The objective
In the Allies' plans, Operation Encore of the IV Corps had as its objective the conquest of Monte Belvedere, opposite the village of Lizzano in Belvedere, Monte Castello, the advance along the ridge towards Monte della Torraccia, Monte Terminale, above the village of Jola di Montese, until reaching, conquering, and defending the front line between Monte Grande d'Aiano and Monte della Spe, north of the village of Castel d'Aiano, Monte della Castellana, opposite the village of Roffeno Musiolo, Monte Valbura, up to the village of Castelnuovo, above State Road 64, south of Vergato. This operation preliminarily redefined the front in the upper Bolognese Apennines, reaching and preparing positions on the starting line of the offensive that in spring would allow total control of State Road 64 up to the city of Bologna. Entering the Po Valley, the divisions, led on the flat terrain by armored forces, were supposed to cut off the retreat of the Germans, who were being pursued east of Bologna by the 8th Army, chasing them closely across the Po River towards Lake Garda.

The territory
Opposite the winter line positions, where the soldiers of the 5th Army were entrenched, lay the central spurs of the mountainous barrier represented by the Apennines: an unbroken line of ridges and peaks, some more than 1,000 meters high. The slopes were covered with chestnut and oak woods and pine forests, although many mountains had steep slopes of bare rock and cliffs.

There were few roads crossing the mountains that could support the movement of a mechanized army advancing towards the Po Valley. The passes through which some of these roads crossed the mountain ridges varied between 900 and 1400 meters above sea level and often ran adjacent to streams that were in flood during most of the winter months. Few secondary roads branched off from these roads towards the mountains, often simple paths that were unable to provide efficient communications and were characterized by sharp bends, steep climbs, and narrow gorges. The span of the bridges was very limited, and it was difficult to cross streams or rivers. Landslides were frequent. Added to all this were the demolitions carried out by the retreating German engineers.

Even the units of the IV Corps had to use unsuitable paths and build many roads to transport artillery, tanks, and supplies. Many of these old paths were improved, others were hastily opened, but they became impassable in case of rain and, in order to reach the mountain positions with equipment and supplies, columns of mules and soldiers were necessary. On the northern slopes, the Germans had dug their shelters and trenches; to the south, the mountains were so rugged that it was impossible for mechanized vehicles to move outside the main roads.

With the onset of rain at the end of September, the mountain streams, usually dry or almost dry in the summer months, became torrential within a few hours. Fog, mist, and clouds often reduced visibility to zero. In late October, snow began to fall on the highest peaks, and in winter, some mountain pass roads were blocked for short periods. During Operation Encore, the cold was bitter and the ground was covered with snow, with mist reducing visibility even though weather conditions were fairly suitable for air operations.

The Germans had excellent observation points and fields of fire over much of State Route 64 as well as the American soldiers' positions west of the Reno River. These elevated positions allowed observation into the distance towards the Po Valley and were considered by General Truscott to be the main objective of Operation Encore, in particular two ridges: the first ran between Monte Serrasiccia and Pizzo di Campiano, known as Monti della Riva, which overlooked the left flank of the 10th Mountain Division and dominated the approach paths to Monte Belvedere and the ridge towards Monte della Torraccia. The Serrasiccia-Pizzo di Campiano ridge ran parallel to the left flank of the division's area of action, bordering it for about six kilometers, and the mountainous side facing the American soldiers was a cliff that rose, in some places, to almost 500 meters above the level of the valley below. That cliff had to be climbed, and the snow-covered ground in front of it offered little shelter.

There were only a few scattered groups of young trees, the roads were narrow and had no surface, so most of the transport had to be done by mules, Weasels, and jeeps. The tanks were positioned in the rear, near the village of Querciola, which was more than a kilometer from Monte Belvedere. Due to the excellent observation and firing points of the Germans and the limited covered stretches, the movement of vehicles and troops could only be carried out at night or during the day in fog or mist.

Allied forces in the field
The Allied infantry forces employed in Operation Encore consisted of the US 10th Mountain Division and the Brazilian 1st Infantry Division, as well as a considerable deployment of divisional, corps, and other battalion artillery brought into the field for that specific operation with an abundant supply of ammunition. The air forces supporting the air-to-ground operations were from the XXII Tactical Air Command and the Brazilian Air Force. German air power was virtually non-existent over Italian territory, so much so that many anti-aircraft artillery units were converted to infantry.

Allied forces in the field
The Allied infantry forces employed in Operation Encore consisted of the US 10th Mountain Division and the Brazilian 1st Infantry Division, as well as a considerable deployment of divisional, corps, and other battalion artillery brought into the field for that specific operation with an abundant supply of ammunition. The air forces supporting the air-to-ground operations were from the XXII Tactical Air Command and the Brazilian Air Force. German air power was virtually non-existent over Italian territory, so much so that many anti-aircraft artillery units were converted to infantry.

The 10th Mountain Division, the first and only American 'Alpine' division, consisted of over 14,000 men and three regiments: the 85th, 86th, and 87th, whose men, chosen from among expert skiers and rock climbers, had been specifically trained for mountain warfare.

Unlike other infantry divisions, which were equipped with medium-caliber artillery, the 10th's artillery consisted of 75 mm howitzers that could be dismantled and transported by mule to positions in the most inaccessible areas.

When the division arrived in Italy, it was given additional and decisive firepower with the assignment of other units: 175th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm), 1125th Field Artillery Battalion (105 mm), 84th Chemical Battalion (107 mm mortars), 751st Tank Battalion, 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and Company A of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion.

The Brazilian Expeditionary Force (BEF) consisted of 25,334 soldiers, including 15,069 combat troops assigned to the 1st Infantry Division and 10,265 men in support forces, including the 1st Brazilian Air Force (F.A.B.), and reserves.

The infantry division was organized into three regiments: the 1st Regiment, named Sampaio, formed in the state of Rio de Janeiro; the 6th Regiment, named Ipiranga, formed in the state of São Paulo; and the 11th Regiment, named Tiradentes, from the state of Minas Gerais.

When it was designated for Operation Encore, the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was reinforced by several Army Corps artillery units, in particular 105 and 155 mm howitzers.

German forces in the field
On the other side of the front were the 232nd Grenadier Division, the 114th Jäger Division, and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division as the most important reserve force in the area. The 232nd Division, which defended about twenty-five kilometers of the front, was composed of three Grenadier regiments: the 1043rd, the 1044th and the 1045th, the 232nd Artillery Regiment, the 232nd Engineer Battalion, the 232nd Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 232nd Replacement Battalion, the 232nd Signal Battalion and the 232nd Command and Supply Battalion.

The division's reserve was the 232nd Rifle Battalion and the 4th Independent Mountain Battalion. The theoretical strength of the division was almost 12,000 men, but at that stage of the war, on March 27, 1945, there were 7,148 men in service, of whom only 2,057 were combat infantry. The same was true of the 114th Jäger Division, which was not motorized but highly mobile and had 9,678 men on the same date, of whom only 1,556 were combat infantry.
The best-equipped division was the 29th Panzer Grenadier, some units of which saw action at the end of Operation Encore when Allied troops were already near Castel d'Aiano. At the end of March, the armored division had 12,446 men, of whom 2,053 were combat infantry, and consisted of two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and an assault gun battalion. Its firepower was comparable to that of a German armored division, but its mobility was much higher.

Please refer to the article in which you can read the account, taken from Heinrich Boucsein's book "Bomber, Jabos, Partisanen," of how the Allied attack was experienced on the other side of the front, from the German point of view.

Training, logistics, and technology. Strengths and weaknesses.
In addition to the availability of equipment and supplies, another disparity was the level of training of the forces involved in Operation Encore.
The 10th Mountain Division was one of the best-trained divisions in the US Army, made up of skilled personnel who were motivated and proud to be in that division. Intensive training in both winter warfare and mountain warfare made both the soldiers and the non-commissioned officers who would lead them experts in their field and in excellent physical condition. Many soldiers, who already possessed a high degree of specialization as civilians, had been further trained by America's best experts, and in several cases even ordinary soldiers demonstrated a strong propensity for leadership.
An example of the high level of preparation achieved was provided by the groups of soldiers, climbers, and rock climbers who, in the days immediately preceding the assault, prepared the routes leading to the top of the Monti della Riva ridge, fixing nails and ropes along the steep rock faces without being detected by the German sentries.
The battles of Operation Encore were a baptism of fire for the soldiers of the 10th Division, who were aided by their high level of training and in-depth knowledge of mountain warfare doctrine.
Unlike the German soldiers, who could remain on the front line for months, in the 10th Mountain Division, the commander, General Heyes, had organized periods of rest in the rear for his troops at the battalion level, which certainly contributed to the soldiers' good performance on the battlefield.

The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, coming up from northern Tuscany, had been involved in some fighting but, having arrived in Italy with a low level of training, was still far from the standards of the 10th US Mountain Division.

It was re-equipped and trained in preparation for battle but, despite improvements, there were still shortcomings at the start of the battles, during which the commander of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira, General João Batista Mascarenhas de Morais, often sent members of his staff to supervise the actions of his units.
The qualities of the Division's soldiers were particularly evident in their high morale, as described by all observers, in their eager desire to do their part in the war, attacking, sometimes recklessly, even under heavy enemy fire, and, above all, in their reciprocal relationships of great friendship with the civilian population.

Older people still remember the relationships between the Brazilians and Italian families, with some soldiers calling 'mom' the 'zdaura' of the house.
Those who were little more than children at the time remember with gratitude how the Brazilians distributed food and medical care to hungry civilians, provided by nurses or doctors in the field.

In the German army, the situation was exactly the opposite. The quality of training, which had always been a strong point, had been declining since the second half of 1944, aggravated by the quality of the soldiers sent to the front and their long stay on the front line without being able to enjoy short moments of rest in the rear. Due to defeats on other fronts, General Kesselring had to transfer four divisions to other fronts. Losses on the Italian front had been significant, many of the men in the various units were elderly or convalescing, and many of them had previously been trained for rear units.

News of the German army's defeats and retreats from other fronts began to sap the morale of the troops. Despite the hardships, defeats, and losses suffered, the great strength of the German units, already greatly reduced in terms of manpower since 1944, still lay in the formidable motivation and preparation of the officers, the efficient chain of command, and the very high level of organization. These factors allowed the Germans to make the most of the few resources, both human and material, that they had available and, defending themselves also because of the stubbornness of their commander-in-chief Adolf Hitler, to skillfully prolong the duration of a war whose final outcome, however, had already been decided since 1943.

Technology
The technology on the battlefield of the opposing armies was at about the same level. The Germans made greater use of the firepower of their infantry by using light machine guns, which were considered the best in the world, but certain factors brought into play by the Allies mitigated these disadvantages. For the first time in the Italian theater, the VT8 fuse was used, allowing the artillery to fire without fine adjustments, and for the climbs to the top of the Monti della Riva, new nylon ropes were used, which were much lighter than the rope ones used until then

Logistics
For the German army, supply logistics were a major problem due to the exceptional strategic and tactical air interdiction campaign conducted by the Allied air forces on the communication routes used by the Germans, from the Brenner Pass, along the roads and bridges of the Po Valley, to the Apennines.
Allied aircraft were omnipresent in the skies, bombing and strafing any movement of troops and vehicles, often at the expense of civilians, who suffered heavy losses in terms of lives and entire villages destroyed. The German practice of relying on locally sourced food and water, often raiding livestock and grain from civilian farms, mitigated the effects of the Allied interdiction campaigns, but in terms of ammunition availability, the situation was extremely critical, especially for the artillery, so much so that it became necessary, for some periods, to temporarily prohibit artillery barrage fire and to use ammunition only in the event of strong attacks by the enemy.
The shortage of fuel made it almost impossible to move operational reserves to the field and, together with the lack of aircraft, the possibility of aerial reconnaissance deep into enemy lines to assess their strength and the availability of vehicles and men.
The situation was so critical that in the early months of 1945, the ability of Army Group C to maintain an unbroken line in the Apennines or, at worst, to organize an orderly strategic retreat was so much in doubt that General Kesselring asked Hitler for greater strategic flexibility, namely to be able to retreat from northern Italy and occupy more defensible positions in the Alps (Operation Herbstnebel), without the pressure of the Allied offensive planned for the spring of 1945. Justifying his decision on the grounds that such a strategy would be detrimental to troop morale, Hitler forbade the general from implementing it, thus sealing the fate of the German Army Group in Italy.

The biggest problem for the Allied army supply officers was the need to have constant and accurate updates on the positions of the advanced units in order to ensure continuous and timely supplies in accordance with the specific needs of each combat unit.
Equally worrying during rainy periods were the impassable conditions of the roads, whose surface turned into mud that often reached beyond the hubs of truck and jeep wheels. There were never any major problems with the supply of food, equipment, and ammunition. In both armies, the level of command and control over their forces was adequate. In general, orders to units and reports from them to their respective commands were in real time, although the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division encountered communication problems between different units.
Thanks to the German message decryption service, known as ULTRA, the Allies were able to ascertain the disposition and intentions of German forces at a strategic level. At a tactical level, the Allies were able to obtain a clear picture of the disposition of German forces in advance through a combination of aerial reconnaissance, aggressive patrols, and information provided by partisans and civilians.
At the tactical level, the German 14th Army Group occupied the mountain peaks overlooking State Road 64 and the Allied positions east of the valley, achieving three critical advantages: the first was that they could see all the movements of the Allied forces in preparation for the offensive, enabling them to predict the timing and locations involved; the second advantage was that those peaks and ridges straddled State Roads 64 and 65, which led to Bologna and the Po Valley; the third advantage was that such mountainous terrain favored the defenders and was difficult for the attackers to conquer.

THE PHASES OF THE OPERATION ENCORE

Operation Encore was divided into two phases: the first, between February 18 and 25, 1945, targeted the ridge from Monte Belvedere to Monte della Torraccia for the 10th Mountain Division and the conquest of Monte Castello by the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division; the second phase, between March 1 and 5, 1945, involved the conquest of the peaks north and northeast of the village of Castel d'Aiano by the 10th Mountain Division, and the conquest of the stronghold of Torre di Nerone and the village of Castelnuovo, which dominated State Road 64, by the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division.

Phase I – Initial deployment of forces
The 10th Mountain Division was positioned on the left flank of the IV Corps with most of its troops behind Lizzano in Belvedere and another part in the Silla river valley near its confluence with the Reno river. The 1st Brazilian Infantry Division was positioned on the right flank of the IV Corps, in the Reno river valley, near the village of Porretta Terme, and at the base of Monte Castello, in the territory of the village of Gaggio Montano.
Opposite the American soldiers, on the ridge of the Riva mountains and on the ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia, were German soldiers from both the 232nd Infantry Division and the 114th Jäger Division. Opposite the Brazilians were only German soldiers from the latter division.

The attack on the Riva mountains
On February 18, 1945, at sunset, the Army Corps artillery began its usual firing on German positions so as not to arouse the enemy's suspicion.
At 7:30 p.m., a preliminary attack was launched on the ridge of the Riva Mountains to secure the left flank of the 10th Mountain Division during the attack on Monte Belvedere, which took place the following day by the 85th and 87th Regiments. In silence and darkness, the expert rock climbers of several companies belonging to the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment began climbing the steep spurs of the five paths, some of which had been previously prepared with pitons and ropes, which would allow them to take the German soldiers of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment completely by surprise as they were about to be relieved by the 232nd Rifle Battalion.

On February 19, while American soldiers repelled various German counterattacks on their positions on the ridge of the Monti della Riva, four .50 caliber machine guns and a 75 mm howitzer were also transported and placed there to support the main attack that would take place a few hours later on Monte Belvedere. We have dedicated another article to the battle of the Monti della Riva, which was the baptism of fire for the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division, taken from the report THE RIVA RIDGE OPERATION, written by Lieutenant Colonel Henry J. Hampton, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment.

The attack on Monte Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia.
With their left flank secure, the other units of the division began to reach their starting lines for the next attack. The 87th Regiment deployed on the northwestern side of Monte Belvedere, the 85th Regiment positioned itself at the base of the mountain for a frontal attack that would also involve Monte Gorgolesco, and the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Regiment established itself on the right flank, east of Monte Belvedere, with the task of occupying the village of Mazzancana.

The attack began at 11 p.m. on February 19, 1945, without any preparatory artillery fire, in the hope of ensuring the tactical surprise of the night assault. On the left side of the mountain, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 87th Regiment crossed the starting line along the road near the village of Querciola. The 1st Battalion immediately headed up the slope towards Belvedere, north of the village of Valpiana. The leading troops, led by Captain , advanced about 700 meters before encountering the first German outposts, where some groups of soldiers put up weak resistance. The positions consisted of machine gun nests, fortified houses, and bunkers stretching from the top of Monte Belvedere, along the eastern flank, to the village of Rocca Corneta, around which there were substantial anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields. Some of these caused casualties among the partisans who were showing the Americans the best routes to advance. At around 3:00 a.m. on February 20, after passing through the village of Corona, the 1st Battalion reached the slopes of Mount Belvedere, overcoming modest resistance, and began to comb a spur of the main ridge facing north towards Valpiana. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion had bypassed the village of Corona after passing through a minefield, whose devices had fortunately been uncovered by the melting snow, and attacked the village of Polla, whose conquest made the German positions along the line between Polla and Pizzo di Campiano indefensible. The counterattacks by two companies of the 1st Battalion of the 1044th Grenadier Regiment, launched against American forces at around 4:00 a.m., had caused heavy losses among the German soldiers. During the day, the positions reached by the regiment were reinforced and reorganized, thanks in part to the entry into the line of the 3rd Battalion of the 87th Regiment, which had remained in reserve.

In the center of the front, the 3rd Battalion of the 85th Regiment climbed the slopes of Monte Belvedere head-on, while the 1st Battalion climbed towards the summit of Monte Gorgolesco. At around 1:00 a.m. on February 20, the 3rd Battalion encountered the first German resistance about 250 meters from the summit. By 6:00 a.m., the two battalions had reached their respective summits and occupied the ridge between Mount Belvedere and Mount Gorgolesco, greeted by heavy and intense mortar barrage fire. German artillery had reduced its activity due to the planned counter-battery fire from both regimental and corps American guns. At around 6:00 p.m., the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Regiment passed through the lines of the 1st Battalion and continued its advance along the ridge towards Monte della Torraccia, encountering increasing mortar and small arms fire.

The 3rd Battalion of the 86th Regiment had encountered little resistance in supporting the advancing battalions of the 85th Regiment. After occupying the village of Mazzancana on the morning of February 20, it had established defensive positions about halfway up a saddle on the south-eastern slope of the mountain, from where it had repelled several counterattacks by German soldiers. Towards the end of the day, units of the 10th Mountain Division had secured the Monte Belvedere area and begun their advance towards Monte della Torraccia.

Air support operations, which began on February 20, were directed primarily at artillery positions located immediately behind the German front lines, and then at command posts. Air support was particularly helpful to units of the 85th Regiment during their frontal attack on German defenses at Monte Belvedere. The contribution of the artillery was also fundamental in supporting the Brazilians.

On February 21, the advanced units of the 87th and 85th Regiments repelled several German counterattacks, continuing their attack towards the northeast. At the beginning of the first phase of the attack, enemy opposition was disorganized due to the rapid advance of the 10th Division units, which did not allow the German soldiers to reorganize their ranks, and the overwhelming Allied firepower. The American soldiers' attacks were carried out at night, without artillery support and, in some cases, with bayonets and grenades.

The attack on the final objective of the first phase, Monte della Torraccia, began on the morning of February 21 by the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Regiment. Due to continuous and strong counterattacks, including by fresh units brought into the area by the Germans, such as the 741st Infantry Regiment belonging to the 114th Jäger Division, the advance came to a halt. The battle became bloody over the next two days and the losses were so heavy that it was not until the morning of February 24 that Monte della Torraccia was conquered and secured by the soldiers of the 3rd Battalion of the 86th Regiment, which had taken over the attack, passing through the positions of the 2nd Battalion of the 85th Regiment.

Meanwhile, the Germans continued their attempts to recapture the strategic ridge of the Riva mountains, but their counterattacks were systematically repelled. The battle for possession of the ridge lasted for several days. Already on the afternoon of February 21, Company D of the 126th Mountain Engineer Battalion had installed a "cable car" about 500 meters long, whose arrival point was located at an altitude along the slope leading up to Monte Cappel Buso. The "cableway" made it possible to send supplies and ammunition to the units fighting on the ridge but, above all, to evacuate the wounded much more quickly than by transporting them on mules along the sloping paths.

The attack on Monte Castello and the contribution of Brazilian soldiers.
While the Americans were along the ridge just beyond the church of Ronchidoso, within sight of Monte della Torraccia, the soldiers of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, preceded by 15 minutes of bombardment by the regimental artillery and a battalion of the IV Corps, launched their attack on the German positions at Monte Castello.
At 5:30 a.m. on February 21, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Regiment, with tactical support from the Brazilian Air Force's P-47s, attacked the mountain, starting from positions around the village of Mazzancana, and captured the summit around noon.
The Germans quickly withdrew, recognizing the risk of being surrounded or at least isolated by American units advancing on their right flank. Monte Castello was secured at sunset that same day. On February 24, after the capture of Monte della Torraccia and the consolidation of the defense by the Americans, the 1st Brazilian Division, advancing in parallel with the units of the 10th Mountain Division, resumed the attack on the village of Bellavista, capturing it under heavy German machine gun fire.
The German line of defense between La Serra and Quota 958 fell on February 25 when a series of German trenches were conquered by Brazilian soldiers with bayonets and grenades.

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Phase II – Initial deployment of forces
After a few days of rest, consolidation, and repositioning, on the morning of March 3, 1945, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 86th Regiment were deployed east and west of Monte della Torraccia, and the 3rd Battalion of the 87th Regiment was deployed on the eastern side of Fosso del Malandrone, which the Americans would call "Punchboard Hill."
Opposite the American units were the 1043rd and 1045th Regiments of the German 232nd Infantry Division and elements of the 114th Jäger Division reinforced by the Mittenwald Battalion. At the end of February, two regiments of the 1st Brazilian Division were deployed to the right of the 10th Mountain Division, between the positions of the 3rd Battalion of the 87th Regiment on "Punchboard Hill" and State Highway 64. The 11th Brazilian Regiment was in contact with the 3rd Battalion of the 87th and the 6th on the right, towards the highway. The 1st Brazilian Regiment and a battalion of the 11th Brazilian Regiment had relieved the units of the 10th Division in the Monte della Torraccia area to allow the American units to position themselves along the "10th corridor" for the start of Phase II.

The initial moves
Between February 26 and March 1, all units of the IV Corps consolidated their positions by conducting aggressive patrols. The heavy losses suffered by the 232nd and 114th Divisions on the ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia had made the position of the German defenses in the area critical. On the night of February 25, the Germans launched a counterattack on the American positions at Monte della Torraccia. Preceded by about a thousand artillery rounds, the soldiers of the Mittenwald Battalion attacked the battalions of the 85th and 86th Regiments of the 10th Mountain Division. By 4:30 a.m. on February 26, the attack had been repelled, but German artillery continued to bombard both American and Brazilian lines throughout that day and the next.

The advance toward positions in view of the Spring Offensive
The objective of the second phase of Operation Encore was to reach the ridges above the village of Castel d'Aiano and those stretching towards State Road 64, south of the town of Vergato. Once consolidated and supplied with ammunition and equipment, these new positions would provide a springboard for the assault on the Po Valley.
Originally scheduled for March 1, the second phase was postponed until 8:00 a.m. on March 3 due to weather conditions. The artillery began shelling the German positions at 6:30 a.m.; the sky above them began to fill with explosions due to the intensive use of VT fuses. The 86th Regiment targeted Monte Terminale, Jola, and Sassomolare, finally settling on Monte Grande d'Aiano. The 87th Regiment targeted Monte delle Vedette, Pietracolora, Madonna di Brasa, and Castel d'Aiano. The 85th Regiment, which was in reserve at the start of the attack, was tasked with conquering Monte della Spe and Monte della Castellana, two peaks overlooking the village of Castel d'Aiano to the north.
Further to the right of the front, the objective of the 10th Anti-Tank Battalion was Monte Valbura, while that of the 10th Reconnaissance Troops was the adjacent Monte Finocchia at an altitude of 715 meters. The Brazilian units advanced on the slopes west of State Road 64, towards the villages of Castelnuovo and Affrico.

While the 2nd Battalion bypassed the slope east of Monte Terminale, overcoming small arms fire and minefields, the 1st Battalion bypassed the slope to the west, immediately relieved by the 3rd Battalion, continuing the advance. During its advance, the 2nd Battalion encountered strong resistance in the village of Jola, at the foot of Monte Terminale to the north, where the Germans had barricaded themselves, turning every house into small forts, and where several American soldiers were killed in action, including Sergeant Tokle, an Olympic ski jumping champion, and John Parker Compton, the son of a well-known New York lawyer.
The tank destroyers of the 701st Tank Destroyer provided important close support to the 2nd Battalion of the 86th Regiment during the fighting for Jola. At the end of the fighting, at sunset on March 3, 1945, most of the officers and staff of the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion of the German 721st Infantry Regiment were taken prisoner. The battalions of the 87th Regiment had advanced until they reached the village of Pietracolora around noon, where they set up checkpoints.
The Germans retreated from ridge to ridge and were no longer able to organize counterattacks as they had done in the first phase of Operation Encore or as their tactics on the battlefield dictated.

The start of the second phase of the offensive caught the Germans while the 721st Infantry Regiment was relieving the 1043rd Grenadier Regiment. Added to this was the extensive use of artillery and air support directed by "Rover Joe," which prevented any movement of troops, even reinforcements to the German divisions on the front line.
After consolidating their positions, the advance resumed on the morning of March 4, when daylight allowed for maximum use of air power.
The 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment, after occupying the village of Sassomolare at around 11:00 a.m., began its attack on Monte Grande d'Aiano, the regiment's final objective, at 1:15 p.m. and overcame German resistance within two hours. Progress was slower for the 87th Regiment.

The 1st Battalion attacked Monte Acidola, above the village of Pietracolora, while the 2nd Battalion attacked the village of Madonna di Brasa. Both objectives were secured at around 4:00 p.m., while the 3rd Battalion attacked Monte della Croce, adjacent to Monte Acidola. At 7:40 p.m., the 1st Battalion of the 87th Regiment began its attack on Castel d'Aiano, with tanks leading the way. On March 5, two battalions of the 85th Regiment, which had remained in reserve until then, were ordered to take Monte della Spe, a hill overlooking the village of Castel d'Aiano and much of the road on which the American and Brazilian forces had advanced.

The 1st Battalion attacked the mountain directly, while the 2nd Battalion headed for the adjacent Monte della Castellana, to the northeast. Without air support due to bad weather, the Americans suffered heavy losses. German artillery and mortar fire on the 2nd Battalion was so intense that it had to withdraw from the first attack, reorganize, and launch a second attack from a different direction. This was a sign that the German defense was tightening.
General Kesselring, uncertain as to the plans and intentions of the Allies on the entire Emilia-Romagna front, had no choice but to bring his strategic reserves into the area: some elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. It was the 15th Regiment of the latter division that led four counterattacks against the units of the 10th Division. All failed.

The 10th Mountain Division had thus reached the positions that would be the springboard for the Spring Offensive: Operation Grapeshot, which would open the way to the Po Valley.

The action of the Brazilian soldiers.

The advance of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division, on the right of the 10th Mountain Division, was closely coordinated with the latter's advance. The 2nd Battalion of the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment was in constant contact with the American units. The Brazilian units secured the right flank up to the S.S. 64, took care of mopping up enemy forces, and took over the objectives once they had been conquered by the 10th Mountain Division, allowing the latter to continue its advance.

The main objective of the 1st Brazilian Regiment was to attack and capture the village of Castelnuovo, while that of the 11th Brazilian Regiment was to occupy the area to the northeast and advance towards the village of Affrico. Both attacks began at 8:00 a.m. on March 5 and were coordinated with the attacks of the 85th Regiment of the 10th Mountain Division, which was attacking Monte della Spe. At 7:10 p.m., the village of Castelnuovo was occupied by the Brazilians, while elements of the 11th Brazilian Infantry Regiment reached positions within sight of the village of Vergato.

On March 7, 1945, Operation Encore came to an end. The units of the IV Corps had reached the positions they would consolidate in the days leading up to April 14, 1945, and from which they would set out for the final assault on German defenses in northern Italy.
The Allied front line stretched from the western slope of Monte della Torraccia towards the villages of Monteforte and Jola, above the town of Maserno in the province of Modena, continuing towards the village of Sassomolare, Monte Grande d'Aiano, Monte Nuvoleti at an altitude of 813 meters, Monte della Spe, Monte della Castellana, Monte Valbura, Torre di Nerone, and the village of Castelnuovo, which dominates State Road 64 in the province of Bologna.