The 86th Mountain Infantry Regiment was the first of the 10th Mountain Division to arrive in Italy.

It landed in Naples on December 23, 1944. On December 25, 1944, the 1st Battalion, with attached service companies and headquarters, was moving north toward Pisa by train, with the rest of the regiment to follow by sea in seven or eight days. Due to the "fear" of what was happening at that time in the Serchio Valley, the rest of the regiment left for Livorno by sea on December 26, 1944.
All units were concentrated in the Pisa staging area where transportation was available and final checks would be carried out. By December 30, 1944, the Serchio Valley had calmed down and the regiment was moving to Quercianella, seven miles south of Livorno, for training and weapons practice.

On January 6, 1945, the 86th Mountain Infantry came under the control of Task Force 45 and prepared to move to the Apennine line, taking over from various "Ack-Ack" [Anti-Aircraft Artillery] battalions. The 86th Mountain Infantry replaced the 900th AA Battalion in the Belvedere area on the night between January 8 and 9.
At that time, there was between one and one and a half meters of snow on the ground in that location. The replacement was carried out at night, after a day-long journey from Quercianella to five kilometers east of Porretta Terme [ Now renamed Alto Reno Terme].

The men were loaded with winter equipment and heavy backpacks weighing between 44 and 55 pounds. Four blankets were assigned to each man as sleeping bags were not available. Two were rolled up and left on the ground at the trucks' arrival point to be collected later when transport became available. Since the trucks transporting them were not equipped with chains, they were unloaded at Porretta Terme, and Company B marched over eleven kilometers in the evening on icy roads. Company A, which had to go further, dropped their backpacks or they would never have made it.
The changeover was completed on the morning of January 9, without incident and before dawn. The battalion defended an area of about eleven kilometers of very rough and rugged terrain, especially to the west, where there was, in every sense of the word, an open flank with about forty kilometers of mountains between our left and the next unit on the left. On the right flank was the B.E.F. [Brazilian Expeditionary Force or F.E.B.].

The Krauts had held the highest peaks, and one felt as if one were at the bottom of a cup with the enemy sitting on two-thirds of the rim looking down on you. There was about as much concealment as a goldfish in an aquarium could have.
The Battalion CP was established in the town of Vidiciatico. Due to the lack of equipment for heavy snow, it was not possible to carry out proper patrolling. Eventually, when some skis and snowshoes arrived, three to five patrols were sent out each day. This proved to be excellent training for the men, who were in the field for the first time, and served to prepare them for combat in subsequent offensive operations.

To the west of the village of Vidiciatico and generally to the southwest, there was a very steep and jagged escarpment called the Mancinello-Campiano ridge. This chain of peaks rose from the very steep gorge of the Dardagna River to various heights. Rising sharply from the fortified town of Rocca Corneta, it stretched to Monte Spigolino, a distance of about eleven kilometers. The peaks from north to south were Pizzo di Campiano (968 meters), Monte Cappel Buso (1,158 meters), Monte Serrasiccia (1,402 meters), Monte della Riva (1,424 meters), Monte Mancinello (1,463 meters), Cingia del Bure (1,410 meters), Le Piagge (1,494 meters), Serra dei Baichetti (1,326 meters), Cingia Sermidiano (1,646 meters), and Monte Spigolino (1,838 meters).
The height of the Dardagna canyon varied from 488 meters at the northern end to about 762 meters at the southern end. There were no crevasses or abrupt passages. The eastern side was generally very steep, rugged, with escarpments, gorges, and steep banks. The west side was somewhat gentler, with no breaks and slopes that extended almost to a plateau west of Monte della Riva.
The watershed on the east side was abrupt, characterized by waterfalls with fast-flowing water. These flowed into a river that ran parallel to the base of the ridge, whose banks varied steeply in a gorge. One of the important factors to consider was the slope of the east side of the escarpment that would have to be climbed to take that ridge held by the enemy. At its shortest point, the average slope of Monte Cappel Buso was about 30 degrees. The average slope of Monte Serrasiccia was 40 degrees. Obviously, the Krauts were guarding this entire plateau.

At the time of the 1st Battalion's arrival, there was no significant activity on the ridge, except for a few known observation points from which artillery and mortar fire was directed when, during the day, they saw some movement in or around the town of Vidiciatico. At first, movement was kept to a minimum. As the days passed, daytime traffic was allowed to increase, so that if and when an operation against Belvedere was launched, an increase in the volume of movement would not necessarily alert the Germans. The amount of enemy mortar and artillery fire was surprisingly small.

In planning Operation Belvedere, it was decided that the Campiano-Mancinello ridge (called Riva Ridge because of the presence of Mount Riva) had to be taken before an attack on Belvedere, due to the importance of its position for observation. Once this ridge was taken, our artillery observers in the field could direct artillery fire at the positions of the Germans, who were running along the Rocca Corneta-Polla-Corona-Belvedere line. If the ridge had not been taken, the Germans could have directed their artillery at the backs of our troops during the attack on Belvedere.

After a reconnaissance by the division commander, Major General George P. Hays, the 86th Mountain Infantry was given the mission of capturing the Campiano-Mancinello ridge before any attack was launched against Belvedere, with the 1st Battalion, part of the 86th Mountain Infantry, making the main effort against Pizzo di Campiano - Monte Cappel Buso - Monte Serrasiccia - Monte Mancinello.
The Mancinello-Campiano ridge was considered the second most important l feature in the area, with Monte Belvedere being the most critical. The ridge provided an excellent view of the western part of the area, especially Belvedere itself. From here, it was possible to observe most of the area behind the Belvedere-Torraccia ridge. If strong resistance was encountered in the capture of Riva Ridge, it was considered appropriate to delay the main attack until a better view could be obtained.

Before the arrival of the 1st Battalion of the 86th Mountain Infantry in the Belvedere area, no patrols had been carried out towards the Mancinello-Campiano ridge. On January 15, 1945, a patrol was sent to Campiano with the following mission:
1. Identify and report the enemy force on Campiano.
2. Secure enemy prisoners.
Since the trail was covered with snow and ice and was rough and very steep in places, this patrol was composed of five experienced mountaineers. This patrol was led by Sergeant Carl Casperson of Company B. Skis were used, but before reaching the summit, they were hidden, and the patrol was able to climb freely up the rock face to the top. As they approached the summit, a dog barked and a German soldier emerged from the trees, looked around, did not see the patrol crouched against the side of a rocky ledge, and then turned back. As Sergeant Casperson and his men continued along the ledge, the dog barked again.
Three Germans emerged, one armed with a carbine, the other two unarmed. They moved toward the ledge, from where they observed the patrol in column along it. Sergeant Casperson and Sergeant Froelicher raised their Tommy guns, and Casperson said in English, "Hands up." The Germans were both surprised and confused, after which the one with the carbine attempted to raise his weapon. At the first movement, both Casperson and Froelicher fired a burst from their Tommy guns. The Krauts collapsed, a machine gun opened fire, and the patrol quickly retraced its steps along the ledge, with bullets flying all over the mountain.
From that moment on, there was increased activity on the ridge. There was continuous improvement and digging of old and new positions.
The result of this patrol was that we had a trail on which a small force of well-trained mountain men could advance. If the ridge was to be taken, other routes were needed. This trail was designated number 1. It took the patrol four and a half hours from Ca' di Julio to reach the point where they encountered the Germans. This point was just above the summit of Pizzo di Campiano. The men had no backpacks and carried only rifles and ammunition. The trail was impassable for mules. The width of the trail varied from thirty to sixty centimeters, and fixed ropes would be needed for the men on the last stretch to the top. A bridge crossed the Dardagna near Ca' di Julio: it was made of stone and one and a half meters wide. It was believed that a platoon of physically fit men trained in the mountains could climb this path and take the summit of Pizzo di Campiano.

The trails were difficult to find due to the snow conditions. When the snowfall began to slow down, with the help of the partisans, a trail was marked out from Farnè-Pianacci to Ca' di Julio and on to Monte Cappel Buso. We were told that this trail could be used by mules once the snow had melted. Lieutenant George R. Schiemier was sent to Monte Cappel Buso at night to locate and scout the trail. A patrol of eight men went out on skis. The trail was found, and the patrol arrived just above the summit of Cappel Buso, where they heard a German patrol approaching, so our patrol withdrew.
The trail was good, but impassable for mules due to the snow. This trail was designated number 2. Without backpacks, it would take three and a half to four hours of hard walking to reach the summit of Mount Cappel Buso from Ca' di Julio. If well loaded or if the snow had melted, mules could use it and even pass in both directions. This track was considered good, and two days of use by men would have compacted the snow sufficiently to allow mules to pass. Any troops could pass either day or night.
Fixed ropes would not be necessary at any point. The main disadvantage was that the track was completely exposed to enemy small arms fire along its entire length, from the right, left, and front. Advancing on a broad front was not possible. All the men and officers hoped that the snow would melt before they had to take the ridge, as this would greatly facilitate movement.

On January 28 and 29, the 86th Mountain Infantry was relieved by the 85th and 87th Mountain Infantry. The regiment was concentrated for training near Lucca. The 1st Battalion and a reinforced company of the 2nd Battalion were to take the ridge. The regiment was also the reserve for IV Corps. The attack was planned for a day in February. A detachment of the 1st Battalion S-2, under the command of Lieutenant Wilson Ware, was left at La Ca' with three officers and twenty-one soldiers to conduct reconnaissance and scout the trails and check their condition. This detachment found two other routes. One was at Monte Serrasiccia, a very rugged hill that would require fixed ropes to overcome several rocky outcrops. Lieutenant McCown led the way and found this trail.
One night, his patrol reached the summit and surveyed the positions and cables of the Germans. The positions were not occupied, as we later discovered that the Germans spent the night in their shelters behind the ridge. This trail was designated number 3. It was a rough and very steep path, but it gave us a direct route to the summit of Monte Serrasiccia, a peak that we needed to hold. It started near Miglianti and Casa Tonelli, descended into a deep gorge, crossed the Dardagna, and then ended at two abandoned houses about 450 meters below the summit. From there on, it was a series of rocky outcrops, cliffs, and ravines.
This route was initially intended to be used only for supplies and evacuation by hand, until supply lines and side routes were developed, from the start of the mule trail to Monte Cappel Buso. The climb up this route by the reinforced Company C was a physical achievement to be admired and showed what men could do when they were trained in the mountains. The upper sections of the trail were exposed to small arms fire all the way to the top.
Six fixed ropes would be needed to facilitate the movement of troops to the top of the rocky outcrop and two small escarpments. Lieutenant McCown, who was killed on the night of February 20, 1945, while leading a patrol, is to be commended for selecting a trail that brought this company to the top without a casualty. It was also necessary to build a very rough footbridge to cross the Dardagna on the night of the attack. A pioneer squad belonging to the A & P Battalion Platoon [Ammunitions & Pioneers] was attached to this force for that purpose.

Lieutenant Gordon Anderson of Company A found another trail south along the Dardagna and then up a very steep slope to the top. Lieutenant Anderson had been reconnoitering the trails for his company for a long time, trying to find a suitable route to Monte Mancinello. Finally, a trail was found by Lieutenant Anderson's patrol from Poggiolforato, south across the Dardagna, then up a canyon to the top of the ridge towards Monte Cingia del Bure.
The company was to advance down the ridge and take Monte Mancinello from the south. This trail was designated number 4. The path leading from the bottom of the canyon was protected from fire on the flanks by small trees, but not from the front at the top. The Krauts were also watching us from above in this gorge. A group of pioneers was added to this force to build a bridge over the Dardagna on the night of the attack.

By February 12, 1945, the snow was no longer an obstacle on any of the trails, as it had melted or was so low that it would hold the weight of a man without the need for skis or snowshoes. As a result of this continuous reconnaissance, the following plan was developed to assault the ridge in five columns, using five different routes.
The reinforced F Company had found a path from Madonna dell'Acero to the heights south of Monte Mancinello called Le Piagge. Once they reached the top, they were to protect the left flank of the 1st Battalion. When the ridge was secured by the 1st Battalion, Company F would rejoin their battalion as Division Reserve, and the 1st Battalion would be responsible for its protection on the left flank.
The trail were numbered from right to left with number 1 going to Pizzo di Campiano, number 2 to Monte Cappel Buso, number 3 to Monte Serrasiccia, number 4 to Monte Mancinello, and number 5 to Le Piagge. In Lucca, the companies were organized into "forces." Each company had to select an assault platoon from its best mountain men. This platoon had to be preceded by a team of three or four men who checked the path and could fix the ropes in the required places.
Only routes 1 and 3 required fixed ropes. The teams on the trail were equipped with ropes, pitons, and small hammers. It was decided that the noise of a hammer could be muffled by wrapping it in a cloth. This was tried and proven to be satisfactory. It was also decided to take the opportunity to install fixed ropes, as this would facilitate climbing and prevent accidents due to falls.
2. It was originally planned that the assault platoons would be composed of men selected from the battalion. About 70% of the men in the battalion had been trained at Camp Hale in the Rocky Mountains. Consequently, it was decided that the assault platoons would not be formed at random, but that each company commander would designate a platoon from his company as an assault platoon. This was done, and it boosted the morale and spirit of the men, as they all considered themselves mountaineers, even though not all of them had trained in the mountains.
When they got close to the summit, the squad would allow the assault platoon to pass through it and attack the ridge. Each assault platoon had an A-6 machine gun and at least six Tommy guns. After two weeks of training in Lucca, mainly in a quarry, we discovered that the 30% who had not trained at Camp Hale were quite skilled at moving over rough terrain, as they were young men who wanted to be as good as the rest of the mountaineers. Of course, if we had had to use skis and snowshoes, it would have been a different story. Two weeks of training was not enough to become skiers and learn how to use snowshoes.

• The following is a breakdown of the various forces:

  Force A - Trail No. 1, Objective, Pizzo di Campiano 1 Platoon, Company A (2 A-6 MG5) 2 Stretcher teams 1 Forward observer and team.

  Force B - Trail No. 2, Objective, Monte Cappel Buso 1 Company, Company B 1 MG Platoon, 1st Platoon, Company D, equipped with LMG 2 81 mm mortar sections, 1st and 2nd sections, 3rd Platoon Company D equipped with 1 long barrel and 1 short barrel for 81 mm mortar 2 stretcher bearer teams 1 forward observer and team.

  Force C – Trail No. 3 - 1st Company, Company C 1st MG Platoon, 2nd Platoon, Company D, equipped with LMG 1 81 mm mortar section, 3rd Section, Company D, equipped with two short-barreled 81 mm mortars 3 stretcher bearer teams 1 pioneer team 1 forward observer and team.

  Force D – Trail No. 4 - 1 Company minus one Platoon, Company A 2 stretcher bearer teams 1 Pioneer team 1 Forward observer and team.

  Force E – Trail No. 5 - 1 Company, Company F 1 MG Platoon, 1st Platoon, Company H 81 mm mortar section 2 stretcher bearer teams.

  The forces described above worked together for about two weeks in Lucca. The most rugged terrain in the area was used, and all materials were packed as required for the operation. The men were given additional training and practice in moving along ledges and fully equipped rock faces. A scale sand table of the Mancinello-Campiano ridge was also constructed in Lucca, using up-to-date maps and aerial photographs. A continuous stream of photographs was available, which proved invaluable. The plan was turned into an order, and the order was issued orally seven days before the operation, which had been tentatively set for February 19-20. A separate room had been set up and equipped with the sand table, maps, aerial photographs, and all the reports sent by courier from the La Ca' detachment, commanded by Lieutenant Ware, who continuously patrolled and monitored the paths and their conditions.
  The company commanders of the 1st Battalion used this room for orientation and to issue their orders to all the men in their companies and attached units. As a result, every single man and officer had a thorough and complete understanding of the operation and what their job would be. The sand table and aerial photographs proved invaluable and were partly responsible for the subsequent success of the operation.

  The regiment had the following intelligence information available.
  The 7th Company of the 1044th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 232nd Division, with possible elements from the 14th AT [Anti-tank] Company, occupied a triangle bounded by Pizzo di Campiano, Monte Spigolino, and Fanano, with about 170 men. Two mountain battalions had been reported in Sestola on February 14 by Italian partisans. The force present on the ridge at any given time was estimated at between forty and fifty men. They manned well-dug positions, covering all possible approaches.
  The positions supported each other, the fields of fire were good and mostly downhill, and the observation was excellent. Since the only approaches to the ridge were along narrow paths, a well-placed machine gun could prevent the columns from advancing on any of these pre-selected routes. In order for the attack to be successful, the concentration of troops had to be carried out secretly in close proximity to the enemy with excellent observation.
  Furthermore, the surprise had to be complete, and so it was decided to attack during the night, with the 1st Battalion making the main effort, on four columns and four paths. The battalion's order was very meticulous and prepared in minute detail. The following maps were used: Italy, 1:25000 97 I SE Gaggio Montano, 97 I SW Fanano, 97 II NW Cutigliano, 97 II NE Lizzano in Belvedere. All platoon commanders were in possession of all the maps.
  Since the battalion had been transported near Porretta Terme, it was decided to march to the foot of the Mancinello-Campiano ridge and remain hidden in the houses of the villages of Ca' di Julio, Pianacci, Farnè, Migliante, and Poggiolforato. The reinforced Company F would move to Madonna dell'Acero before the 1st Battalion. All the men were required to remain inside the houses, with guards posted behind all the windows and doors.
  This allowed the men to rest for a whole day after the fourteen-mile march from the DP [Departure Point] in Castelluccio to the starting areas of the attack. It also gave them time for a final review of the attack plan. The 1st Battalion left Lucca on the morning of February 17 by motor vehicle and arrived at the DP in the dark. Once they had crossed the ridge that hid Castelluccio, as all movements during the day were under observation from Monte Belvedere, they continued with a night march.

  On February 15, the Battalion Commander flew over the ridge to carry out a final reconnaissance of any new movements and a final study of the terrain. As a result of this flight, the following plan was drawn up: to the west of Monte Cappel Buso there was a ridge extending from Monte Serrasiccia, which we called Crinale X. As seen from the air and in photographs, this ridge was important because it controlled Monte Cappel Buso which, together with Pizzo di Campiano, had to be held at all costs to deprive the Germans of their observation of the approaches to Monte Belvedere. From Campiano and Buso, our artillery observers could also direct fire at the rear of Belvedere and Monte della Torraccia and across the entire German line from Rocca Corneta, Polla, and Corona. Ridge X was also a good approach route for the counterattack against Monte Serrasiccia. An attack plan was drawn up whereby Force D (Company A minus one platoon) would leave one platoon on Monte Mancinello and relieve Company C and the attacking s on Monte Serrasiccia; Company C would then take over the defense of Ridge X. If Ridge X was occupied by the Germans, an attack would be launched the following day by this company, on the orders of the Regimental Commander via the Commander of the 1st Battalion.
  A very complete and detailed written field order was drawn up together with a cover story. This was distributed four days before the battalion moved, so everyone had enough time to study it. The complete order with cover story followed. As this was the first offensive combat for this unit, which involved a difficult and specific operation, all instructions were very complete and detailed.

  The units arrived in their departure areas on the night of February 16-17. The vehicle engines ran very quietly. The men had an extra forty-eight ammunition clips, for a total of ninety-six clips. This ammunition, as well as extra K rations, had been supplied at Vidiciatico, through which the troops had passed.
  Specific vehicles had preceded the troops so that the mortars, machine guns, and extra ammunition had to be carried by hand by the soldiers for only a distance of four hundred to eight hundred meters. All vehicles had returned under the control of the battalion before dark. This was considered tactically correct in view of the fact that our front was covered by an infantry battalion.

  During the night of February 16-17, a 110 cable had been laid by an advance team, starting from the battalion CP in Farnè and extending to all the departure areas. The cable was laid in the snow and covered. The plan was that each column would have a team of five men assigned to the 130 cable, who would follow the column up the hill and report its position to the battalion every hour. This worked very well. Under no circumstances was the radio to be used, except in an emergency where contact with the enemy was made.

  It was planned that if a column encountered resistance and could not advance during the night, it would call for artillery support at dawn and then attack. The supporting fire consisted of: three field artillery battalions in direct support of the 86th Regiment for the period February 18-19, seven .50 caliber machine guns for direct fire cover in the direction of Pizzo di Campiano and Cappel Buso, positioned at La Ca' and Plinardo.

  The anti-tank battalion (75mm howitzers) of direct fire, positioned at La Ca'; a platoon of medium tanks, in a direct fire position on Pizzo di Campiano, Cappel Buso, and Serrasiccia; a platoon of chemical mortars. These units were all in position on the night of February 18-19 and could fire on the orders of the commander of the 1st Battalion. The battalion commander did not want any adjustment fire, so as not to compromise the element of surprise that was necessary to make the attack a success.
  The complete fire plan was worked out in advance by the battalion commander and Lieutenant Colonel Pearson, commander of the 605th Field Artillery Battalion, our combat artillery team. This plan consisted of a series of numbered fire trations covering the entire ridge, taking into account the particular characteristics of the terrain. The commander of each unit had a forward observer and a team equipped with a cable and radio, who knew the fire plan. As soon as the ridge was taken, the adjustment for defensive fire would begin. Communications with the direct fire weapons were conducted via wire from the Battalion CP. Fortunately, the direct fire weapons were not needed during the initial attack. Only .50 caliber machine guns were used later.
  The chemical mortar platoon was equipped with SCR300 radios, tuned to the same channel as the companies. Many times their fire was directed by the company commander using the SCR300. This was a workaround that, while satisfactory at the time, was not practical. The mortars had supported the troops in stopping counterattacks and were used against German shelters for disruption purposes.
  The battalion's mission was divided into three parts:

  • Conquer the Mancinello-Campiano ridge and occupy, organize, and defend key points on the terrain.
  • Protect the left flank of the 10th Mountain Division in its attack on Monte Belvedere.
  • Provide fire support and assistance, through observation, to the regiment on the left (the 87th) in its attack on Monte Belvedere.

  In line with the third part of the mission, it was decided to bring four .50 caliber machine guns and a 75 mm howitzer to the ridge. The aim was to bring these weapons close to Pizzo di Campiano or Monte Cappel Buso and fire directly on the main German defense line, which stretched from Rocca Corneta, a heavily defended area, through the fortified villages of Polla and Corona. The forward observers could direct fire on that terrain very efficiently in support of the attack. Of course, the first problem was to secure the ridge and defend it from the counterattack that was sure to come. After that, the guns could be brought up. The .50 caliber machine guns were not a problem, but the 75 mm howitzer gave us some concern.

  The attack began at dusk, at 7:30 p.m., on the night of February 18-19. Accompanying the battalion was a platoon of thirty porters from the 86th Regiment Service Company, which followed Company B on Trail 2. The platoon carried four .50 caliber machine guns on their backpacks, mortar ammunition, and .50 caliber ammunition. These weapons were mainly for direct fire on the Rocca Corneta and Polla ridge, in support of the 87th Regiment's attack. A machine gun platoon from Company D was organized to fire these weapons.
  It was planned to use the Alpini Company's mules on Trail 2, which was to be the battalion's main supply route. This was the only route that a mule could pass.
  There was also the 256th QM Transport Company commanded by Captain Fred Burke. These men, laden with backpacks, climbed up trail 3 and supplied Companies A and C and th s with water and ammunition: this road was impassable for mules.
  Company A, on Trail 4, loaded its men with basic ammunition and rations. The plan was to resupply them from Trail 3 and, if necessary, with mules from Trail 2. The battalion had been reinforced by eighty men. Thirty of these were provided by Company D to be organized into a transport platoon for this heavy weapons company. Fifteen were provided by Company B, fifteen by Company C, and twenty by Company A to be used as transporters.
  The entire Headquarters Company, including the cooks, were used as porters and did an excellent job of packing rations, water, and ammunition for their respective units. All supplies and ammunition could only be carried by hand or, on Trail 2, by mules. Evacuation was planned on Trails 2 and 3. Everything would be carried by hand, with rest stations on each route where plasma was available. This was effectively put into practice and no casualties were lost.

  On the second day, after the conquest of the summit of Monte Cappel Buso, Company D of the 10th Mountain Engineer Battalion completed a cableway that ended on a plateau on the steepest part of the slope, more than halfway to the summit. This cableway proved invaluable for supplies and evacuations and was built in a very short time and under difficult conditions. This company directly supported the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment. They had to clear a path meter by meter to bring equipment to the site where the cableway was to be built.

  The attack proceeded according to plan. There was only one contact with the enemy on Trail 2 by Company B. As the assault platoon reached the summit of Monte Cappel Buso, the Germans opened fire with machine guns and submachine guns. Taking advantage of what they had learned earlier, not to return fire at night, the lead echelon continued its advance. Not a single shot was fired by our men. All columns reached their objectives without losses.

  The Germans had retreated to their shelters for the night, leaving no one on sentry duty. The maximum had been gained, the surprise was complete, and important rugged terrain had been taken without a loss. At 01:17 on February 19, Company B's assault platoon was on top of Monte Cappel Buso. The rest of the company was 450 meters below, along the path. At 02:50, the entire Company B was in position on Monte Cappel Buso and was digging in. The machine gun and submachine guns had withdrawn along Ridge X and were firing intermittently. We did not return fire. At 02:58 on February 19, Company A was in position and digging in without having had any contact with the Krauts. At 04:07, the commanders of Companies E and F had defined and established the boundaries of contact and command. At 03:05, Company C was on the summit and digging in. A patrol sent forward had had no contact.
  All this time, fog and clouds had descended.
  Force A on Trail 1, at Pizzo di Campiano, had not yet reported in. This was a very difficult route, and there was concern for this column. At 05:45, Force A reported in to th r via cable. Shortly before daybreak, all units were on the summit. Force A, commanded by Lieutenant Loose of Company A, had a very difficult time. That trail was very dangerous, steep, and long. Early in the evening, a thick fog had descended.
  The cable team and the forward artillery observer had gotten lost and were not found until the next day. The platoon had split up, but by daylight, they had all reached their objective. The artillery radio had refused to work, so the infantry's SCR300 was used to direct artillery fire. This platoon advanced and occupied the Krauts' positions, which had been magnificently prepared and were well covered.
  The Germans had retreated to their houses for the night, so at dawn Lieutenant Loose took a patrol and went to the houses, where he took three prisoners and killed four others. A briefcase of documents was captured along with an 81mm mortar, 165 shells, 20 pairs of binoculars, machine guns, food, and supplies.

  During the early morning, a very thick fog settled over the entire Mancinello-Campiano ridge. This was extremely advantageous for us, allowing us to hide our movements on the ridge and giving us more time to dig and prepare our positions. Before daylight, all units had entrenched themselves on the ridge and were preparing and organizing their positions. Patrols had been sent out on the flanks without coming into contact with the enemy. Radio silence was broken at 06:00 on February 19.

  At 11:00 a.m., the fog began to lift and the artillery and mortars were aimed. The first firefight was sustained by Company A at 11:06 a.m. with some Germans in the vicinity of some houses in Sega. By 12:00, the Company C patrol had contacted Company B on Cappel Buso, and the Company B patrol had contacted Force A on Campiano. Company A had engaged an enemy patrol of twelve men who had approached to within about 180 meters of the machine guns. Six were killed and six surrendered. They were very surprised to find American troops on the ridge. At 1:00 p.m., Company C observed an enemy force of forty men advancing toward Monte Serrasiccia and their positions. The Krauts observed some of our men and saluted them. Our men returned the salute and waited for the Krauts to come within range. Fire was opened at 180 meters, and the column of Germans was disintegrated; at 1:35 p.m., the rest of the Germans launched an attack on Company C from the direction of Ridge X. They were driven back by artillery, mortars, and machine gun fire, and disappeared into a forest on Ridge X.

  On the morning of February 19 at 3:00 a.m., two teams of mules arrived with a transport company of Italian Alpini. They had marched for thirty-two kilometers and were allowed to rest until 10:00 a.m. in Farnè. A howitzer had been brought to Farnè with a Weasel, placed on sleds (this howitzer could be divided into several parts), and an attempt had been made to push them up path 2. The Italian mules were considered too small to carry the tube. The entire AT Platoon of the 1st Battalion was given the mission of positioning the howitzer on the ridge. The sleds were not practical, and the howitzer was eventually loaded onto mules, which carried it to the top of Monte Cappel Buso, where the gun began firing at 4:50 p.m. The mule died a few hours later.

  The four .50 caliber machine guns had been placed near the top of Trail 2, where they were collected by Lieutenant Boudoures and the platoon of porters at 7:25 p.m. The cable between Pizzo di Campiano and Company B was out of order. As the lieutenant was advancing along a knife-edge ridge at Campiano, a German MG wounded the lieutenant and four men. It was later discovered that the Germans had infiltrated between Company B, at Monte Cappel Buso, and Lieutenant Loose's platoon, at Campiano, and had cut the cable. The .50 caliber machine guns were placed on Monte Cappel Buso, from where they could fire not only on Rocca Corneta but also over a wider range.
  During the night between February 19 and 20, Lieutenant Loose's platoon came under counterattack: the first arrived at 6:20 p.m. At that moment, the FO (Forward Observer) called artillery fire on his position. After verification, the fire was opened.
  Thanks to the excellent position built by the Germans, we suffered no losses. This position was a hot spot and the Germans fought hard for it. They tried several times to surround the position but were driven away by artillery fire directed by the platoon's SCR 300 and grenades. Attempts to make contact with this platoon during the night were unsuccessful because the Germans had a strong position covering the knife-edge ridge, which could only be crossed by reinforcements in single file. At noon the following day, Lieutenant Loose's platoon was reinforced by a platoon from Company B. Lieutenant Loose's platoon suffered nine casualties, who were carried by hand to the battalion's first-aid station at Ca' di Giulio. Six men were killed. As a result of the night action, twenty-six enemy dead were counted around the positions.
  From February 19 to February 23, when the 1st Battalion was relieved by the 10th Anti-Tank Battalion, the summit of Pizzo di Campiano was subjected to six counterattacks. The last was in the early morning of February 21, when seventy men attacked from two sides and were repulsed with heavy losses. The .50 caliber machine guns provided covering fire, repelling the ambitious attempt by the Krauts to climb the slope northeast of Pizzo di Campiano. The Division attacked Belvedere at 11:00 p.m. on February 19.

  At 1:10 p.m. on February 20, the plan to capture Ridge X was put into action when enemy troops were seen moving in the woods. Company C attacked, supported by artillery fire, 81 mm mortars from Company B from the Monte Cappel Buso area, and .50 caliber machine guns from Buso. Ridge X was taken and the second part went according to plan. At 11:45 a.m. on February 20, Company F was ordered to descend from the ridge and the 1st Battalion remained responsible for the left flank. For this reason, a platoon was left at Monte Mancinello. Small patrols of Krauts were still wandering around this area, apparently very confused.

  At 8:00 p.m. on February 20, Company E was relieved from its positions at Castello and Sussadello, where it had protected the right flank of the 1st Battalion. Since Monte Belvedere-Corona and Polla had been captured, there was no longer any need for this company. The 2nd Battalion was in reserve. During the afternoon of February 20, the 75 mm howitzer and two .50 caliber machine guns fired on Rocca Corneta, and the garrison surrendered to elements of Company E.

  Counterattacks, whose strength was diminishing, continued along the ridge on February 20, 21, and 22. They ranged from patrols of ten men to companies of seventy to eighty men. In no case did they ever reach our positions. Several times they used the trick of the Red Cross flag to enter our positions, but this failed. Small groups of three or four men were caught in artillery and mortar fire, which was very effective in open spaces.

  The installation of the cable car, built by Company D of the 10th Engineer Battalion, was a great help for supplies and evacuation. The transport by hand of the 256th QM Company and the evacuation of the wounded down Trail 3 was excellent. The Service Company's porter platoon carried supplies and ammunition to the top and brought down the wounded and dead. The men of the Headquarters Company were also of great assistance, and all carried packs to exhaustion, some making as many as three trips in twenty-four hours. By February 21, 10 ¾ tons of ammunition had been brought to the ridge, and there was never a shortage of ammunition, rations, or water. The small Italian mules performed quartermaster duties, although the battalion commander deemed it necessary to have their work supervised by four or five mule handlers, along with some American non-commissioned officers who spoke Italian, to keep them moving.

  On February 23, the 1st Battalion of the 86th Regiment was relieved by the Anti-Tank Battalion. The objective had been captured without losses, but the counterattacks took a toll of seventeen dead, thirty-eight wounded, and three missing. Thanks to the use of plasma, none of the wounded were lost, although in some cases it took six to twelve hours to bring a casualty down from the ridge. When the cableway was operational, this time was reduced to four hours, sometimes two.

  Interrogations of prisoners revealed that the 7th Company of the 1044th Rifle Regiment of the 232nd Division held the ridge. This company was relieved on February 19 by two companies of the 4th Mountain Battalion. A third company of this mountain battalion was in Sestola. These were probably the seventy-five men that the P-47s strafed on the road to Fanano. The 7th Company suffered heavy losses in the fighting on February 19-20.
  Company F wiped out a column of thirty Germans with machine guns, so it can be assumed that the 4th Battalion had ceased to exist as an organized fighting force. At no point did they expect an attack on the ridge, and it came as a complete surprise as it was considered too rugged, a difficult obstacle for a large unit to take. The success of this operation, a prelude to the Monte Belvedere operation and the final push towards the Po and the Alps, can be attributed to the following reasons:

  • 70% of the personnel were trained in the American Rocky Mountains. They were not afraid of the rough, precipitous, and difficult terrain.
  • Preventive reconnaissance of the target for approach routes by officers and soldiers who knew the mountains.
  • A complex plan made easy by detailed orders, the use of 'sand tables', aerial photographs, and the thorough teaching of the plans to every man and officer in the battalion through the use of 'sand tables' and aerial photographs.
  • Aerial reconnaissance by commanders of terrain that could not be observed by ground reconnaissance.
  • A period of training on terrain as similar as possible to that on which operations would take place.
  • Night movements during both the approach and attack phases.
  • Physical fitness and endurance, which was the most difficult obstacle to overcome initially.
  • High morale and esprit de corps among the men, who knew they were specialized in mountain equipment and that when given a target, they would do their best to achieve it in order to justify their specialized training.

  Source: The Riva Ridge Operation Report of Lt. Col. Henry J. Hampton, June 12, 1945