ATTACK ON MONTE BELVEDERE

D-Day for the attack on Monte Belvedere and the Monte della Torraccia ridge was set for February 19, but the grand plan in which this battalion participated was put into action on February 18, or D-1. The preliminary part of the main attack was directed against Pizzo Di Campiano and the Monte Serrasiccia ridge, with the aim of both unbalancing the enemy's defenses and gaining the high ground from which to observe the subsequent attack on Belvedere itself.

The troops of the 10th Mountain Division, in collaboration with the Brazilian forces of the 1st Infantry Division, F.E.B.², carried out the main offensive, but the action on "D"-1 was conducted exclusively by the 86th Regiment belonging to the 10th Mountain Division. In both periods, all units supporting the infantry were under the direct command of the 751st Tank Battalion Headquarters. During "D"-1, a platoon of medium tanks³  with 76 mm guns, plus a platoon of tank destroyers from Company "A" of the 701st TD Battalion⁴ , provided fire support for the infantry troops attacking the Monte Mancinello and Pizzo di Campiano area.

The tanks were positioned at L482142 [La Cà], L473138 [between Torlaino and Poggiolforato] and L471133 [south of Poggiolforato towards Castellina]; the TDs at L493141 [halfway between Vidiciatico and La Cà] and L488152 [on the road between Vidiciatico and Farnè near C. Vescovo]. At the end of the mission, the TD platoon remained in that area, but the tank platoon returned under the control of its main company (Company "B" of the 751st Tank Battalion) to prepare to support the infantry attack planned for the following morning against Monte Belvedere. In addition to the entire tank battalion, Company "A," part of the 701st TD Battalion, was placed under the command of this headquarters to supplement the support role that the tanks were to assume.

For the D-Day action, the entire armored force had been divided into five different "forces," each of which was to be deployed in a different sector of the front and in support of different elements of the infantry. The "Froman Force," commanded by 1st Lieutenant Floyd N. Froman of Company "B" of the 751st Tank Battalion, consisted of two platoons of medium tanks from Company "B" and one platoon of light tanks from Company "D" of the 751st Tank Battalion. This force was to support the attack of the 87th Mountain Regiment, allowing the medium tank platoon and the light tank platoon to be used to fire on the C. Florio line (L505174), C. Valle (L502178), and Polla (L508176), while the other platoon of medium tanks was kept in reserve to be used when the infantry moved towards Valpiana (L518183).
This reserve platoon of medium tanks was the same platoon that had supported the assault on Pizzo di Campiano and had moved to positions near L471141 - L472137 to prepare for its new mission. At the same time, the 3rd Platoon of Company "B" had moved into firing positions at L508166 [south of Polla], from wher sufficient fields of fire could be obtained to provide adequate support to the advancing infantry. The 1st Platoon of Company "D" of the 751st Tank Battalion, the light tank platoon attached to the Froman Force, was stationed near Querciola (L512162) to serve as an advance position until the attack moved through.
The second force, under the command of 1st Lieutenant Thomas J. Murphy of Company "D," consisting of the 2nd Medium Tank Platoon of Company "B" and the 3rd Light Tank Platoon of Company "D," supported the attack of the 85th Mountain Regiment as it advanced across the plateau from Monte Belvedere (L523177) towards Monte della Torraccia (L558203). These platoons assembled near Querciola but moved with the infantry advance to L520170 [at the foot of Monte Belvedere between Polla and the Santa Filomena ridge] during the advance towards the summit of Monte Belvedere on the first day of the attack.
A third force consisted of the 1st and 3rd Platoons of Company "C." The 751st Tank Battalion and the 2nd Platoon of Company "D," commanded by Captain Alan R. Guttridge, were assigned to support the 86th Mountain Regiment to fire, on orders from that battalion headquarters, on positions along the ridge between Monte Belvedere and Monte Castello. The 1st Platoon was in firing positions at L565158 [near Cà Naldi south of Gaggio Montano], the 3rd Platoon at L548167 [western outskirts of Gaggio Montano] and the 2nd Platoon of Company "D" at L546182 [on the ridge just east of Rochidoso].
The fourth and fifth forces were both under the operational control of Captain Lee E. Neville of Company "A," but the fourth was commanded directly by Captain Ira P. Harrington of this battalion and consisted of the 2nd Platoon of Company "C" and a platoon of TDs from the 701st TD Battalion. The mission of this group was to support the attack of the 1st Brazilian Infantry Division (B.E.F.) against Monte Castello (L567192) from the firing position at Bombiana (L585183). The fifth force consisted of the three tank platoons of Company "A" with the same mission as the fourth group, but firing from Riola (L650198). All of the battalion's assault weapons, assembled into a single platoon and commanded by 1st Lieutenant Joseph W. Lengyel, were used in an artillery role at L611166 [on the Reno River bank about halfway between Silla and Marano], under the direction of the 424th Field Artillery Group. The mortar platoon was not employed as a unit.

Such were the positions of all units assigned and attached to this battalion at H-hour on D-Day, February 19, 1945.

As the attack advanced on the left flank, the 3rd Platoon of Company "B" and the 1st Platoon of Company "D" remained in their previously selected support positions.
However, on February 20, the 1st Platoon of Company "B" was moved through Corona to Valpiana (L519983) to reinforce the infantry troops occupying the latter village. During this movement, the platoon encountered extensive minefields in the vicinity of Corona. Although such a situation had been contemplated and the engineers had carried out a check before the tanks began their advance, it was impossible to detect and remove all the mines. As a result, two tanks from the 1st Platoon were damaged. When the road was sufficiently cleared to allow the tanks to continue advancing, the platoon moved to Valpiana, occupied a good defensive position, and helped the infantry consolidate the newly conquered terrain.
Immediately to the right of this sector, Murphy Force was reduced to a platoon of medium tanks, the 2nd Platoon of Company "B." The 3rd Platoon of Company "D," originally part of this group, was transferred to Force Guttridge on February 20 and moved to the vicinity of Gaggio Montano (L551167). The same change was made in the situation of the 1st Platoon of Company "D" when, after the attack began, it was removed from the control of Froman Force. As the 2nd Platoon of Company "B" climbed the slopes of Mount Belvedere, its advance was severely hampered by mines that were even more densely placed than those found in the Corona area.
The platoon commander's tank was completely destroyed, but the platoon managed to gain the upper hand on the mountain and reached a position east of the summit at 212200A, immediately behind the front-line infantry positions.
As the 86th Mountain Regiment advanced in its attack on the ridge from Mount Belvedere to Mount Castello, Guttridge Force was ordered to move from its original firing positions towards the Chapel of Ronchidoso (L544186). This required a great deal of work on the part of the engineers of the 10th Mountain Division, but with their help, the vehicles succeeded in a seemingly hopeless mission. Contact with the infantry was made ahead of schedule, and the tanks reinforced the advanced positions against the inevitable counterattacks. Harrington and Neville's forces did not take part in the initial stages of the attack.

The 1st Infantry Division, BEF, did not launch its advance until American units reached Hill 1053 (L548189) [about halfway along the ridge between Ronchidoso and Monte della Torraccia]. Both of these armored groups were therefore ready to provide defensive fire in case of a counterattack and to engage targets of opportunity on call or observation.
When Brazilian troops occupied Monte Castello, the 2nd Platoon of Company "C" moved from its position at Bombiana towards Abetaia (L577190) to act as a roadblock against a possible counterattack. In doing so, one tank hit a mine and was partially damaged. In this action, the tank crews of this platoon were credited with the capture of six prisoners.

Throughout the action undertaken by these five armored forces, the main obstacles to their advance proved to be mines. Considering that the enemy had had at least three months to prepare its defensive positions, it had carefully organized its terrain. In the vicinity of Corona and Monte Belvedere, box mines, Teller mines, and Toff mines were laid with a diabolical intelligence rarely encountered by this unit. Furthermore, across the ridge heights, anti-personnel mines fixed with stakes were laid in such an intricate pattern that infantry advance was virtually impossible without constant use of Bangalore tubes and other demolition to clear a path. In many cases, these stake mines were laid at intervals of only one and a half meters.
In the right sector, around Abetaia, this battalion encountered for the first time a variation of the Toff mine made entirely of pressed papier-mâché and glass, with only a small piece of metal used as a fuse.

After taking up their assigned positions along the ridge on the Belvedere hill, the tank crews made the most of their excellent vantage point and provided splendid reports of their actions and their weapons. In addition to carrying out countless fire missions, thanks to their observation of enemy personnel and movements, they were credited with silencing an 88 mm battery and destroying two identified Mark IV tanks. §

Sometimes targets were detected that could not be reached by the weapons available on the tanks, so the tank crews took on the role of observers, adjusting the artillery fire that resulted in the destruction of a great deal of enemy equipment.

Communications during the operation followed routine procedures within the battalion [communications] network, but it was imperative that the various armored groups maintain constant contact with the infantry troops they were supporting. This required the use of SCR 300⁵ to find a common frequency between the infantry and the tanks. Only recently has the tank units been authorized to be equipped with these SCR 300s. Previously, with only the standard SCR 508, 528, or 538 available, the tank units were seriously disadvantaged by the lack of communications between infantry and tanks.
Although it had been impossible to obtain the entire contingent of SCR 300s authorized for the battalion, the few with which the tank companies were equipped proved invaluable. When we receive the full allocation, there will be enough sets to provide seven for each of the four companies in line. At present, only half that number is available.
In addition to radio contact, the commander of each armored unit maintained a personal connection with the infantry headquarters he supported. The battalion headquarters had a representative at the command post of the 10th Mountain Division with whom communication by cable was, of course, constant.

The supply problem was compounded by the inaccessible positions in which the tanks were located. Before the platoons of Company "C" and Company "D" could be resupplied at Cappella di Ronchidoso (L542187), fifteen mules had to be obtained to carry supplies from the last point accessible to vehicles. The constant deterioration of the ground due to thawing created a growing problem, so much so that the 2nd Platoon of Company "B," on the summit of Monte Belvedere, had to call in mules to carry supplies. Apart from these exceptions, the supply procedure remained normal.

Maintenance was left entirely to the relevant sections of the companies. When the two tanks of Company "B" were lost at Corona due to mines, they were evacuated by the battalion maintenance unit, but there were no other cases that the companies were unable to handle. Personnel losses were light, considering the action in which the unit was engaged. When the tank of the leader of 2nd Platoon, belonging to Company "B," was destroyed by mines on the approach to Monte Belvedere, the platoon leader and one member of his crew were thrown out of the vehicle by the explosion, but the remaining three crew members were killed.

In other cases, most personnel losses were caused by artillery fire once the tanks had reached their final positions. The battalion executive officer was killed during an inspection of the forward positions. Supervision by the officers in charge of supplies and maintenance organization had always been prompt, and both the battalion's S-4, Captain Wendell M. Moyer, and 1st Lieutenant James S. Rowley, in charge of maintenance for Company "C," were injured. At the start of the attack, the force assigned to the battalion was slightly less than authorized, but the losses suffered did not critically affect its combat efficiency. We believe that, during this operation, the concerted action between the infantry and armored units achieved a high standard. At no time were the troops on foot without armored support during their approach to their objective. Once the objectives were reached and the tanks were in vulnerable forward positions, they always had close protection from the infantry.

CASTEL D'AIANO
There was only one way to get to Castel d'Aiano, and the road wound through a narrow corridor at the end of which was the objective.
With each advance, the need to occupy the high ground to protect the flanks had probably become the basic premise of operations in Italy, and so it was here too.
But there was a further difficulty. Before the advance could begin, the approach paths had to be cleared, and the Monte Belvedere - Monte Castello ridge dominated the entrance to the valley leading to Castel d'Aiano. The only road wound its way through a precipitous gorge in Malandrone (L571197), and as long as the enemy occupied the plateau directly overlooking the gorge, it was only a matter of pulling the cord to unleash deadly fire on the road.

In reality, the battle for Castel d'Aiano began on February 18 when the assault on Monte Belvedere was launched.

D-Day was scheduled for March 1, 1945, with H-hour set for 7:00 a.m.

The 10th Mountain Division, with the support of armored vehicles and artillery, was to attack with two regiments straddling the road. The artillery was to open the attack with a 20-minute barrage before H-hour. The armored vehicles, Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion, Companies "B" and "C" of the 701st TD Battalion, and Company "D" of the 126th Engineer Battalion, all under the command of the 751st Tank Battalion, were to advance at "H" hour together with the infantry. Air support was to be directed against specific targets consisting of road junctions, bridges, known enemy positions, and motor transport. But things did not go this way, as the attack was postponed twice before finally taking place on March 3.

The plan of operations called for the tanks and TD companies to be divided into two separate forces. The commanding officer of Company "B" of the 701st TD Battalion was given control, in addition to his own company, of a platoon from Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion, positioned in support of the 86th Mountain Regiment, which was to attack to the left of the road. The force deployed to the right of the road consisted of two platoons, Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion and Company "C" of the 701st TD Battalion, which supported the 87th Mountain Regiment. The commanding officer of Company "C" of the 701st TD Battalion led this group.
For clarity, we will refer to the force on the left side of the road as "Force Ault" and the force on the right side as "Force Patch." In addition, at Casa Di Bombiana (L587190), a firebase was formed consisting of the 2nd Platoon of Company "C" of the 751st Tank Battalion and the 1st Platoon of Company "A" of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion. In front of them lay an excellent field of fire, and they were able to cover the movement of the first units as they crossed the starting line.
Once the infantry had taken and secured the objectives, the tank positions lost their advantage and the platoons were moved. It was not envisaged that the "Patch Force" would be engaged in action until the infantry had occupied and secured the objectives, at which point a tank platoon was to join an infantry company to form a roadblock at Pietra Colora (L596221). Before the action began, Company C of the 701st TD Battalion was employed as artillery and remained in position on alert, ready to move at two hours' notice. When the time came, its mission was to head to Castel d'Aiano with the 85th Mountain Regiment. However, the "Ault Force" was ready to move with the infantry from the start of the attack, jumping from position to position, advancing constantly, always ready to attack any target that could delay the advance of the troops on foot. Captain Ault moved his "force" and the two tank platoons that were to go with Captain Patch to a rendezvous area at L573175 [on the road from Gaggio Montano to the junction for Bombiana at Ca' Bertè] at 01:30 on the morning of March 3. From that area, the TDs, preceded by two platoons of tanks, left the following morning in time to be at the starting line by 07:00.

The advance of the infantry was also followed by armored vehicles, but the nature of the terrain forced the vehicles to follow routes along the road. Thanks to continuous close reconnaissance, carried out just behind the infantry front line, the commanders of the armored vehicles were able to find excellent positions from which to obtain complete fields of fire. In this way, the infantry, while still on the move, had constant and immediate support; the tanks and TDs were able to move quickly into defensive support positions once the objectives were occupied and the consolidation of positions had begun.

The attack had an inauspicious start further back; during the approach to the starting line, even before coming under German artillery fire at Malandrone, a tank from Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion went off the road, got stuck in the mud, and was put out of action. The remaining four tanks continued their march and, fortunately, this turned out to be a typical case of a bad start leading to a good ending. The infantry's first objective was Monte Terminale and the enemy stronghold at Jola (L566218), both of which had to be cleared before proceeding to other objectives.
Shortly after the advance began, the remaining four vehicles of the lead tank platoon left the road and began crossing the ridge towards Monte della Vedetta (L1585223). This proved to be an unfortunate move, as the terrain was completely unsuitable. One tank reached L572209, another went to L574208, and two even climbed to L579217, but the three vehicles got stuck and remained immobilized for most of the day. Thanks to the remarkable work carried out by the tank company's maintenance section, the vehicles were back in action in record time, but their valuable firepower was lost for several hours.
The only tank still mobile was used by Captain Visher, commanding officer of Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion, to lead the advancing armored column. Meanwhile, the infantry had been blocked at Monte Terminale by determined resistance from Jola (L566218). The Germans had barricaded themselves in cellars and were firing from houses that had been turned into miniature fortresses. Armored vehicles were urgently requested, so the TD platoon leading the advance moved to the 908 road junction (L569216) [the junction leading to the village of Jola on the road from Gaggio Montano to Castel d'Aiano], from where it could effectively enter the village and liberate it from the enemy. Once the most urgent work was completed, the platoon remained in the village until it was called upon, the following afternoon, to take up defensive positions along the infantry line on another target.

While the fighting for Jola was underway, progress on the right was going well. The infantry of the 87th Mountain Regiment had occupied one objective and was still a long way from another. Since the armored unit had been unable to follow them along the ridge, the troops made their own way along Monte della Vedetta and into the village of Pietra Colora (L570221), where a checkpoint was established, reinforced by a platoon of tanks that had moved north of the starting line as early as 9:30 a.m. It took little time to carry out the operation, and the enemy opposition was not intense, but the terrain was difficult for the Doughboys^(7),who were only able to enter Pietra Colora in the late afternoon. To protect their advanced positions, they needed additional tanks, which did not move very quickly because, to reach Pietra Colora, they were forced to move north along the main road to the junction with the road to Canevaccia (L587236) and then turn southeast towards Pietra Colora.
Securing the hills around the junction and making it defensible took the rest of the day.
When night fell, there was a platoon of TDs in Jola and two other platoons with a platoon of tanks south of the junction, unable to do anything but wait. That night, the infantry in Pietra Colora requested tank support for their checkpoint, but the tanks could not get there. Even when they were able to go to Pietra Colora, they were again stopped on their way to their objective, this time by demolition and mines. The engineers began work immediately, but it was a big job and took time.
Before the platoon could advance, its mission changed and it was ordered to move to L600237 [junction on the "Sprilla road" east of Monte Acidola]. The 1st Infantry Division, B.E.F., had attacked in conjunction with the 10th Mountain Division, occupying Santa Maria Villiana (L610215) and had come so close to Pietra Colora that the presence of armored vehicles at the checkpoint was no longer necessary.

The attack continued at 08:00 on the morning of March 4, with the immediate objectives being Monte Acidola (L597231) and Bacucco (L605244). In preparation for the penetration expected that day, Company "C" of the 701st TD Battalion moved before dawn from its artillery positions to the assembly area at L571176 [on the road between Gaggio Montano and the Abetaia junction at Cà Bertè] and prepared to lead the advance of all forces to Castel d'Aiano, if possible. Monte Acidola was occupied by 9:00 a.m.; by liberating and making the Canevaccia junction sufficiently usable, the TD company was able to continue on to Castel d'Aiano.

One of the roads radiating from Canevaccia led to Montese, a known center of enemy activity, and it was imperative that the approach roads to it be under artillery fire control. Two TD platoons from Company "B" of the 701st TD Battalion left the main road near Sassomolare (L585242) with the intention that one of them should continue towards hill 788 (L588600) while the other should occupy the points it deemed most appropriate in Sassomolare. The platoons waited there until Hill 788 was in our hands, then the vehicles began the ascent.

But once again, the terrain proved to be the deciding factor, and it wasn't long before maintenance crews were busy recovering bogged-down tanks and returning vehicles to action. It was a time-consuming job that lasted all night, and the next morning the platoon returned to L588242, the point from which it had started. The terrain was proving difficult for the infantry, and on the morning of March 4, it became clear that the attack on Castel d'Aiano during the night had not facilitated the advance enough to allow armored vehicles to enter the town. The "Patch Force" continued north, firing at houses, bringing enemy infantry out into the open and providing countless prisoners for our Doughboys, while making plans to take up position at Madonna di Brasa (L600247) with sufficient force to cover the entire village and all the roads leading to it.

Movement northward, even on the road, was slow. Engineers had to work constantly to clear a path of mines, and at L596246 [just before Madonna di Brasa] they found a blown-up bridge that delayed the column all night. The job was too big to be handled on the spot by the engineers working with the tanks, and assistance was requested. This was slow in coming, and the bulldozer from Company C of the 751st Tank Battalion was sent to the scene. The road surface was hard, and the tank-dozer could do little to break it up and fill the holes. Normal engineer equipment was needed, so another urgent request was made, and work finally began.

The following morning, at 08:00, a message from the commander of Company "A" of the 760th Tank Battalion reported that four tanks had finally been able to enter Madonna di Brasa and occupy good firing positions. At the end of the second day, the tank platoon, originally headed for Pietra Colora, was at Sprilla (L600237), and the TD platoon occupying Jola had moved to L558225 [ridge in the Gennarelli area of Jola], the northernmost point of the objective. From there, it was possible to move to firing positions on the crest of the ridge and fire on both Maserno (L551229) and Montese (L558245).

A platoon of tanks and the TD company attempting to enter Madonna di Brasa were deployed near the main road among the rubble at L596245 [just south of Madonna di Brasa] and the intersection at L586236 [Canevaccia]. A platoon of tanks and two platoons of TDs were in position near L588242 [Sassomolare], from where they covered the advance of the "Forza Patch" as it moved north.

That night, the 85th Mountain Regiment moved into position to encircle Castel d'Aiano on the morning of March 5 and attack several targets. They would be supported by fire from Captain Patch's group of vehicles, and once all the higher ground had been secured, a battalion of the 87th Mountain Regiment and armored forces would enter Castel d'Aiano, consolidating the position with checkpoints on all access roads to the village.

At 08:00, after the usual 20-minute artillery barrage, the infantry surged forward to occupy their assigned objectives, encountering considerably more intense opposition than on the previous two days. They did not know it at the time, but that morning, facing them were elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, quite different from the 232nd Infantry Division or the 114th Jäger Division. The greatest difficulty was encountered in approaching the village of Famaticcia (L611262); so the fire of the tanks and TDs was directed at the target, successfully eliminating it. The tank platoon on the far right of Sprilla [an old path that ran from west to east at the northern base of Monte Acidola, then turned north and headed towards Castel d'Aiano] began to move at dawn through Pianestrina (L610238) and then north to join Company "C" of the 701st TD Battalion at Castel d'Aiano.
After passing Pianestrina, a communication arrived from the infantry requesting fire on the enemy strongholds that were blocking their advance on Monte della Castellana. The mission was completed and the platoon continued, but for the second time the platoon's mission changed and it was ordered to remain in Pianestrina to provide security on the road leading to Castel d'Aiano from the southeast.
The situation in Castel d'Aiano was being resolved, so Captain Patch was able to send in a few vehicles, encountering little opposition. His command vehicle and the command tank of Company 'A' of the 760th Tank Battalion, with a platoon of TDs, entered the village at 11:00 a.m. and proceeded to sweep it as thoroughly as possible. Of course, infantry was requested immediately, but the battalion that was to occupy the village did not move until 2:06 p.m. and was then delayed by resistance encountered at L607254 [a few hundred meters before the village of Castel d'Aiano]. By 4:30 p.m., it was clear that troops would not be available that night as an outpost for the armored forces.
Enemy infantry was sighted on the hill behind the village and the vehicles withdrew to their previously occupied positions at Madonna Di Brasa. Somehow, somewhere along the line, an excellent opportunity to destroy or capture enemy personnel and equipment had been lost because the infantry was unable to exploit the opportunity presented by the armored penetration.

While the infantry consolidated its positions on the morning of March 5, a platoon of TDs from Company "B" of the 701st TD Battalion headed for Le Borre - L573230 - and waited there for the request from the infantry battalion commander before climbing to the top of the ridge after sunset. However, in the afternoon, the division commander ordered the platoon to take up position, and at 4:00 p.m., it headed for the vicinity of L570235 [ridge west of the Canevaccia crossroads]. Another change occurred when the platoon moved to the vicinity of Chirichella (L584237) [about 100 meters after the Canevaccia crossroads on the road leading to Montese] to form a roadblock towards Montese. The tank platoon originally near Sassomolare remained in place.

At the end of the third day, the position of the armored forces was slightly different from that at the end of the second day. The "Patch Force" was still south of Castel d'Aiano. A platoon of tanks was at L609244, near Pianestrina, and others were on guard duty at L587242 [Sassomolare]. Two platoons of Company "B" of the 701st TD Battalion were in defensive positions at L570235 [along the ridge west of the Canevaccia crossroads] and at L584237 [a few dozen meters west of the Canevaccia crossroads]. The other platoon planned to move on the morning of March 6 from Jola (L567219) because its firing positions at the top of the ridge had become inaccessible and the vehicles were needed in a position that allowed for greater mobility.

During the night between March 5 and 6, the infantrymen had entered Castel d'Aiano and liberated it.
The village was under intense [German] artillery and mortar fire but was firmly held, and it was imperative that roadblocks be formed to the west, north, and east sides of the village. The "Patch Force" had moved in on the morning of March 6 and set to work, with the help of the engineers, to make the place impenetrable from the road. Their mission had been accomplished. This is the story of the operational execution of the plan. It was successful; to be precise and to appreciate the degree of success achieved, another factor must be understood.

It is necessary to recall once again the attack on Monte Belvedere. The 232nd Infantry Division had held the heights east of Belvedere for many months. It had stubbornly resisted our patrols and small position adjustments, having no intention of surrendering without a fight. But fortunately, our attack was planned, intentionally or inadvertently, when a regiment of the 232nd Division was being replaced by the 741st Regiment of the 114th Jäger Division. The new regiment had been marching from the east for about a week. The men were tired and their equipment was poor; morale was low. The unit was thrown into the line as a reserve, with no opportunity for orientation. The result was that the defense of the positions on the ground fell apart. History repeated itself at Castel d'Aiano.
When the attack finally began, it was postponed for a good reason that only became apparent later. Weather conditions were one reason, but it is not known if they were the main one. Just under 48 hours before the attack on March 3, the 721st Regiment of the 114th Division had arrived in the sector to replace additional elements of the 232nd Division.

Our second offensive resulted in a complete defeat for the enemy infantry, and once again the defense from the positions on the ground collapsed. In the first two days, prisoners flocked in their hundreds, eager to surrender.
On the third day, the situation was completely reversed. As if it were two different battles on two different fronts, the nature of the [German] opposition changed. Troops from the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division had arrived on the scene and entered the fray. Their resistance was stiff, but it was too late.
By that time, we were so focused on our objective that they could no longer prevent our success. Armored units had been spotted on the first day of the attack as our advance elements approached the Canevaccia crossroads. Three tanks were reported retreating north, but circumstances later indicated that these were assault guns from the 914th Assault Gun Battalion. Two long columns of armored vehicles were reported approaching from the northeast on the night of March 4-5, but no attack developed.

At the time of writing, there is no indication that the enemy intends to engage its armored vehicles in a large-scale counterattack. There have been no threats in limited areas either. In one or two isolated cases, we were targeted by anti-tank fire ; during the attack, the main opposition came from intense artillery and mortar fire, and the newly captured positions were constantly harassed. As usual, apart from the perpetually rough terrain, armored vehicles were delayed by mines and demolition.
Once again, the need for constant liaison between infantry and armored support vehicles was evident. While during the Monte Belvedere action some vehicles in this battalion had SCR300s and could contact the infantry, in this latest mission the armored vehicles were not equipped with them. The result was that this headquarters was called upon to provide liaison officers. One was at division headquarters, which is normal, but when the 85th Regiment prepared to attack, two additional officers were requested, one for each of the assault battalions. The request was impossible to fulfill, and an officer from these headquarters at the regiment headquarters had to be replaced. This organization was far from satisfactory due to the delay caused by requests for clarification on the positions and methods for directing the fire of the guns, coming from the battalion to the regiment and then forwarded to the armored vehicles for execution. In one case, by the time the request to fire on three targets was made, the infantry had already occupied the first two and only the third could be engaged. With direct radio contact between the infantry and armored vehicles, the situation would have been 100% resolved.
Supply and maintenance were normal. The two companies of the 701st TD Battalion were served by their main units, and simple arrangements were made whereby this Headquarters supplied Company 'A' of the 760th Tank Battalion.
Ultimately, during the period in which this Headquarters supported the 10th Mountain Division, coordination and cooperation were of a high standard.
A platoon of division engineers was an integral part of each of the two armored groups, and a third platoon was constantly busy on the main supply road. They suffered many casualties, but the support they provided allowed the armored vehicles to go where they would otherwise have had to stop. The work of the three armored companies involved was admirable.
Although directed by headquarters entirely foreign to them and one without troops involved, the commanders made every effort to accomplish their mission and did so with commendable spirit. No vehicles were lost; casualties among personnel were negligible. Their performance was truly admirable.

/s/ C. J. Madden (from JNO) /t/ C. J. Madden, Major, 751st Tank Battalion, Commander.

NOTES:
1 Positions were derived from original contemporary maps used by the US Army.
2 F.E.B.: Força Expedicionária Brasileira (Brazilian Expeditionary Force), of which the 1st Infantry Division was a part.
3 Sherman M4A1, also called Sherman I by the British. The 751st Tank Battalion was also equipped with Sherman M4s with 75mm guns and Stuart M5A1s, known as light tanks, with 75mm guns.
4 TD: Tank Destroyer. The 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion was equipped with the M10 model with a 76mm M7 gun, the M8 armored car with a 37mm gun, and the M20.
5 The SCR300 was the standard transceiver for infantry units in the field. Manufactured by Motorola, it was channelized and operated between 40 and 48 MHz.
6 The SCR 508 was a short-range transceiver used by armored forces between command and tanks. It operated between 20 and 27.9 MHz with 10 frequency presets. The SCR 528 variant included the transmitter and a single receiver, and the SCR 538 variant included a receiver and a BC 605 amplifier for the intercom.
7 Literally "dough boys." It is not known exactly how US soldiers in World War I were given this nickname, which was the most commonly used term to refer to troops deployed in Europe as part of the American Expeditionary Forces. There are a variety of theories about the origins of the nickname. According to one explanation, the term dates back to the Mexican War of 1846-48, when American infantrymen made long marches over dusty terrain, giving the impression of being covered in flour or dough.

Source: Headquarters 751st Tank Battalion. Report of action – Mt. Belvedere attack – Castel d’Aiano. Major C.J. Madden, 751st Tank Bn, Commanding.