for some last-minute training. It was here that the division's first tragedy occurred when an S-mine exploded in the training area. The casualties, eight dead and four wounded, occurred the day before the regiment was attached to IV Corps for immediate use in the line.
On January 8, 1945, the 86th Infantry Regiment left Quercianella by truck and moved to the Task Force 45 sector where it was to be deployed. As the personnel approached to relieve the anti-aircraft battalions holding the line, the movement of troops and equipment by truck became increasingly difficult. In many cases, travel by truck was out of the question, so for many snow-covered miles, the journey was made on foot.
The mountain-trained infantry troops realized for the first time that the terrain was as rugged and the climate as cold as in the austere Rocky Mountains surrounding Camp Hale.

On January 9, Brigadier General Robinson E. Duff, assistant to the Division Commander of the 10th Mountain Division, took over command of Task Force 45, and the 86th Infantry Regiment came directly under his control. The 2nd Battalion of the 86th Infantry Regiment took over from units of the 39th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment and the 434th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion in the vicinity of Cutigliano, Ontoni, and Vizzanetta. The 3rd Battalion also moved immediately into position at , taking over elements of the same units in the areas surrounding Bagni di Lucca, La Lima, San Marcello, Maresca, and Corsigna. The 1st Battalion completed the final stages of the takeover when it moved into the positions occupied by the 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion on the right. Thus, the 1st Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, fresh and eager to learn real combat, moved into battle positions to get their first impressions of what it was like to be "down there."
The first day of combat ended with patrols establishing contact with adjacent units. Going from a hammock on a ship to a snow-lined foxhole in the high Apennines in 17 days was certainly an abrupt transition for the mountain soldier. After replacements, the 39th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment moved to Pistoia to be disbanded. Due to the continued absence of German aircraft, the 5th Army was able to convert the numerous anti-aircraft units to other specializations. The 434th and 900th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalions moved to Montecatini for conversion to infantry and became part of the new 473rd Infantry Regiment. Around noon on January 10, the Alpine troops experienced the sensation of hearing the roar and crash of enemy artillery fire for the first time.

These troops learned a great deal in a very short period of time. For example, patrols sent out on reconnaissance to the front returned with reports that movement was extremely slow and difficult due to heavy snowfall and that snowshoes and skis were essential. Patrols sent out on January 13 were equipped accordingly. On January 16, slightly north of Ontoni, the regiment experienced its first major firefight. Shortly before dawn, a patrol was stopped at a bend in the road by an enemy group that opened fire; after illuminating the scene with flares and a brief exchange of shots, the enemy withdrew.

On January 21, the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division arrived in the area to further increase the strength of General Crittenberger's command. On the same day, it was attached to Task Force 45, and the 1st Battalion relieved elements of the 86th Infantry in the Bagni di Lucca sector. The 2nd Battalion had moved to the vicinity of Prunetta to engage in further training and acclimatization, and the 3rd Battalion had moved to the vicinity of San Marcello as a reserve for Task Force 45. The movement of these units was coordinated smoothly, and their arrival was greeted with deep satisfaction at the IV Corps Command Post in Lucca, as the corps was in the process of being reinforced.

On January 20, the 87th Infantry Regiment, the third regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, was in a staging area at Villa Colli, northwest of Lucca. Here it trained and made preparations to take over from the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, which would be completed within the next two weeks. While in the area, it was designated as a corps reserve. That night, due to reports of another possible German reconnaissance force in the Serchio Valley, the Regiment received orders to be on alert for possible deployment.
Five counterattack plans were hastily prepared so that the unit would be ready for any eventuality, but nothing happened. The unit was credited with a uniformly fluid movement capability like the other two and further impressed the IV Corps personnel with the high caliber of the Division.
During the period at Villa Colli, emphasis was placed on company-level training and the adaptation of this type of unit for reconnaissance purposes. Of particular value was the combat training received by mortar crews, snipers, and 75 mm artillery crews. On January 27, the 81mm mortars joined the 92nd Infantry Division to gain practical experience in line fire missions. In one case, they received an emergency call for mortar fire and the crew responded immediately, went into action, and recorded an accurate shot on a possible German patrol. The 75mm gunners received similar training, which was almost too much for one section ( ) as it came under heavy counterbattery fire from the enemy. A noteworthy result of this training period for the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment was the sharing of individual responsibilities from the highest to the lowest ranks.

By January 28, the final stages of moving the division's last units to the front line were completed. Major General George P. Hays, Division Commander, with his entire staff, took command of Task Force 45, replacing General Duff. The establishment of the division's command post at Campo Tizzoro on the same day completed the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division into combat. The division was the only one in the U.S. Army organized primarily for mountain warfare, and about a quarter of its personnel had already served in the Aleutian Islands.
The main distinction between the mountain division and a standard infantry division was in its means of transport, which consisted almost entirely of columns of horses and pack mules; in its artillery, consisting of only three battalions of 75 mm transportable howitzers [dismountable and transportable on mules]; and in its anti-tank and supply battalions. The personnel had been specifically trained for mountain operations; their training included mountain climbing and the use of skis and snowshoes.

The main activity of the 10th Mountain Division in Task Force 45's sector was to maintain a heavy patrol screen, if possible across the entire front. To mention a few more lessons learned, the snow covering this part of the Apennines revealed many things to the mountain troops: for example, that the crust beneath the layer of powdery snow broke easily under their weight with a crunching sound that revealed their presence to enemy listening posts and active patrols; that sometimes thick fog and low-hanging clouds limited observation to very short distances. To give a picture of the weather conditions they had to contend with, here is a direct quote from a message from a patrol leader: "Very strong wind. Poor visibility early in the morning. Desperate need for crampons and ice axes. Weapons need to be cleaned thoroughly of ice and snow. We need protective sheaths. The use of rifles is uncertain." There was much more to this message than one might imagine, because in reality the cold snow on the mountain sometimes froze the M-1 rifles and machine guns. Acting on these reports, the IV Corps Armament Section investigated and discovered that patrol members, thus equipped, often stuck their weapons in the snow during steep mountain climbs, causing snow to accumulate around the bolt mechanism, jamming it and rendering the weapons inoperable.
The 86th Infantry Regiment was the first to improve the method of transporting supplies on snow-covered mountain trails. They converted hand sleds into mule-drawn sleds, thereby doubling the capacity of a pack mule. By the end of the month, the newly arrived unit had its feet on the ground, was fully oriented in its new environment, and was ready for operations at the Division level.

Task Force 45 is disbanded – "A job well done"
When the 10th Mountain Division entered IV Corps in the first month of the new year, Task Force 45 left the campaign. When General Hays assumed command of Task Force 45 at 06:00 on January 28, his headquarters took over the duties of Task Force 45 headquarters, also replacing the headquarters artillery battery, the 45th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, which was transferred to Limestre for disbandment.

Task Force 45 had been a mixture of American and British anti-aircraft gunners converted to infantry, as well as Italian and Brazilian partisans, other infantry, and American armored forces. Its artillery consisted of their anti-aircraft guns, tank guns, tank destroyer guns, and weapons captured from the Germans. Its engineers were mostly Italian civilians who were not afraid to work to the sound of cannons and who built well. It achieved a lot with very little. British anti-aircraft soldiers advanced under the cover of American tanks, American mortar fire from the rear, American engineers clearing mines ahead, and Yankees climbing out of their trenches with British artillery firing from the rear, with Italian partisans on their side and Brazilians on their flanks, taught that different peoples can fight well together for a common cause.

During its operations, from July 1944 to January 1945, Task Force 45 was assigned, at various times, between 3,000 and 8,000 men from over 56 different types of mixed units. It covered a front of 20 to 40 kilometers, both in the mountains and on the coastal plain, and advanced its initial front by 32 kilometers from the Arno River line to the Gothic Line and the Cinquale Canal. It suffered 650 casualties: 87 dead, 452 wounded, and 111 missing.

On February 12, General Crittenberger decorated Colonel Gerald G. Gibbs, commanding officer of the 45th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Brigade, with the Legion of Merit, and, after praising the unit, announced its disbandment as indicated in General Order No. 15 dated February 11, 1945, from the Headquarters of the 5th Army. The task force he commanded was held in high esteem by General Crittenberger and his staff, as it was actually a unit of the IV Corps, which had been formed by the IV Corps when infantry troops were scarce. It had been molded into a fighting unit that filled a huge gap in the line, and its work was done.

Goosebumps for the Germans in January
If it was cold and uncomfortable for the troops of the IV Corps, the consequences of the weather were undoubtedly twice as unpleasant for the enemy. Prisoners gathered near Molazzana reported that the Christmas attack had allowed them to collect a booty of many American garments that German and Italian troops were forced to wear to supplement their own. It was reported, but never confirmed, that some of these uniforms were used to equip agents who could then move freely behind our lines in the guise of American soldiers.

At the beginning of the month, civilian and Italian prisoners from units of the Italian Fascist Republic confirmed the suspicion that German troops in the Serchio Valley were pushing their expendable allies, the Italians, into advanced positions while enjoying the relative safety of the rear. Until January 9, there was much speculation about the position of the skilled German 4th Mountain Battalion, and the discovery of two corpses from this unit, slightly northeast of Monte Belvedere, indicated that they had elements in line in that area. However, subsequent information revealed that this unit was located in the more mountainous area near Abetone, much further west. Throughout January, the disposition of enemy troops did not undergo any major changes.
On the coastal flank, south of Massa, German troops from the 281st Regiment of the 148th Infantry Division anchored themselves at that end of the line. To the east of there, the snow-covered Monte Altissimo and Grottorotundo were occupied by Italian troops from the Monte Rosa and San Marco Divisions, who endured the rigors of the cold while German troops from the rest of the 148th Infantry Division sat in the more comfortable Serchio Valley. East of the valley, where the mountains rose to storm-swept heights of almost 1,800 meters, the enemy thinned out its troops and held this part of the front with the 232nd Rifle Battalion.
On the rest of the front, which stretched eastward to State Road 64, the three regiments of the German 232nd Infantry Division and the 267th Regiment of the 94th Infantry Division, frequently alternating between the trenches and rest areas, maintained a frigid vigil. The enemy had also adopted the strategy of converting other branches into infantry, whose missions had become relatively unimportant at this stage of the campaign. A German deserter, who crossed the line in the coastal sector ( ), reported the transfer of 700-800 men from an anti-submarine unit, the 22nd Torpedo Boat Flotilla, to infantry training in La Spezia and as port guards in Genoa. In view of these crude methods, the caliber of the coast guard troops was not implemented, but on the other hand, the enemy was not particularly concerned that we might have offensive intentions that could involve a landing operation. Around January 20, statements by deserters from the Italian Division of the Italian Fascist Republic, which was stationed in northwestern Italy as part of the Italian-French border guard, indicated a possible German intention to deploy that division in the western section of the line. Prisoners who had deserted to the partisans in the vicinity of Aulla, while the Italian Division was still far behind, heralded a steady stream of deserters. The Corps G-2 had gathered enough information to put together a complete biographical sketch of these Fascist units of the Italian Republic, which was included in the appendix to the daily periodic report, and the information was provided to all subordinates during a meeting. These were the only Fascist formations that Benito Mussolini could muster to defend his newly organized Italian Republic. Most of the men were not volunteers at all but enlisted because they had no other alternative.
To justify his spectacular rescue by paratroopers in Rome, Italy had capitulated to the Allies at the time, and as a measure of appreciation for Hitler's benevolent protection, Mussolini worked feverishly and hard to assemble these inexperienced units, which nevertheless made a modest contribution to the Axis war effort. Deserters from these Italian divisions spoke of harsh and offensive treatment by their German co-belligerents. Most of the battalions were composed of German officers as supervisors and non-commissioned officers, who threatened that, in the event of desertion, drastic measures would be taken against the deserters' families. This factor was a powerful weapon in the hands of the Germans, because Italian soldiers, whose homes were in northern Italy, feared Nazi reprisals against their loved ones. However, those who had no family or had distant ties to relatives did not hesitate to take advantage of the proximity of our frontline positions to throw their rifles into the snow and surrender to the conditions set out in the 5th Army's "Safe Conduct" passes. They reported seeing posters on notice boards threatening to kill the rest of a squad if one of its comrades decided to desert.
It was never known whether this ruthless but persuasive method was applied, but in any case, Italian soldiers continued to appear at our outposts to surrender or join the partisans in the hills. Of the 92 Italians taken prisoner in January and belonging to the Italia, Monte Rosa, San Marco, and other units of the Italian militia, 74 of them were genuine deserters.

The German rear
The Germans had to contend with a considerable amount of unrest far behind their front lines. Italian partisans were well organized to engage in extensive sabotage operations against the enemy supply system. The activities of these partisans were encouraged by special Allied units set up specifically to contact the partisans, direct their campaign against German installations, and provide them with trained military advisers.
British and American agents were smuggled through the lines or parachuted into areas occupied by partisans. Large quantities of small arms, ammunition, and explosives were dropped from Allied transport planes into remote valleys. British and American uniforms were sent to bands of patriots to be used on the day when an organized uprising against the Germans would be ordered. By December, these activities had reached such proportions that the enemy was forced to begin a determined attempt to clean up the situation. Elements of several divisions, including the entire 162nd Turkmen Grenadier Division, reputed to be unreliable in battle, were engaged in this program. Carefully planned attacks were carried out against partisan strongholds. The general pattern followed was the establishment of a siege, followed by a policy of starving and cutting off the various bands.
Severe measures were taken. The Germans refused to recognize the partisans as soldiers under international law and executed many of those captured. People who had befriended or supported the guerrillas were sometimes executed but more often sent to forced labor in Germany. Some of the Italian units employed in hunting down partisans were of little use due to high rates of desertion; for example, by the end of November 1944, the Monte Rosa Alpine Division had lost more than 6,000 men who had deserted. Many of these fugitives joined the partisans, while others donned civilian clothes and went into hiding.

The paper campaign
It is worth mentioning the propaganda leaflets that filled the special bullets of friends and enemies, which whistled on both sides of the lines; a new method of attempting to wear down the other side's resistance without bloodshed. The method was better known as psychological warfare. It is safe to say that our leaflets were the most persuasive and, as already mentioned, Italian soldiers readily took advantage of the 'Safe conduct' passes. When the identification of the Italian fascist units opposing the IV Army Corps was confirmed, a number of propaganda grenades were immediately made available to the artillery to flood the Italian units. It was known that the war no longer interested the conscripted Italian soldiers, and it was believed that they would take the first available opportunity to desert their insulting German allies, who looked upon Italian soldiers with contempt and derision.

However, the Germans did not hesitate to saturate the Italians with their propaganda, claiming that American troops of color would kill them on sight, or that they would be sent to America for forced labor never to return, or that they would be handed over to the Russians as slaves to work in the mines of Siberia. Thousands of "Safe Conduct" passes printed in Italian were dropped behind enemy lines inside artillery shells or thrown from an airplane onto the positions of the Italian San Marco and Monte Rosa Divisions. Observers on the front line noticed that when the shells exploded and the leaflets flooded the landscape, Italian troops rushed out of their holes and positions, picked them up, and rushed back just as quickly. We had orders not to fire on them for fear that our offers of desertion would be negated by our own shells. The Italians also knew we would not fire, because it had become customary practice. Italian deserters recounted how soldiers fought over these passes and guarded them jealously, even though death at the hands of the Germans was almost certain if one of them was found in possession of one. The results were surprising. Not long after the end of a cannonade or paper bombardment, our outposts were alerted by movement in front of them, only to learn that it was an Italian deserter or a group of Italians asking to surrender under the terms of the "Safe Conduct" pass.

Below is an example of the "Safe Conduct" pass with which many Italians used to surrender:

SAFE CONDUCT - (English version)
BY PRESENTING THIS PASS, THE BEARER OR BEARERS INDICATE THAT THEY ARE ABANDONING THE FIGHT AGAINST THE ALLIES. TAKE HIM OR THEM TO SAFETY.

SAFE CONDUCT - (Italian version written in Italian)
THIS PASS GUARANTEES YOU SAFE PASSAGE THROUGH OUR LINES. AGREE AMONG YOURSELVES. TAKE POSSESSION OF A FLYER. ONE IS ENOUGH FOR THE WHOLE GROUP. COME IN GROUPS OF NO MORE THAN 5 , OR 6. CARRY YOUR WEAPONS POINTED TOWARD THE GROUND AND NOT AS IF YOU INTEND TO USE THEM. LEAVE DURING THE NIGHT. THE TERRAIN IS FAVORABLE. DARKNESS PROVIDES COVER. REACH OUR LINES AT SUNSET OR LATER, NOT BEFORE. APPROACH OUR LINES OPENLY, CARRYING A WHITE CLOTH OR HANDKERCHIEF OR YOUR PASS. WHOEVER HAS THE FLYER SHOULD LEAD THE GROUP. OUR TROOPS ARE WAITING FOR YOU AND WILL TAKE YOU TO SAFETY. YOU WILL BE WELL TREATED. HURRY. THE GERMANS HAVE ALREADY DECIDED TO WITHDRAW YOU AND INTERN YOU IN CONCENTRATION CAMPS. COME IMMEDIATELY.

The Germans, through many years of practice, were skilled in the use of psychological warfare, but for some reason their numerous leaflets, sexy, funny, and otherwise, failed to impress our troops. They tried many approaches. They threw colorful leaflets at the Brazilians to stir up discontent over their ties to the Allies. One of the brightly colored comics depicted President Roosevelt as a ferocious eagle, with his sharp claws grabbing minerals, coffee, and oil to take them out of Brazil; on the back it said in Portuguese:

BRAZILIANS
Your wonderful country is the richest in the world.
Why don't you extract oil?
The Americans don't want you to.
Why can't you sell coffee?
The Americans don't want you to.
Why do you produce so little rubber in Brazil?
The Americans don't want you to.
Why isn't mining exploration more developed?
The Americans don't want you to do it.
The Americans want to take care of Brazil so that their capitalists can exploit the wealth of your land.
That is why you, Brazil's best soldier, were sent from Brazil to die in Europe and never return to your country.

These were used by Brazilian soldiers both as fuel for stoves in their makeshift winter shelters and for other purposes that cannot be mentioned here. A stream of leaflets of all kinds was thrown at the Americans. One type depicted a beautiful blonde with blue eyes and ruby-colored lips, smiling happily in the arms of her handsome, enamored G.I., and at the bottom was the inscription "LIVE FOR HER." On the other side was the sneering face of Stalin looking at a pile of dirt on top of which lay a twisted American helmet, and beneath the pile of debris protruded the combat boots of an American soldier. On this side was printed: "OR DIE FOR HIM."
Others were imbued with subtle propaganda that smacked of anti-Semitism, with the claim that the soldier was at the front dying for the Jews at home. A leaflet on discrimination was addressed to the troops of the 92nd Infantry Division, showing two black civilians being forcibly removed from a white church in New York because of their color. The general tone of these leaflets chastised our government for allowing discrimination and informed black soldiers that nothing like this existed in Germany.

Our best propaganda sheet was based on the newspaper "Frontpost," which was dropped to the Germans from our planes. It was a weekly newspaper printed specifically to inform German troops. Its effectiveness was based on truthful accounts of the progress of the war. The German soldier in Berlin, who had not heard from his family for months and who had secretly picked up a copy of "Frontpost" from the newspapers, reading that the Russians were at the gates of Berlin, must have been shocked, because news of such German reversals did not circulate freely from the German High Command (it was learned that the price of a copy of "Frontpost" in the German lines in Italy was notoriously one mark, worth about thirty cents before the war).

In addition to this paper campaign, the Germans broadcast a continuous stream of propaganda via radio waves from enlightened English-speaking personalities such as the British Lord Haw-Haw, Ezra Pound, the American, and Axis Sally from the Milan station. The most entertaining was Axis Sally, because her modern American music, jazz, and jokes were in true American style. Our troops were free to listen to these entertainments for what they were. We all wondered what Axis Sally looked like: her voice was playfully feminine, and the way she purred over the airwaves made us think of an attractive, curvaceous girl.

Command post in Lucca
When the staff of IV Corps Headquarters piled into trucks and jeeps to leave the mountains, leave Taviano, and settle in Lucca, for some, preparations were underway for a turkey dinner, and for the unlucky ones, C rations would be their Christmas feast.
The G sections were moved into the spacious dining rooms and bedrooms of the enormous Massarosa palace in the center of the city of Lucca. The wings of this palace wound around a large courtyard, where the trailers and vans of the General Command and some members of the staff were parked. In the room where Section G-3 operated, there were large paintings with golden frames. On one side of the room, a warm fire crackled in an unusually large stone fireplace, casting red, flickering shadows on the map boards on the opposite side of the room.
Logs were piled nearby. The modern telephone wires hastily strung across the room and the map boards leaning against the walls detracted from the ancient, musty atmosphere that had permeated the building before the IV Corps moved in. On that frantic Christmas day and night, Colonel Curtis, Lieutenant Colonel Maulsby, Lieutenant Colonel Pond, and Major Hamilton were too busy to take note of their new surroundings.
One was always on the phone taking messages, the phones ringing incessantly; others studied maps intently and worked on various plans to deal with the Serchio threat. Backpacks and bedding were scattered around the room, as there had been no time for Sergeant Major Luther, the chief clerk, to "tidy up the house." Sergeant Alan Mitchell, Section Draftsman, was busily sketching over a map to accompany the G-3 situation report for the following morning. On that first day in Lucca, everyone was busy. The tension arising from the Serchio situation was reflected in that room. Finally, on December 27, when the German wave was stopped by the 8th Indian Division, the pale expressions on the haggard faces of the officers and men were a warning that sleep was now a necessity. When the situation was back under control and the line was reestablished, the work slowed down.
There was little time and the pressure had been intense, but Livorno was not lost. From that moment on, Sergeant Major Luther had the opportunity to establish some order in the Section. He reorganized the layout of the makeshift map boards, and for the rest of the time, the telephones and the section operated normally from 4 to 6 p.m. each day with one officer and one clerk on duty.
In January, after the mountain line returned to calm, both sides were content to return to slumber and wait for the arrival of warmer weather and spring. The personnel of the IV Corps took advantage of the truce and spent their free time looking around the city of Lucca.
Lucca was an ancient and picturesque city, and the temperature was never really cold, and any amount of snowfall was a big novelty. The warmth of the sun's rays in the middle of winter was explained by the fact that this capital of the province of Lucca, sheltered in the Arno valley, was only 19 meters above sea level.
As the soldiers walked through the narrow streets, they realized that these ancient thoroughfares, wide enough for a jeep or little more, spoke to them from the distant past. The Military Police, stationed at the four gates of the high wall that protected the city, performed the same duties as the city sentries in 1645. Early in the morning and at various times throughout the day, the bells of its many churches rang loudly throughout the city and the surrounding countryside. The city had many churches, most of them markedly basilica-like, with richly decorated exteriors, fine apse ends, and square bell towers, in some cases with crenellated tops and windows that increased in number as they rose in height. They had followed the Pisan style. Every day, soldiers and officers walked back and forth across the stone square in front of St. Martin's Cathedral on their way to eat. As they approached this ancient relic, few realized that this tall church had been started long before Columbus discovered America. This enormous cathedral was begun in 1060 AD by Bishop Anselm, who later became Pope Alexander II. For almost two months, the IV Corps lived in a city that had elbowed its way into history since 218 BC. At that time, one of the Roman emperors, Sempronius, retreated to the city with his battered army after his defeat at Trebbia at the hands of Hannibal. History also tells us that Julius Caesar held his famous conference with Pompey and Crassus here in 56 BC. He did not know then that fate had already sealed his destiny in the Roman Senate. In Lucca, on the same narrow streets where the jeeps of the IV Corps now drove, Roman two-wheeled chariots once roared.
The saldi of the Roman Legions marched along these same roads. Lucca was then, as it is today, the meeting point of the roads leading to the ancient Roman settlements of Florentia (Florence), Parma, Luna [a Roman colony founded in 177 BC at the mouth of the Magra River as a military outpost in the campaign against the Ligurian Apuani] and Pisa. Ancient Lucca suffered its share of looting and was deprived of part of its territory, but nevertheless presented itself as an important city and fortress at the time of Narses [Byzantine general], who besieged it for three months in 553 AD.
Lucca is steeped in a history of turmoil that presents researchers of ancient history with an infinite wealth of topics. Under the Lombards, it was the residence of a Duke or Marquis and had the privilege of a mint. A coin minted in Lucca is now priceless to coin collectors around the world.
The Dukes gradually extended their power over the whole of Tuscany, but after the death of the famous Matilda, the city established itself as an independent community around 1160. Here is an indication of how many times Lucca changed hands. "Occupied by the troops of Louis of Bavaria, sold to wealthy Genoese, taken by John, King of Bohemia, who granted it to the Rossi family of Parma, then ceded to Martino della Scala of Verona, sold to the Florentines, ceded to the Pisans, nominally liberated by Emperor Charles IV and governed by his Vicar." In 1546, Francesco Burlamacchi made several attempts to bring political cohesion to Italy, but died on the scaffold. Napoleon also entered the scene, founding a principality here in 1805 for his sister Elisa and her husband Felice Baciocchi. Let us not forget that in 1944 the Germans occupied it until it was conquered by the American troops of the IV Corps, in whose hands it was at the time of this story.
Just as the military leaders of ancient Lucca once drew up plans for the defense of the city, so did General Crittenberger and his staff in 1944; not for the defense of Lucca, because it was not really in danger, but because of the preliminary operation that would take place in the mountains that formed the northern horizon. This planning was done in accordance with the suggestions of the 5th Army, which in February had planned a limited attack by the IV Corps.

Plans and Operations Section
The Corps' operational nerve center operated in the G-3 Section. Reports from all Corps units and adjacent and higher headquarters flowed into this section. The positions of friendly and enemy troops, reports on operations, plans, and future intentions were collected and kept up to date on maps, charts, and files. Division reports were received every six hours and more frequently during periods of intensive action. Situation Reports (SITREPS) followed a standardized three-paragraph format. The first part represented the actual development of operations; the second listed the Commander's intentions; the third indicated changes in the location of command posts or changes in the allocation of troops.
Twice a day, at 12:00 and 24:00, the G-3 Section compiled the SITREPS to be sent to the 5th Army; informal SITREPS were also forwarded at 06:00 and 16:00, providing information on activity up to those times. In addition, a daily report was prepared containing a summary of operations for the 24-hour period. Various types of information maps were kept in the G-3 Section. To provide a complete understanding of the situation at any given time, these maps included not only information compiled in the G-3 Section but also information obtained from other sections. A duplicate set of the complete G-3 maps was kept in the War Room, also known as the Liaison Room, from which liaison officers from various units could obtain a complete picture of the Corps to report back to their respective commanders.
Thus ended another month of winter operations. Although no progress had been made along the broad front of IV Corps, the mission of maintaining contact with the enemy through patrols and raids was assiduously carried out. Assailed by our artillery and constantly alerted by our probing, the Germans shivered in the icy wind as they waited tensely for the next move of the Allied forces in Italy. Among the enemy forces facing IV Corps, losses of personnel and equipment were a constant drain at a time when they could not afford to see their forces depleted. The emphasis was still on rest and recreation for our troops. Divisions were assisted in setting up rest facilities in their respective areas, and normal quotas for assignments to Army rest centers continued. Replacements were beginning to pour into the IV Corps, bringing depleted units back to full strength. A total of 2,530 recruits arrived to shiver and be buffeted by the icy storms of the Apennines; however, after being absorbed by the units that needed them, they quickly learned the know-how to find warmth and comfort where they could.

THE CAMPAIGN IN THE APENNINES

ATTACKS ON LIMITED TARGETS IN FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1945

February was an extremely cold month, but the fact that within a few weeks the snow would begin to melt into icy streams cascading down the mountain slopes offered some consolation against the bitterly cold winds that howled through the crags and swept furiously across the mountain tops. After a month of rest, reorganization, and routine tasks following the December incident in the Serchio Valley, the IV Corps was ready to launch attacks on limited objectives, particularly in the sector of the 92nd Infantry Division. This was in line with the instructions for operations contained in Directive No. 2 of January 9, 1945, of the 5th Army. In addition to occupying terrain whose characteristics were of fundamental importance in providing the best positions from which to launch the spring offensive, the local attacks were designed to keep the enemy confused about our intentions and to keep them off balance during the months of February and March.

THE ATTACKS OF THE 92nd DIVISION

The 92nd Infantry Division, with the attached 366th Infantry Regiment and various support troops, undertook two separate offensive operations. One of these was designed to improve positions in the Serchio Valley and the other to achieve similar success in the coastal sector along State Road I.

……… omitted ……….

 THE OPERATIONS OF MONTE BELVEDERE - MONTE DELLA TORRACCIA - CASTELNUOVO

While the 92nd Infantry Division was attacking in the Serchio Valley and on the coast, Task Force 45 (10th Mountain Division) and the 1st Infantry Division of the FEB sent out patrols with the aim of worrying and confusing the enemy as much as possible. It was also an opportune moment to carry out frequent unit rotations, giving everyone the chance to get used to the sound of battle and the feeling of the front line, especially the Alpine troops. On several occasions, the Brazilian headquarters in Bagni della Porretta came under fire from enemy 170mm guns. One of these barrages destroyed four vehicles and wounded four men.
The mountain troops were becoming skilled at patrolling, as on February 5, when a platoon of riflemen from the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a section of light machine guns and a team of 60mm mortars, conducted a raid on Mount Spigolino, held by the enemy. The force reached the top of the mountain, captured an enemy machine gun position and took two prisoners after killing four. In February, a patrol from Company B of the 85th Infantry Regiment, consisting of two officers and 81 men, was sent on a raid against enemy positions at Alpe Tre Potenze. The results were one enemy killed, eleven captured along with two machine guns and 15,000 rounds of ammunition. With actions such as these, the patrols of the new division were rapidly becoming expert and the enemy's ranks were slowly being depleted.
The third planned attack on limited targets, as a preliminary move to improve positions before launching the more extensive spring offensive, was aimed at securing the heights overlooking a 16-kilometer stretch of State Road 64. The objectives of the attack, outlined by the 5th Army in Operations Instruction No. 4 of February 16, were a series of mountain peaks and ridges about 8 kilometers west of the road, extending from a point opposite Porretta in the north to a point south and west of Vergato, a distance of about 13 kilometers. In German hands, these peaks, averaging 1,050 meters in height, offered a complete vantage point over most of the main road in that area and our positions east of the Reno River. If occupied by our forces, not only would the Germans be denied the use of these valuable observation points, but we would also gain good positions from which to direct the future offensive. The terrain north of the objectives, although still very rugged, gradually sloped down towards the Po Valley.
The planned operations were much more ambitious than those recently organized in the Serchio Valley and the Ligurian coastal plain. The attack was to involve the FEB's 1st Brazilian Infantry Division and the fresher 10th Mountain Division, for which this would be the first major engagement. The first phase of the attack involved the conquest of the long-contested Monte Belvedere and its two twin peaks: Monte della Torraccia and Monte Castello. The second phase, which was to begin after the ground taken in the first phase had been completely consolidated, required the occupation of additional ridges northeast of Monte della Torraccia and Monte Castello, including Monte Grande d'Aiano, Monte della Croce, Monte Castellana, and the territory surrounding the municipality of Castelnuovo. The occupation of these objectives would have pushed our lines up to 11 kilometers west of State Road 64 and would have put in our hands the terrain dominating the main road leading to the bastion of Vergato, thus enabling us to neutralize this stronghold.
The most critical terrain, included in Phase I of the attack, was Monte Belvedere, its twin ridge called Monte Gorgolesco, and the hill along the saddle connecting it to Monte della Torraccia. This saddle was formed by a 5-kilometer-long ridge, only slightly lower than the 1,139 meters above sea level of Monte Belvedere and the 1,082 meters above sea level of the summit of Monte della Torraccia. These peaks and the ridge dominated not only the terrain to the southeast but also the Panaro river basin, which stretched to the northwest. One and a half kilometers south of Monte della Torraccia was Monte Castello, the third critical hill in the immediate vicinity.

Since there had been little major action in the Monte Belvedere area since November, it was expected that the enemy had developed an intricate system of minefields. Aerial photographs revealed a growing number of bunkers, trenches, and barbed wire, carefully camouflaged by snow, confirming that the enemy was busy improving its positions.

To the west of our positions, at the base of Monte Belvedere and extending for about 6.5 kilometers from northeast to southwest, was the even more rugged Serrasiccia - Cappel Buso ridge. From Mount Serrasiccia, which rose to a height of 1,380 meters above sea level, the ridge sloped slightly towards both ends; with the extraordinary feature of being a 450-meter rocky cliff almost sheer on the northwestern side. Pizzo di Campiano, at the northern end, was almost 30 meters higher than Mount Belvedere and would have provided an excellent vantage point over the reverse slopes of the Belvedere-Torraccia ridge. It was therefore considered essential that this ridge be taken, thus securing the left flank, before the main assault. Surprise would be extremely difficult to achieve, and in this respect, good camouflage and the careful movement of troops under the cover of twilight became much more important.

Across the entire mountain system, concealment was only possible in scattered bushes that grew sparsely. Communication routes would prove more difficult as they would have to follow steep paths where deep snow had to be taken into account. The few roads in this area were narrow, many of them unsuitable for two-way traffic. The burden of supply would fall on pack mules, tracked Weasels, and jeeps. With very careful and slow driving, a limited number of armored vehicles were able to be pushed forward; in previous operations in the vicinity, tanks had advanced as far as the village of Querciola, on a ridge just over 1.5 kilometers southwest of the summit of Monte Belvedere.

The photographic intelligence service indicated that the Germans also realized the tactical importance of this ridge and had amassed a large number of artillery pieces in the Campiano-Belvedere-Castello area; a total of 97 cannons were sighted. The enemy artillery was deployed fairly evenly across the front, from the eastern border of the Corps to Monte Belvedere, with a slight tendency to concentrate near Monte Terminale; west of Monte Belvedere there was very little artillery. The sector was defended by the German 232nd Grenadier Division, which was spread over a 30-kilometer front, with the 1045th Grenadier Regiment holding most of the Belvedere-Torraccia ridge. The 1043rd Grenadier Regiment was located in the Monte Castello area and the 1044th Regiment was scattered along the Serrasiccia-Cappel Buso ridge and the mountains to the southwest of it. In reserve were the 232nd Rifle Battalion and elements of the independent 4th Mountain Battalion.

The artillery of the IV Corps coordinated the supporting fire.
From February 12 to 19, the IV Corps artillery was busy preparing for the attack by the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Infantry Division of the FEB. The Corps artillery unitsdeployed with the 92nd Division were transferred to the Bagni della Porretta area. The 5th Army assigned additional medium artillery to the IV Corps, which was also moved to the same area. On February 15, an advance party of IV Corps artillery personnel moved into the new area to prepare detailed plans for the attack, in collaboration with the artillery staffs of the two divisions. The maneuvers planned for the two units required, for the first time, complete integration of the artillery plans of both divisions and the Corps.
Many meetings and very detailed and coordinated planning were necessary to perfect the plan and put together the pieces to support the formidable machine that it later proved to be during the attack. The 'no-fire' lines in each area of action had to be carefully established and strictly followed. A maximum distance line had to be prescribed for the FEB's 1st Infantry Division, and each division's artillery had to be ready to support the other in certain critical areas. The Corps artillery units deployed together for this attack consisted of the 424th Field Artillery Group, which was assigned the mission of general Corps support and reinforcing the artillery fire of the 10th Mountain Division. This group consisted of the 633rd Field Artillery Battalion, which had 155 mm guns and 200 mm howitzers, and the 185th Field Artillery Battalion with 155 mm howitzers. The 248th Field Artillery Battalion with 155 mm howitzers, not part of the group, was placed in general support, reinforcing the fire of the FEB's 1st Infantry Division. The Corps' final artillery plan did not call for any artillery preparation prior to the attack, as the initial success of the attack depended on the element of surprise.

The counterbattery phase of the plan was refined to perfection. Nine enemy artillery groups were plotted on maps, each group containing three to five known enemy batteries. With pre-set firing data, the Corps artillery was ready to concentrate its fire on any group that became active. In addition, a comprehensive program of immediate counterbattery fire was ready, covering all known enemy batteries, in case the enemy artillery became generally active. Each enemy battery was to be initially interdicted with at least four battery salvos, followed by devastating fire of 12 platoon salvos per hour for prolonged neutralization. As for jamming fire, after a thorough cartographic study, critical points on the road networks and possible assembly areas were determined, intelligence summaries were read, and a jamming program was prepared for use in case aerial observation aircraft were unable to operate. The artillery of each division prepared a defensive fire plan to protect its assigned targets. Defensive and reinforcement fire were determined by studying maps and aerial reconnaissance. An effective mortar fire program was planned because, in the past, the enemy had effectively used mortar fire against our infantry in this sector. Plans for 11 counter-mortar fire groups were prepared by the divisions against 67 known enemy mortar positions. At the request of the division artillery, the corps artillery was ready to fire on any of these groups. Much of the ultimate success of the offensive was credited to the flexibility of this artillery plan. Every detail was considered, and if a contingency arose that negated the effects of one of the plans, another would be put into operation in its place.

The attack
By February 1, the entire 10th Mountain Division was concentrated in the Task Force 45 sector, which stretched east from Bagni di Lucca, through the Cutigliano Valley to the southern slopes of Monte Belvedere.
On February 15, the newly organized 473rd Infantry Regiment was attached to IV Corps and took over the elements of the 10th Mountain Division in the areas of Bagni al Lucca and Cutigliano. Two days later, the division took command of only the eastern part of Task Force 45's sector, and the 473rd Infantry Regiment took command of the western half. On February 17, the 10th Mountain Division was detached from Task Force 45 and took command of the new sector under its own name. The border between the 10th Mountain Division and the Brazilians of the FEB remained unchanged - the former Task Force 45 - FEB border. The new border between the 10th Mountain Division and the reduced Task Force 45 was the S. Felice - Pontepetri - Pracchia - Spigolino - Fanano line.

At the end of the day, the 10th Mountain Division was reunited in its new sector with most of its units in the Lizzano area, in the Setta River Valley, southwest of Porretta. That night, patrol activity was somewhat reduced due to bad weather. Rain and fog made observation practically impossible during the early part of the evening, but the temperature, at that moment, was not below zero. All support units moved silently to their agreed positions. As night fell on February 18, the 10th Mountain Division was ready for its first major clash with the enemy. There was a tense atmosphere of anticipation throughout the division. On the night of the attack, the Corps artillery began laying down normal covering fire so as not to alert the enemy to anything unusual.

At 7:30 p.m., the preliminary attack was launched to secure the flank on the Serrasiccia-Campiano ridge. The 1st Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry had been selected to take advantage of the key feature of the terrain. The battalion's expert mountaineers climbed 450 meters up the rocks and placed ropes for use by other personnel who were not as well trained and would be climbing after them. This expert mountain battalion, tackling the steep rock face in the dark, took the 2nd Battalion of the German 1044th Grenadier Regiment by surprise, just as it was about to be relieved by elements of the 232nd Rifle Battalion. The enemy, caught off balance, gave up the strategic heights after putting up relatively little resistance, and by 06:00 the ridge line was firmly secured. It was not until 06:55 on February 19 that the enemy artillery became active. The Corps artillery responded promptly with its counter-battery program, which proved very effective as the infantry received no artillery bombardment for the next two hours and only light bombardment until late afternoon.

In detail, the mountain battalion attacked head-on towards the ridge with Company A moving against Mount Mancinello, Company B against Mount Cappel Buso, and Company C against Mount Serrasiccia. Company F, attached to the 1st Battalion, advanced against the positions south of Monte Mancinello to provide protection on the left flank, while a platoon from Company A operated independently on the right flank to take the spur of Pizzo di Campiano. The attack on that seemingly impassable terrain, so steep that the troops found it necessary to use ropes to climb, took the enemy completely by surprise. Company A reached the ridge of Monte Mancinello at 00:45, closely supported by Company F.
At 3:00 a.m. on February 19, Company B reached the lower slopes of its objective, where it encountered the first enemy reaction in the form of small arms fire. After an hour of skirmishing, the objective was captured and the garrison was mostly killed or captured. At 05:05, Company C attacked its objective, which it secured after a lively firefight. The detached platoon of Company A reached the summit of Pizzo di Campiano after a grueling nine-hour climb and successfully occupied that area of the ridge. Before dawn broke over the crenellated area, the 1st Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry had achieved all of its objectives.

The first enemy counterattacks were directed against the detached platoon of Company A; three of these attacks of varying strength, from a platoon to a company, were repulsed during the day. With darkness, the Germans renewed their attacks and continued to hammer this thin line of defense throughout the night of February 19-20. Before losing communication with the battalion, the platoon requested artillery fire, which was immediately carried out in the form of close fire that drove the Germans off the slope. By the morning of the 20th, the platoon had killed twenty-six Germans and captured seven, but never knew how many had been wounded. Isolated and running low on ammunition, the platoon held out until reinforcements arrived at 08:00 on the 21st, repelling seven enemy attempts to retake the position.

Other counterattacks were carried out at other points along the ridge, but these were also successfully repelled. Two companies of the German 4th Independent Mountain Battalion were virtually wiped out in these battles. The problem of supplying and evacuating the battalion was solved by the division's engineers, who built a cableway that reached two-thirds of the way up the slope; from there on, supplies were pulled up with ropes or carried by hand. Seven .50 caliber machine guns and two 75 mm howitzers were positioned on the newly conquered ridge to support the main attack on Monte Belvedere. The 1st Battalion of the 86th Infantry Regiment held and improved its positions until the early hours of February 22, when it was replaced by the 10th Mountain Anti-Tank Battalion and the 10th Mountain Reconnaissance Troop.

With its left flank protected by the ridge, the division secretly moved its other units into attack positions. Reinforcing the division's firepower were the 185th Field Artillery Battalion; Company A of the 1125th Armored Field Artillery Battalion; Company A of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion; and the 106 mm mortars of the 84th Chemical Battalion. The 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 751st Tank Battalion provided the armored force, and detailed arrangements were made for air support from "Rover Joe" and the XXII Tactical Air Command.

The division's attack plan called for the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment to move northeast on the western slope of Mount Belvedere, while on its right, the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment was engaged in a frontal attack directly against the peaks of Belvedere and Gorgolesco. The 3rd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment was ready on the division's right flank and had the mission of protecting this flank by capturing the village of Mazzancana. When the 10th Mountain Division reached Hill 1053, about halfway between Gorgolesco and Monte della Torraccia, the Brazilian Expeditionary Force was to attack Monte Castello. It was essential that the start of this phase of the attack be planned correctly.

Since the enemy on Monte Belvedere could observe our positions in the Silla valley completely, the assault troops marched 13 kilometers during the night between February 18 and 19 toward the advanced assembly areas at the base of the Belvedere-Gorgolesco ridge. That attack began at 11:00 p.m. on February 19, without any artillery preparation, in the hope of securing the initial tactical surprise of the night assault. On the left, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment crossed the starting line along the road network near Querciola, close to the hamlets of Polla and Rocca Corneta, while the 1st Battalion pressed northeast up the slope towards Mount Belvedere and north to the village of Valpiana. the troops of Company B, in the lead, advanced about 700 meters before reaching the first enemy outpost, where they encountered sporadic resistance from groups of Germans who had entrenched themselves along a line of machine gun bunkers and fortified houses stretching from the summit of Mount Belvedere in the west to Rocca Corneta.
On the western slope, near Corona, the units encountered extensive anti-personnel and anti-tank minefields, which caused some casualties among the partisans acting as guides. An hour and a half after bypassing Corona at 3:00 a.m., the 1st Battalion reached Mount Belvedere, where it encountered moderate resistance and immediately began clearing a spur of the main ridge running north towards Valpiana. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion bypassed Corona after pushing through the minefields, which fortunately had been uncovered by the melting snow, and headed six hundred meters west towards Polla. This stronghold, taken at 10:35 a.m., opened another hole in the enemy's main line of defense, making Rocca Corneta, between Polla and the elements of the Division that were on Pizzo di Campiano, indefensible.
The 3rd Battalion moved to the center of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment's area, north of Corona, during the morning, and throughout the day the regiment's position on the front was improved and organized. Two companies of the 1st Battalion of the German 1044th Grenadier Regiment suffered heavy losses during our initial advance and during a failed counterattack launched at 4:00 a.m. ( ).
Further east, similar successes were achieved when the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion against Monte Belvedere and its 1st Battalion against Monte Gorgolesco.
At 01:00 on February 20, the 3rd Battalion encountered the first resistance about 270 meters from the summit. Three hours later, the advancing troops had made their way to the top, and at 06:15 the entire battalion was on the ridge, where it was greeted by extremely heavy mortar and artillery fire.
On Monte Gorgolesco, the 1st Battalion encountered almost identical enemy resistance, but at 06:10 it cleared the summit and began advancing along the ridge towards Monte della Torraccia, encountering increased small arms fire and mortar rounds. However, the enemy artillery was partially neutralized by previously planned counter-battery fire.
The 3rd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, which had encountered little opposition during its supporting attack to the right of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment, occupied the village of Mazzancana on the morning of the 20th and established defensive positions about halfway up the south-eastern slope of the ridge. At 11:15 a.m., the Germans launched company-sized counterattacks east of Monte Gorgolesco, and many other minor attacks were repulsed during the day. These actions were ineffective in stopping our advance, and by 6:00 p.m., about half of the ridge had been cleared when the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment passed through the positions of the 1st Battalion to continue the attack, clearing the enemy from the Chapel of Ronchidoso despite stubborn resistance. During the night, there were five German counterattacks, and heavy losses were suffered on both sides.
The activity of our aircraft, which began operating at first light, played an important role in reducing enemy bombardments and, during the day, provided close support to all sectors of the division's front by bombing, strafing, and firing rockets at enemy gun positions and other installations. "Rover Joe" directed 53 missions in support of the advance of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment. Those air attacks against enemy mortars and artillery positions in the rear were the most effective.
During February 21, the 87th Infantry Regiment repelled local counterattacks along most of its front, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers, while artillery fire and aerial bombardment shattered a powerful concentration of troops north of Valpiana before an attack could be launched against us. At 07:00, Company C was hit by one of these assaults by about eighty Germans. They were beaten without any casualties on our part, and when the morning fog cleared, 25 dead enemies were found in the area. The 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment was deployed along the reverse slopes of Mount Belvedere, across Polla to one end of Valpiana and up to the summit of Belvedere. German mortar fire was extremely accurate on those positions during the day and alone caused eight casualties. Artillery support was limited due to poor communications caused by German mortar fire, which had disrupted the lines. A battalion-strength counterattack was launched against the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment by elements of the 741st Light Regiment, the first unit of the 114th (Light) Jäger Division to be engaged against us in this sector. That counterattack, reinforced by elements of the 1st Battalion of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment, temporarily halted our advance, but failed to recapture the ground that the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment had already taken. The 2nd Battalion of the 85th Mountain Infantry resumed its advance in the late afternoon and reached positions just below the summit of Monte della Torraccia after dark.
Prisoners from the 741st Jaeger Regiment said they had been marching from the Lake Comacchio area on the Adriatic for seven days when some of them were put on trucks to rush to counter the IV Corps' attack. Later, General Crittenberger, interrogating one of the Nazi prisoners from another unit of the division, asked him, "And how did you get here?" "Zu fuss" (on foot). "The whole way? Never in trucks?" "Nein, zu fuss" (No, on foot). This indicated that the 114th Jaeger Division was on the march to carry out the normal changeover of the 232nd Infantry Division and when our attack developed, soldiers were urgently engaged in an ttempt to stop our advance.
The 1st Brazilian Division, in its attack on Monte Castello, followed tactics similar to those used by the 10th Mountain Division. The 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment attacked from the west and south, while the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment pushed north across the eastern slopes at the foot of the mountain, with most of its weight directed east of the mountain. At 05:30 on February 21, carefully coordinating with the advance of the [American] Alpine troops, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment began their attack from positions north and east of Mazzancana and within two hours took the heights at the foot of the main mountain. The Germans, whose right flank was threatened by our advance along the Belvedere-Torraccia ridge, withdrew from some of their positions and were also swept away by a 15-minute preparatory artillery barrage before the Brazilians began their main assault on Monte Castello at noon. The two battalions headed for the objective, with the 1st Battalion attacking from the northeast and the 3rd Battalion from the north. The advance elements of the 1st Battalion reached the summit at 5:45 p.m., and an hour later the 3rd Battalion climbed the southern slopes; by 8:40 p.m., the main pockets of resistance on the mountain had been wiped out.
The 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment advanced in its area to capture the village of Abetaia. On the 22nd, positions throughout the 10th Mountain Division remained virtually unchanged. While the 87th Infantry Regiment held the positions it had reached on the 21st, the 85th, pounded by German artillery and mortar fire, failed to reach the summit of Monte della Torraccia. The Brazilians made slight gains north of Monte Castello and were consequently unable to make any progress. Throughout this time, the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment, on the right flank of the 1st Brazilian Division, had not taken part in the attack.
At the start of the attack, a great effort was made to move tanks and tank destroyers into position on the ridge once it had been captured, mainly as a defensive measure, as very heavy counterattacks were expected. On February 20, the tanks advanced as far as Querciola, but many were put out of action by mines and others left the path in an attempt to tackle the rough terrain on the road to Corona and Valpiana. On the morning of February 21, a tank finally reached Valpiana, and the following day, additional tanks and tank destroyers reached the ridge northeast of Monte Belvedere, after engineers had cleared the roads of deeply laid mines.
On the morning of the 23rd, Monte della Casellina, a mile east of Monte Castello, was occupied by the 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment, and the village of Bella Vista fell in the late afternoon. During the night between February 23 and 24, the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment relieved the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Infantry Regiment and, after heavy artillery preparation, attacked and captured the summit of the hotly contested Monte della Torraccia at 7:30 a.m. It did not stop there but advanced slightly beyond the ridge, where extensive trench systems were overcome. On February 24, the Brazilians continued their advance and by midnight, La Serra, just over 1,500 meters east of Monte della Torraccia, was surrounded and captured under heavy machine gun fire. With all objectives in our hands, phase one of the two divisions' attack was complete.

On February 25, on the northwestern slopes of Mount Torraccia, the enemy launched the strongest counterattack of this operation. The Mittenwald Mountain Training Battalion, which had been roaming elusively behind enemy lines in front of the IV Corps for several months, and the 114th Reconnaissance Battalion were the troops used in this attack. This counterattack was preceded by unusually heavy artillery fire from three light field howitzer battalions, but it was repelled just as on previous occasions. Our troops withstood the intense initial artillery fire and, when the enemy approached, brought out all their weapons.
Members of the 741st Light Regiment and the 114th Reconnaissance Battalion (114th Light Division) continued to resist for several days on the northeastern slopes of Mount Torraccia ( ), but the counterattack on February 26 marked the enemy's last effort to regain possession of the ridge.

Up to that point in the operation, the 10th Mountain Division suffered a total of 850 casualties, including 195 dead, 10 missing, and the rest wounded. The enemy suffered a much higher number of casualties and almost 400 of its troops were captured. Achieving tactical surprise, the Alpine troops, in their first major engagement, had completed the operation in less time than expected.
The 1st Infantry Division of the FEB suffered 246 casualties, including 32 dead, 205 wounded, and 9 missing. Most of these losses occurred in the attack on Mount Castello; their success filled the Brazilians with pride because the mountain had dominated their positions for many months and previous attempts to capture it had been unsuccessful and costly.

German resistance was less than expected, although counterattacks were launched with force. During the Belvedere-Torraccia action, the artillery supported the advance of the troops by continuously hammering the enemy with [grenades equipped with] time fuses, Time on Target, and variable time firing.
As for VT [fuses], the divisional artillery used this American innovation for the first time. The explosion in the air of these plastic-tipped shells, whose magnetic ignition mechanism was activated by a certain proximity to any material, forced the enemy out of their positions. With this type of fire, the exposed foxholes [trenches] were not safe. In that extremely steep terrain where the angle of inclination relative to the angle of flight became less acute, the effect of the explosion, at fourteen meters above the ground, shattered the interior of the trenches along its perimeter. The high volume of VT barrage fire caught the Germans every time they tried to move materials and men on the ground. The constant combination of three types of fire littered the slopes with countless enemy casualties.

After the conclusion of the first phase of the attack on February 25, changes [in position on the front] between the 10th Mountain Division and the 1st Brazilian Division led to the subdivision of the Brazilian operational zone. All the objectives included in this phase had been captured and consolidated; the two divisions adjusted their positions in preparation for the second phase.
On February 28, after the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment and the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division had completed their mutual changes, the FEB took command of the western sector of the 10th Mountain Division's area, and the 10th Mountain Anti-Tank Battalion and the 10th Mountain Reconnaissance Troop, on the Serrasiccia-Campiano ridge, were placed under Brazilian operational control.
These changes led the 10th Mountain Division to hold a sector running northeast, with its left border along the eastern slopes of Mount Gorgolesco and its right border half a mile east of Mount Castello. From this point, the FEB's territory resumed to the east, extending to the Reno River, where its sector bordered that of the 1st Armored Division of the II Corps.

Meanwhile, some adjustments took place on the left flank of IV Corps. At 06:00 on February 24, the Commanding General of the 92nd Infantry Division assumed command of the Task Force 45 sector, thus extending the 92nd Infantry Division east of the border of the old Task Force 45-10th Mountain Division. At the same time, the 473rd Infantry Regiment was detached from Task Force 45 and assigned to the 92nd Infantry Division. Relieved by the 365th Infantry Regiment, the 473rd Infantry Regiment moved west to take up frontline positions west of the Serchio River.

The second phase of the attack
The second phase of the Corps' attack, designed to push our positions forward to a general east-west line slightly south of Vergato, was originally scheduled to begin on March 1, but bad weather forced two postponements. The date was set for 03:00 on March 3. To the left of the attack zone, between our advanced positions and the line of the final phase of the operation, there were more than six kilometers of high ridges and peaks, which the 10th Mountain Division was tasked with crossing. The Brazilians were assigned the task of advancing northeast parallel to State Road 64, with the Castelnuovo ridge as their main objective.

General Hays planned to deploy two regiments side by side: the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment on the left flank to the west, directed mainly against Monte Terminale, Monte della Vedetta, and Monte Grande d'Aiano, and the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment on the right against Monte della Croce, Monte della Castellana, and finally against Castel d'Aiano and Monte della Spe. The tanks of the 751st Tank Battalion and the 76mm self-propelled guns of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion were assigned to provide armored support.
At 08:00 on March 3, preceded by twenty minutes of intense artillery preparation, the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment crossed the starting line from positions just north of Monte Torraccia, advancing with two battalions flanked: the 1st Battalion on the western slopes of Mount Terminale and the 2nd Battalion across the eastern side of the mountain. The 1st Battalion advanced rapidly through enemy artillery, mortar, and small arms fire and successfully crossed the German minefields. At 11:00, after the entire western section of the mountain had been cleared, the 3rd Battalion of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment was moved forward from the division's reserve to take up those positions and provide protection on the left flank. The relieved battalion was reassembled, ready to take over from another of the attacking formations.
The 2nd Battalion quickly overran the eastern part of Monte Terminale, clearing it by 8:40 a.m., but an hour later encountered heavy resistance in the village of Jola, just north of the mountain.
Supported by direct fire from tank destroyers, the battalion fought through the streets and cleared houses that had been turned into fortified defenses by the Germans; the village was finally cleared around noon.
Among the prisoners taken at Jola were the commanding officers and most of the personnel of the 2nd Battalion of the 721st Light Regiment.
The action of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment in the first five hours of the attack virtually destroyed this enemy battalion and inflicted heavy losses on other elements of the 721st Light Regiment.
After the fall of Jola, the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment passed through the 2nd Battalion and continued forward to take Campo del Sole at 5:45 p.m. This advance brought the leading troops about three kilometers north of the starting line, where the regiment dug in for the night.

A similar success was achieved in the area of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment, which had attacked at the same time. With only the 3rd Battalion engaged, the regiment advanced in battalion columns against resistance of varying strength, and by noon Monte della Vedetta, one mile southeast of Campo del Sole, had been cleared and a roadblock established at Pietra Colora. Here, as elsewhere on the division's front, the enemy retreated from one ridge to another, never counterattacking as might have been expected, losing a large number of prisoners from both the 114th Light Division and the 232nd Grenadier Division.
Once again, our attack had caught the enemy in the middle of a changeover, while this time the 721st Light Regiment was relieving elements of the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment.

From dawn onwards, extensive air support from fighter-bombers led by "Rover Joe" once again blocked the German units immediately behind the front line, thus preventing the movement of enemy forces . The aircraft also made a significant contribution to the effective counter-battery program against enemy artillery and mortars.

Both attacking regiments resumed their advance at 08:00 on March 4, preceded by artillery barrages. In the area of the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the 1st Battalion moved towards the village of Sassomolare, cleared it at noon, and continued its push northwards towards Monte Grande d'Aiano, the regiment's final objective. The final assault on this hill began at 1:15 p.m., and in just over two hours, the resistance was overcome.
As no further progress was expected in this sector, a defensive organization was immediately set up on Monte Grande. The 3rd Battalion, which had passed through the 2nd Battalion the day before, moved forward to the right of the 1st Battalion, while the 3rd Battalion of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment occupied additional defensive positions along the flank extending to the west.

Progress was not as rapid in the area of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment. The 1st Battalion attacked Monte Acidola, north of Pietra Colora, while the 2nd Battalion deviated to the northwest and then rotated to the front of the 1st Battalion on Madonna di Brasa, northeast of Sassomolare. Monte Acidola fell at noon and shortly after 4 p.m. Madonna di Brasa was occupied. At 10 a.m., the 3rd Battalion was engaged for the first time, striking east of Pietra Colora against Monte della Croce. This brilliant flank attack quickly wrested the important position from the Germans, who were cleared out shortly after 3:00 p.m.; the mountain troops were subsequently relieved by the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment.

The conquest of Monte Grande d'Aiano on March 4 paved the way for the completion of Phase II operations the following day in the territory between this mountain and State Road 64. While the 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment continued its sweeps in the northwestern part of the division's area, the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment pushed into the center while elements of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment were busy clearing the mountains on the right.
Both the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment were concentrated in a narrow area just over a kilometer wide and directed their attack against the village of Castel d'Aiano. The 2nd Battalion maneuvered to the left to take the high ground [Monte Grande d'Aiano] and block the roads running northwest to Castel d'Aiano, while the 1st Battalion attacked the village. In the late afternoon of March 5, the 2nd Battalion had fought its way through the cover positions and at 7:40 p.m. the 1st Battalion, led by tanks, moved into Castel d'Aiano. In this area, they encountered elements of the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, which had rushed in from the reserve to block our advance, but their fierce fighting did not prevent us from capturing the village.

Previous advances had made it possible to engage the fresh 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment to the right of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment. At 08:00 on March 5, the 1st Battalion attacked northward against Monte della Spe, located slightly northeast of Castel d'Aiano, and the 2nd Battalion struck northeast in a flanking attack against the Monte della Castellana massif. Shortly before noon, the 1st Battalion reached a wide gorge below the southern slopes of its objective, crossing it under heavy enemy fire that caused heavy casualties, and set out on the mountainside. Despite strong enemy resistance, the battalion reached the summit of Monte della Spe at 6:00 p.m. When the 2nd Battalion attacked the southern slope of the Monte della Castellana ridge, it found the approaches covered by such heavy fire that the advancing companies were forced to fall back.
Circling around to the west, while our artillery covered the target with concentrated fire from all available weapons, it launched a new attack on the western slopes.
At 3:00 p.m., after overcoming extensive trench systems, the advanced elements reached the summit. The enemy, which had been outflanked on the southern slopes, was quickly rounded up as Company E moved northwest along the ridge line, capturing the northern summit of Monte Spicchione before dark.

The long-awaited counterattacks materialized during the night of March 5-6, directed against our most advanced positions on Monte della Spe. Elements of the 15th Armored Grenadier Regiment launched an attack before midnight, followed by others at 12:30 a.m. and 1:30 a.m., and 4:40 a.m., but failed to dislodge the 1st Battalion of the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment from the summit, although one German group managed to penetrate so close that bayonets came into play. After the fourth failed attempt, the enemy ceased its efforts to retake the position, relying on heavy artillery fire to harass the American positions. The three days of effort by the 10th Mountain Division resulted in the capture of approximately 1,200 prisoners and the occupation of over 90 square kilometers of enemy territory.

The Brazilian effort on the far right of IV Corps was closely coordinated with the advance of the 10th Mountain Division, although the attack was initially launched in scattered areas. On March 3, the 2nd Battalion of the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment pushed forward on the right flank of the 87th Mountain Infantry Regiment. On the same day, the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment captured the area around Rocca Pitigliana, swept through several small villages between there and Pietra Colora, and took over all the positions of the 10th Mountain Division east of Pietra Colora.
In conjunction with the attack by the 85th Mountain Infantry Regiment, the following day the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment moved northeast to bypass the village of Castelnuovo from the west, finally entering the village at 7:10 p.m. after intense bombardment of nearby German positions. To the right of the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment and just west of State Road 64, the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment advanced east of Castelnuovo and pushed forward almost a kilometer and a half beyond two positions overlooking Vergato.

In the days immediately following March 5, further adjustments were made to the position of the troops to complete the operation. On March 6, the reconnaissance squadron of the 81st Cavalry was detached from the 1st Armored Division and assigned to the IV Corps and began replacing the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment. The Squadron first replaced this Brazilian unit, then sent elements ahead of the 6th Brazilian Infantry Regiment, restricting its field of action and establishing contact with the 10th Mountain Division. On March 9, the 10th Mountain Anti-Tank Battalion and the 10th Mountain Reconnaissance Troop occupied Mount Valbura and another Mount Belvedere, just west of the Reconnaissance Squadron's positions. The occupation of these positions completed the establishment of a solid American front, and all elements of the FEB were moved to what had been the Brazilian western sector, thus concentrating the entire 1st Brazilian Division to the left of the 10th Mountain Division.

The successes achieved by the 10th Mountain Division and the Brazilians pushed the right flank of IV Corps forward, almost flanking that of II Corps, which had greatly widened the 5th Army's salient in the mountain wall. This further breach in his defense caused such anxiety to the enemy that he was forced to field one of his last remaining units, the 29th Armored Grenadier Division, taking it from the tactical reserve. Our troops had gained all the ground included in the list of limited objectives and could have gone beyond the enemy line under the momentum created, but General Truscott was forced to pull back and halt the advance of the IV Corps.
The reason was that since it would be at least another month before the main attack could begin , further advances would have extended the IV Corps' exposed flank and would only have served to focus additional enemy attention on this sector, causing the Germans to increase the amount of defenses prepared west of Highway 64. Our positions consolidated along a series of peaks and ridges that provided an excellent starting line for the spring offensive.

The IV Corps was located on the slopes of the protected side of the Apennine mountain range, which gradually descended towards the Po Valley to the north. All our limited objectives had been achieved, and at that point a period of troop movement began for rest and reorganization, in order to be ready for the full-scale attack in the spring.